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HOW THIS REPORT IS ORGANIZED 
The Executive Summary provides a high-level overview of findings, insights, policy options and 
conclusions, while the Introduction discusses the rationale for the report, its key research 
questions and its overall approach.  A Methodology and Data segment details the research 
techniques and assumptions.   
The report is then divided into five sections: 
Section I explains the financing of fringe benefits in Milwaukee County, which has become 
perhaps the key financial issue facing Milwaukee County government, and an issue that any 
potential government restructuring must address.  This section provides historical analysis, a 
glimpse into future trends and discussion of the county’s methodology for allocating and 
budgeting fringe benefit costs, including so-called “legacy costs” associated with retirees. 
Section II contains subsections that break down and analyze county government’s major 
functions, as well as a concluding subsection that briefly analyzes remaining functions.  These 
subsections discuss the legal and programmatic rationales that have placed these functions in 
Milwaukee County government, the financial considerations that would come into play should 
policymakers wish to consider housing them in an alternative government body, and the pros, 
cons and logistical questions associated with alternative entities.  Alternative models found in 
other states provide context and perspective. 
Section III provides broad financial models of three scenarios for alternative structures for 
Milwaukee County government. 
Section IV describes the experience of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in eliminating 
several of its county governments in the late 1990s.  It summarizes the events that led to the 
decision to eliminate several county governments, the mechanics of the enabling legislation, and 
insights from this experience that might apply to Milwaukee County. 
Section V summarizes the report’s key findings and presents a set of step-by-step policy options 
for policymakers to consider as they grapple with the financial problems and governance 
challenges facing Milwaukee County government. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Milwaukee County government faces immediate and substantial fiscal and programmatic 
challenges.  A combination of stagnant state and local revenues, skyrocketing pension and health 
care obligations, and several successive years of severe budgetary stress have left it weakened in 
virtually all areas.  Meanwhile, as its fiscal pressures worsen and its service levels erode, it 
operates with no long-range plan for digging its way out. 
The urgency of this matter cannot be overstated.  The county’s structural deficit – defined as the 
gap between expenditure needs and anticipated revenues – is projected to grow from $48 million 
in 2011 to more than $106 million by 2014, despite several successive years of significant 
expenditure and staff reductions and anticipation of significant wage and benefit concessions in 
2010.  This projection is the clearest indication yet that the county’s finances are crumbling and 
that valued services in areas like parks, transit, mental health and public safety face severe 
degradation without prompt and concerted action.    
This action could take any of several forms, including the complete elimination of Milwaukee 
County government.  This report, commissioned by the Greater Milwaukee Committee, provides 
detailed analysis and perspective on the complex issues surrounding that option, as well as other 
potential structural changes.  Among other things, it explores the legal and logistical challenges 
involved with eliminating a $1.4 billion government with 5,500 full-time employees; alternative 
administrative structures used by other metropolitan areas to deliver services now housed in 
Milwaukee County; and whether radical restructuring would save taxpayer dollars and improve 
service quality.   
The report begins by quantifying and analyzing perhaps the largest component of Milwaukee 
County’s budget difficulties: its pension and health care obligations to its retirees, also known as 
“legacy costs.”  Next, it analyzes the budgets of each of the critical functions of county 
government and potential alternative homes for each function.  The report then models and 
analyzes what county government would look like under three different restructuring scenarios, 
including one in which Milwaukee County government is eliminated entirely.  After a discussion 
of Massachusetts’ experience with abolishing county governments, the report closes with a series 
of policy options.  
The overall intent of this report is to provide community leaders and elected officials with a level 
of analysis that will allow them to reasonably debate whether downsizing or eliminating 
Milwaukee County government is a viable and desired option.  For those who conclude that it is, 
this report offers a source of fiscal and policy analysis that can be utilized to contemplate 
legislative initiatives and resolve some of the complex issues we identify.  For those who do not, 
this report provides further insight into the extent to which Milwaukee County government’s 
overriding fiscal problems are negatively impacting its various functions, and highlights the need 
for immediate consideration of alternative strategies to address those problems.    
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SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
• Retiree fringe benefit liabilities are a legal obligation and must be financed regardless 
of any county governance change that may (or may not) be implemented.  The county’s 
pension and health care expenditures nearly tripled during the first eight years of this decade, 
from $67 million in 2000 to $179 million in 2008.  About 46% of those costs are “legacy 
costs” attributed to retirees.  Retiree fringe benefit cost increases will continue to accumulate 
in future years, driven by unfunded pension liabilities and the rising cost of health care, and 
will continue to have a huge impact on county taxpayers for the foreseeable future.  Prompt 
action is needed to isolate and control those costs. 
 
• The treatment of the county’s fringe benefit obligations would be a key factor in 
reorganization deliberations.  If consensus was achieved to remove certain functions from 
Milwaukee County government, the magnitude of the retiree legacy liabilities attached to 
such functions makes it unlikely that any other government would readily accept them.  
Moving those functions to another government while leaving their associated legacy 
liabilities with the county, however, could result in a much smaller county government even 
less capable of affording its legacy-related costs.   
 
• Milwaukee County operates a vast array of diverse programs that must compete for a 
shrinking set of resources.  Milwaukee County was created as an “administrative arm” to 
manage programs locally on behalf of the state, but it has taken on significant discretionary 
programs over the years.  This creates a level of competition for county taxpayer resources 
among diverse programs that is somewhat unique and that perhaps was not intended by those 
who founded Milwaukee County’s current governance structure.   
 
• Transferring functions like parks and transit to special districts with a dedicated 
funding source would enhance funding stability but also would produce new 
government bodies with their own funding demands.  In other states, the primary rationale 
for creating special districts has been to provide services more effectively at a regional level 
and/or to prevent certain services from being negatively affected by the budget difficulties 
facing a municipal or county government.  Before taking a similar approach, Milwaukee 
County citizens should weigh the potential for stable funding and better quality versus the 
creation of new, independent government bodies that claim a share of taxpayer resources.  
Citizens also should weigh the potential benefits of creating a streamlined county 
government that is able to focus solely on its mandated services. 
 
• Potential savings associated with government restructuring are difficult to measure 
precisely but merit further exploration. Restructuring could produce several sources of 
potential savings that could not be quantified in this report.  Those include reduced overhead 
costs, proceeds from liquidating unneeded buildings and equipment, and the opportunity to 
negotiate lower wage and benefit costs.  The report models three restructuring scenarios and 
reports savings that can be reliably estimated ranging from $2 million to $9.6 million 
annually. Restructuring also could produce new possibilities for funding the county’s long-
term liabilities if state elected officials create new funding sources for transferred functions 
while allowing existing county revenue streams to remain intact.      
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• Massachusetts overcame similar (though much smaller-scale) complexities to eliminate 
several county governments and could be a model for how such an endeavor might be 
undertaken in Milwaukee.  The Massachusetts example also demonstrates the extraordinary 
amount of leadership, resources and attention that would be required by state government. 
 
FRAMING THE ISSUES 
 
County governments exist as creations of the State of Wisconsin.  Unlike cities and villages, 
counties do not have constitutional “home rule” authority, which means they only may undertake 
functions expressly granted to them by state statutes.  In fact, many consider counties 
“administrative arms of state government” that were designed by the state to administer local 
functions on its behalf, but not necessarily to do anything more.   
Milwaukee County, of course, does much more, which is a reason for its unique nature and, 
arguably, its unique problems.  A good deal of the public debate about Milwaukee County’s 
financial challenges, for example, has centered on the condition of its parks, cultural facilities 
and transit system – three functional areas that Milwaukee County government elected to assume 
with the permission of state government, but not at its behest.   
A FUNCTION­BY­FUNCTION REVIEW 
 
With this perspective in mind, consideration of Milwaukee County’s governance structure should 
start with an analysis of each major county function.  This approach includes exploration of why 
the county is performing the function; how the function is administered in other metropolitan 
areas; whether transferring it to a different government body is logistically and politically viable; 
and whether doing so would improve its quality and cost effectiveness.   
Our analysis indicates that many other metropolitan areas decided to consolidate services like 
parks, transit and human services at a regional or state level largely to secure financial and 
programmatic stability.  A similar argument could be made for transferring those same types of 
services outside of Milwaukee County government, but citizens and policymakers must weigh 
the desire to secure stability for certain functions against any potential negatives associated with 
creating additional local governmental bodies or enhancing the role of the state.       
 
We also find that the legal, logistical and political complexity associated with transferring certain 
functions outside of Milwaukee County government is significant.  Complex issues that would 
need to be resolved range from legal and constitutional uncertainties, to the appropriate treatment 
of real property and debt, to dilemmas regarding cash flow and accounting.  This suggests that 
any effort to dismantle Milwaukee County government needs to be addressed on a function-by-
function basis and would require strong leadership at the state level. 
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EXPLORING THREE RESTRUCTURING SCENARIOS   
 
Using the insights gained from the individual functional analyses, the report develops and 
provides a broad fiscal analysis of three alternative restructuring scenarios:   
 
• The first scenario is the complete elimination of Milwaukee County government. 
 
• The second scenario returns county government to its “roots,” consisting only of its 
constitutional and statutory mandates.  The one exception is health and human services.  
While this is largely a mandated service, this scenario returns it to the state in recognition of 
the previous state takeover of several human service functions in Milwaukee County, and the 
rationale that it may be beneficial to have all human services in the county administered and 
coordinated by one governmental entity.   
 
• The final scenario removes only the transit system, airport, parks and cultural facilities from 
county government.  This scenario differs from the second scenario in that all existing health 
and human services functions remain with the county.  The functions that are removed are 
not mandated and already have been subject to considerable discussion regarding new 
governance options.  In addition, these are functions for which new regional approaches to 
governance may be most viable.  
 
Using 2008 actual spending, the table below summarizes the three scenarios, while the diagram 
on the following page depicts the flow of county services to alternative government entities. 
 
Summary of Three County Government Restructuring Scenarios 
  
Key functions 
removed 
Estimated 
remaining 
expenditure 
budget 
Estimated 
Remaining 
property tax 
levy* 
Legacy 
costs as % 
of remaining 
tax levy 
Estimated 
remaining full-
time county 
employees 
2008 County 
Government** None $1,340,250,497 $236,268,763 34.2% 5,707  
Scenario 1 – 
Eliminate County 
Government 
All $85,685,857 $80,685,858 100.0% 0 
Scenario 2 – 
Significantly 
Streamline 
Parks, Culture, 
Airport, Transit,  
Human Services, 
CMO, Aging, 
Child Support 
Enforcement 
$370,377,101 $104,423,293 77.3% 2,424 
Scenario 3 – 
Remove Major 
Discretionary 
Parks, Culture, 
Airport, Transit $1,014,430,758 $181,790,833 44.4% 4,567 
* Under each of the three scenarios, policymakers would need to determine whether and to what extent the 
existing .5% Milwaukee County sales tax would remain in place and continue to be utilized to offset debt 
service.  That decision could significantly impact the property tax levy amounts shown for each scenario. 
** 2008 expenditure totals do not include expenditures on the General Assistance Medical Program, as that 
program has since been eliminated and would no longer factor into this analysis. 
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Summary of Flow of Functions in Restructuring Scenarios 
Scenario 1 
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• Register of Deeds 
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• Aging 
∗ Behavioral Health Division 
∗ Care Management Organization
Scenario 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(None) 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 1 
• Emergency Medical Services 
∗ Highway Maintenance & 
     Transportation Services 
∗ Election Commission 
 
Scenario 2 
• Emergency Medical Services 
∗ BHD 
Zoo & 
Cultural 
Fu
nc
tio
ns
 m
ov
ed
 to
 th
e 
 
ST
A
TE
 
Fu
nc
tio
ns
 m
ov
ed
 to
 
 S
PE
CI
A
L 
D
IS
TR
IC
TS
/ 
SE
PA
RA
TE
 T
A
XI
N
G
 A
U
TH
O
RI
TI
ES
 
Fu
nc
tio
ns
 m
ov
ed
 to
 
M
U
N
IC
IP
A
LI
TI
ES
 
Parks 
∗ Sheriff 
Transit
Airport
∗ CMO 
Scenario 2 
∗ BHD 
Zoo & 
Cultural
Parks 
Transit 
Airport
∗ CMO 
Scenario 3 
Zoo & 
Cultural 
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Transit 
Airport 
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(None) 
Scenario 1: Eliminate county government 
Scenario 2: Significantly streamline 
Scenario 3: Remove Major Discretionary 
 
∗   This report cites multiple potential alternative 
      receiving entities for this function. 
Note: As discussed in Section II of this report, an alternative to creating separate special districts for parks and zoo/cultural would be to create 
one special district for parks and cultural services.  The same holds for the airport and transit system—those two functions could fall under one 
umbrella  transportation district. 
Milwaukee 
County 
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Determination of potential fiscal savings associated with each scenario is complicated by 
uncertainty regarding how alternative governing bodies would secure administrative services 
now provided by the county (e.g. accounting, human resources, information technology); 
whether they would utilize transferred county workers and be required to abide by existing labor 
agreements; whether they would utilize county buildings and equipment; and whether the 
function now has sufficient operating funds to fulfill its mission and responsibilities.  The 
savings that can be reliably estimated are shown in the table below (based on 2008 actual 
expenditures). 
Comparison of 2008 Levy Savings, Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 
  
Scenario 1: 
2008 levy 
savings 
Scenario 2: 
2008 levy 
savings 
Scenario 3: 
2008 levy 
savings 
County Executive ($831,826) ($656,711) ($284,628) 
County Board ($5,459,700) ($4,438,180) ($1,669,370) 
County Treasurer  ($1,185,901) -- -- 
County Clerk ($310,195) -- -- 
Election Commission ($1,155,025) -- -- 
Community Business Development Partners ($417,841) -- -- 
Personnel Review Board ($171,347) -- -- 
Civil Service Commission ($27,596) -- -- 
Total ($9,559,432) ($5,094,891) ($1,953,999) 
 
Insights derived from the modeling of these scenarios include the following: 
• If county government is eliminated but legacy costs are not distributed to the governments 
that take over county functions, then about $81 million in annual legacy costs would remain 
as a responsibility of county taxpayers.  In addition, about $5 million in annual debt service 
costs would remain for capital assets that could not logically be transferred to alternative 
governments.  As a point of reference, we calculated what the 2008 impact of that combined 
$86 million obligation would have been on the owner of a Milwaukee County home assessed 
at $150,000, assuming that state government elected to assess the county’s property 
taxpayers for those costs in the absence of county government. We found that this average 
homeowner would have seen a line item of $197 on his or her property tax bill.   
 
• A potential alternative might be to use revenues generated from the county’s existing .5% 
sales tax to partially offset the $86 million remaining cost.  Based on our assumption that 
most debt service costs would be spread to receiving entities, if we also assume that those 
entities would pay for debt service out of new or existing revenue streams, then most of the 
$65 million per year generated by the county sales tax could be utilized to offset the annual 
legacy payment, as opposed to its current use of paying for debt service on capital assets.  
That possibility, of course, would depend upon a decision by policymakers to leave the 
county sales tax in place even if county government no longer existed. 
 
• Scenario 2 assumes a much smaller county expenditure budget ($370 million as opposed to 
the current $1.3 billion) with county board and county executive offices that are reduced by a 
similar proportion.  This scenario would return Milwaukee County government to the 
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traditional role of “administrative arm” of state government, which could significantly reduce 
the politics and dissention that characterize Milwaukee County government today.  It also 
could produce more accountability and better coordination of human services programs in the 
county by consolidating those programs under state leadership.  The fact that the new county 
government would have a proportional legacy burden triple the size of the current liability is 
a significant challenge, however.  Policymakers could continue using the property tax to fund 
that obligation, though that would produce a situation in which legacy costs would be 
equivalent to 77% of the county tax levy. 
 
• Scenario 3 differs from Scenario 2 only in its assumption that current health and human 
services would remain with county government.  Because that function comprises about 45% 
of the county expenditure budget, the overall county budget in Scenario 3 exceeds $1 billion.  
Again, the size of the county board and county executive’s office is reduced in proportion to 
the reduction in overall county expenditures.  Because the county’s severe financial 
challenges arguably have had the greatest negative impact on parks, culture and transit, there 
may be appeal in separating those functions from county government in order to eliminate 
their uphill struggle to compete for scarce resources. Also, as with Scenario 2, there may be 
logic to re-establishing the county’s focus on its mandates and to explore a regional approach 
to providing aviation, transit and parks/culture services.  The legacy problem still would 
exist, with legacy costs equaling 44% of the county tax levy.   
 
THE MASSACHUSETTS EXAMPLE 
 
In the late 1990s, Massachusetts eliminated several of its county governments.  While the 
Massachusetts example does not provide an exact parallel with the concept suggested for 
Milwaukee County because its counties had far fewer responsibilities to begin with, this example 
does offer several important insights into how a layer of government can be made to disappear. 
 
Until 1997, Massachusetts had 14 county governments, whose primary role was to administer 
jails, health facilities, agricultural schools, registries of deeds and probate, courthouses, county 
roads and extension services. Several of these counties experienced fiscal problems and turned to 
the state for emergency assistance in the early 1990s.  Middlesex County, the state’s largest with 
1.4 million citizens, defaulted on $4.6 million of hospital loans and teetered on the brink of 
bankruptcy.   
In July 1997, the state abolished Middlesex County and set up a process to eliminate two more 
county governments within one year and all county governments within two years.  The 
mechanics of the legislation provide interesting insights into how Wisconsin officials might 
approach some of the complexities related to a similar governance reform effort in Milwaukee 
County.  For example: 
• The Massachusetts secretary of administration created what essentially was a balance sheet in 
which liabilities of the former county government (including unfunded pension liabilities) 
were listed and valued on one side, and assets on the other.  Upon determining the net cost to 
the state (i.e. the value of liabilities incurred in excess of assets obtained), the secretary 
developed a schedule under which the state would be fully reimbursed over a period of 
  Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 10 
 
several years via an assessment on taxpayers of the former county.  This approach not only 
demonstrates how the state might play a leading role in taking over county functions without 
saddling itself with county costs, but it also provides insight into its potential ability to 
leverage unneeded county real estate assets to offset liabilities.  A balance sheet approach 
should be considered regardless of whether county government is restructured or eliminated. 
 
• Massachusetts implemented dual strategies for addressing pension-related issues: it moved 
those employees transferred to the state payroll to the state retirement system, and left the 
county retirement system in place to continue to serve retirees and inactive members.  Again, 
this approach holds relevance for the Milwaukee County discussion whether or not the 
government is dismantled or streamlined.  For example, there is logic that suggests 
immediately closing the county retirement system to new members and additional employee 
earnings.  Under such an approach, all existing and future county employees would become 
members of the state retirement system and any future benefits earned would be at the level 
enjoyed by state employees. 
 
• Another intriguing component of the Massachusetts approach was its mechanism to allow the 
cities and towns of counties whose governments had been eliminated to form regional 
councils of government to provide shared services.  A key difference between a regional 
council of governments and a county government is that municipalities are able to “opt in” to 
have certain shared services performed by the regional council when such an approach makes 
sense for their budgets and communities.  Such an approach might be warranted for several 
services in Milwaukee County, including public health, general road and street maintenance, 
housing, property assessment, economic development, and even special public safety 
services.   
 
• A primary lesson learned is that undertaking a governance reform that is so complex and 
contentious requires resolute leadership from state government and a willingness by the state 
to devote considerable human resources and an up-front financial investment to the endeavor.   
In Milwaukee County, the current county executive has expressed support for abolishing 
county government, but the governor and legislative leaders thus far have been largely absent 
from any discussion about significant downsizing or outright elimination.  The Massachusetts 
example teaches us that state elected officials not only would have to be in on the discussion, 
but they would have to lead it. 
POLICY OPTIONS 
 
Although governance reform promises to be highly complex and in need of strong state 
leadership, we urge local leaders not to abandon efforts to pursue comprehensive structural 
change in Milwaukee County government.  The specific shape of such reform must weigh the 
findings contained in this report, but there are certain key decisions that require immediate 
consideration regardless of whether and what types of governance changes are pursued.   
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DECISION 1: The future of discretionary county programs 
 
In light of the county’s fiscal condition, it cannot continue to provide its major discretionary 
services at a level even approximating the expectations of users while also accommodating its 
growing legacy costs.  Simply put, county government and its citizens are at a crossroads.  They 
can choose to dramatically increase property tax levy support for parks, cultural and transit 
services; identify new sources of revenue to support those services; or accept a significant 
decline in their breadth and quality. 
The debate over how to pay for discretionary functions also is an opportunity to consider 
whether it is appropriate to remove those functions from Milwaukee County government.  This 
report shows there is not a clear-cut resolution to the issue of where to house the discretionary 
services.  Transferring functions into special districts may not significantly reduce their costs, 
which means a value judgment must be made as to whether certain sets of services are 
sufficiently important to justify not only their own segregated funding sources, but also separate 
governance.  Whether the services might be more effectively delivered on a multi-county 
regional basis also should factor into the equation. 
From the perspective of Milwaukee County’s larger fiscal challenges, another question emerges: 
Could a reduction in the size and scope of Milwaukee County government, while not solving its 
fiscal problems, produce less political and more professional governance that would lead to 
better planning and decision-making?   
 
We have observed that other county and municipal governments in southeast Wisconsin 
generally function with greater focus and far less acrimony than Milwaukee County.  
Consequently, it is appropriate to consider whether a streamlined and restructured county 
government that focuses solely on its state mandates and that views itself as an administrative 
arm of the state would produce the more focused and professional approach to governance that is 
required to right the county’s financial ship.     
 
DECISION 2: How to address legacy costs 
 
Milwaukee County leaders would be wise to consider a shift in philosophy and methodology 
with regard to legacy costs.  That shift would reflect the fact that legacy costs are a legal 
obligation to past employees that must be met (notwithstanding reasonable efforts to reduce it), 
but that must not impact the effectiveness of government functions without consideration of 
programmatic needs and priorities.  The following are different approaches state and county 
leaders might consider to help control legacy costs and achieve this shift: 
• Closing the county pension system as of a date certain and shifting future costs and liabilities 
to the state system.  This approach not only could produce long-term savings for the county, 
but it also could enable the county to finally get past its 2000-2001 pension scandal.  
 
•  Establishing a defined contribution plan (i.e. 401(k)-type approach) for new county 
employees and for future pension benefits earned by existing employees.  Again, this might 
entail closing the existing pension fund and isolating and managing it under the existing or a 
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new management structure.  A new defined contribution fund then could be established to 
manage employer and employee contributions under the new plan. 
 
• Isolating the legacy share of its annual pension costs and determining how to address those 
costs centrally.  This would help ensure that the county copes with legacy costs based on its 
priorities and its legal mandates, as opposed to allocating those costs to departments at the 
beginning of the budget process as if they were directly related to departmental operations.   
 
• Isolating retiree health care costs and liabilities and addressing those costs centrally.  In 
addition to producing the benefits cited above, separating retiree health costs from other 
health care costs would allow for the singular, priority focus they deserve and encourage 
consideration of long-term financing strategies. 
Civic leaders also might consider enlisting the best legal, actuarial and employee benefits 
professionals from Milwaukee’s private sector to form a new task force to assist the county in re-
exploring possibilities for reducing its legacy costs.   
 
DECISION 3: A plan for the county’s physical assets and infrastructure 
 
In light of the impact Milwaukee County’s legacy costs are having on its fiscal health, it would 
be logical for it to consider how it might use its assets to offset its liabilities.  That does not 
imply a “fire sale” of county property, but it does suggest the county needs to develop a strategic 
plan for its physical assets that takes into account its shrinking workforce and its severe 
operating challenges.  Quite simply, county taxpayers and their elected officials need to 
determine the appropriate size of Milwaukee County government not only from an operational 
perspective, but also from a physical one.   
 
The strategic plan could include examination of long-term leases of valuable assets to secure 
resources to pay down liabilities.  A potential long-term lease of General Mitchell International 
Airport has received the most attention to date in light of its tremendous value, but the county 
also owns parking lots, a marina and other land and structures that could be contemplated for 
lease arrangements, provided that the operation of those assets for their established public 
purposes could be maintained appropriately.  In addition, the county could contemplate the 
possibility of transferring ownership of cultural institutions to the non-profit organizations that 
administer them in order to relieve itself of major maintenance and capital improvement needs 
and/or to generate new revenues. 
 
DECISION 4: Alternative approaches to government reorganization 
 
While the Greater Milwaukee Committee commissioned this report to explore the possibility of 
downsizing or eliminating Milwaukee County government, other metropolitan areas have 
pursued different forms of governance change, including city-county consolidation and metro 
government.  Detailed consideration of such alternative forms of governance also may be 
warranted in Milwaukee County. 
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Consideration also might be given to simply consolidating additional municipal functions at the 
county level without turning to a merger of governments.  Such services logically might include 
public health, economic development, housing, property assessment and “back office” 
administrative functions such as information technology, property tax collection, debt 
issuance/management and procurement. 
 
Ultimately, a top-to-bottom review of all municipal services should occur that is similar to that 
performed for county services in this report.  That review should consider which services might 
be more efficiently provided at a regional or state level, and whether there is political will to 
include jurisdictions outside of Milwaukee County in the definition of “regional.”  
   
CONCLUSION 
 
Whether to embark on a lengthy process to streamline and potentially eliminate Milwaukee 
County government cannot be determined conclusively by research and fiscal analysis alone; that 
determination also requires value judgments as to the importance of various county services as 
well as to the leadership abilities of current and future county leaders.   
 
In the end, there are no silver bullets that will magically solve the financial problems facing 
Milwaukee County government and relieve taxpayers from obligations already incurred.  The 
depth of those problems and obligations, however, does create an imperative to consider how 
government structure influences fiscal health and impacts fiscal management and decision-
making.      
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INTRODUCTION 
This report explores the issues and possibilities surrounding the creation of a new local 
government structure in Milwaukee County.  It was commissioned by the Greater Milwaukee 
Committee (GMC) as a follow-up to GMC-commissioned research released by the Public Policy 
Forum in March 2009, entitled “Milwaukee County’s Fiscal Condition: Crisis on the Horizon?”   
The March 2009 report found a fiscal crisis “that has grown worse with each successive year, 
and that may now be so severe that radical solutions are required.”  This report specifically 
examines one such solution that recently has moved to the forefront of public discussion: the 
significant downsizing or complete elimination of Milwaukee County government.   
While this report constitutes the most detailed effort to date to explore that option in terms of 
fiscal analysis and modeling, it is only the latest in a series of reports that have been issued by 
entities concerned about the functionality and future of Milwaukee County government.  Indeed, 
since at least the mid 1990s – when the county executive appointed a Milwaukee County 
Commission for the 21st Century – prominent members of Milwaukee’s elected, business and 
civic leadership have voiced concern about the fiscal sustainability of key county functions.  In 
doing so, several also have questioned various elements of the county-municipal relationship, 
and some have asked whether that relationship is an ineffective relic of an earlier day that 
requires replacement. 
Questions about the future of county government became much more pronounced in 2002, when 
a pension scandal cast serious doubt upon the county’s long-term solvency and the quality of its 
management.  That led to another special committee and recommendations for structural change.  
A third round of special committees and reform proposals was generated in 2005-06 in response 
to the county executive’s “reality tour,” a series of speaking engagements designed to warn 
community leaders of the county’s dire fiscal circumstances. 
Today, as county government’s fiscal problems have continued to worsen, and as its elected 
leadership has been unable to agree even on their nature and scope, it is not surprising that some 
– including the current county executive – are questioning whether county government is needed 
at all.   
Is it really possible, however, to eliminate a government with a $1.4 billion budget, 5,500 full-
time employees, several critical state-mandated functions, and unfunded retirement liabilities 
exceeding $2 billion? Among the issues that must be earnestly researched and contemplated 
before such action seriously can be debated are the following: 
• What are the biggest legal and logistical hurdles to eliminating the state’s largest county 
government, and how can they be addressed?   
• What government body is the appropriate home for each county service, and if not county 
government, would other bodies be willing to take on the service?   
• Would the elimination of county government save taxpayer dollars, and what might be 
the effect on the quality of services? 
• What might be done with the county’s $2 billion in unfunded pension and retiree health 
care liabilities if county government is eliminated?    
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This report explores those questions, providing answers when they are readily apparent, but also 
providing options that will need to be deliberated by citizens and policymakers, and raising 
additional questions that will need to be more thoroughly explored by attorneys, actuaries and 
others.   
It is clear that the multitude of public policy, fiscal, logistical and political considerations 
associated with an endeavor of this magnitude cannot be resolved by a limited research effort.  It 
is our intent, however, to identify, frame and analyze those considerations with sufficient clarity 
to allow for informed debate about the possibility of pursuing a new government structure. 
We begin by quantifying and analyzing the largest component of Milwaukee County’s budget 
difficulties: its pension and health care obligations to its retirees, also known as “legacy costs.”  
Next, we break down the budgets of major functions of county government: parks, transit, 
cultural institutions, the airport, mental health, the sheriff, Family Care, the courts and the district 
attorney.  From this exercise we are able to estimate the actual annualized cost of providing those 
functions (as opposed to the “county cost,” which includes costs related to county retirement 
benefits).  This is an essential determination in the consideration of transferring a particular 
function to some other entity.  We also include analysis of potential government bodies that 
might appropriately take on each function, discussing pros, cons and practical considerations 
associated with each option.   
Having conducted this initial analysis, we then model and analyze what county government 
would look like under various scenarios in which key functions are provided by other 
governments, as well as a scenario under which it is eliminated entirely.  We close with 
discussion of Massachusetts’ experience with abolishing county governments and a series of 
policy options and conclusions.  
The overall intent of this report is to provide community leaders and elected officials with a level 
of analysis that will allow them to reasonably debate whether downsizing or eliminating 
Milwaukee County government is a viable and desired option.  For those who conclude that it is, 
this report offers a source of fiscal and policy analysis that can be utilized to contemplate 
legislative initiatives and resolve some of the complex issues we identify.  For those who do not, 
this report provides further insight into the extent to which Milwaukee County government’s 
overriding fiscal problems are negatively impacting its various functions, and highlights the need 
for immediate consideration of alternative strategies to address those problems.    
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The main sources of data utilized in this report are Milwaukee County financial reports, budget 
documents, and financial records.  We wish to thank officials from the county’s Administrative 
Services, Employee Benefits and Audit departments for helping us gather this information.   
The study also relies upon data obtained from Milwaukee County Employees’ Retirement 
System reports and from conversations with staff and actuaries associated with that system, as 
well as reports and information collected from the City of Milwaukee and State of Wisconsin.   
Finally, for Section IV, we utilized data collected from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ 
official web site, its statutes, newspaper articles and interviews with knowledgeable individuals, 
including a Massachusetts state representative, a former governor and local policy researchers. 
The breakdown of Milwaukee County functional budgets in Section II and the modeling of three 
governance reform models in Section III required certain selective use of data sets and 
numerous assumptions.  The following summarizes key data sets and assumptions used in budget 
tables in Section II.   
• All dollar figures are based on 2008 actual expenditure and revenue amounts reported in the 
county’s electronic budget database, unless otherwise noted. 
 
• Budget tables for each department include a column showing estimated legacy costs 
associated with the department per the county’s existing methodology (which reflects each 
department’s percentage of active full-time employees), as well as a column showing the 
costs if the methodology instead was based on each department’s actual retirees.  Retiree 
history is taken from a 2009 county working document that aimed to distinguish the number 
of retirees associated with each county department.   
 
• Departmental debt is taken from a historical debt spreadsheet managed by county budget 
staff.  Most debt has been identified by function; however, due to limited knowledge of all 
county capital projects, we were unable to discern the appropriate function for most projects 
in the categories of county grounds, courthouse complex, and other agency.  Consequently, 
this debt is not reflected in functional tables, and it is assumed it would remain with the 
county under governance reform alternatives. 
 
• Half of total 2008 county health care and life insurance costs are attributed to active 
employees and half to county retirees.  This mirrors a fringe benefit rate calculation used by 
the county’s budget staff during the 2009 budget process. 
 
• One-third of 2008 county pension costs are attributed to retirees, and the remaining two-
thirds to active employees.  This mirrors a fringe benefit rate calculation used by the county’s 
budget staff during the 2009 budget process.   
 
• Budget tables apportion a share of the county's long-term pension debt and unfunded 
liability, the total of which is $486,655,509, to each function based on that function's retiree 
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history.  Of that estimated liability, pension obligation bonds total $397,797,000 and the 
unfunded actuarial accrued liability totals the remaining $88,858,509.  These totals are as of 
January 1, 2009 and are taken from an actuarial report conducted by Buck Consultants. 
 
• Budget tables apportion a share of the county's future OPEB liability, the total of which is 
$1,546,458,000, to each function based on that function's retiree history.  This total is as of 
January 1, 2008 and is taken from an actuarial valuation conducted by Cambridge Advisory 
Group. 
 
• Central service charges are broken down as follows: 
 
o Administration – Audit, Disability Services, Employee Benefits, Labor Relations, 
Risk Management, Procurement, Fiscal Affairs, Accounting, Accounts Payable, 
Payroll, and HRIS 
o Legal – Corporation Counsel 
o Information Technology –  Information Management Services Division (IMSD) 
o Facilities –  Facilities Management and Architecture, Engineering, and 
Environmental 
o Fleet – Fleet Management 
 
• Central service charges to departments include not only the direct cost of central services, but 
also legacy costs associated with central service departments.  We attribute about 10% of 
central service charges to central service legacy costs.  This percentage does not significantly 
change between the two legacy cost allocation methods used in the budget tables. 
 
Key assumptions for the governance reform scenarios in Section III are described in the text of 
that section.  The assumptions noted above for Section II also apply to that section unless 
otherwise noted.  The following are some additional assumptions of a more technical nature used 
in Section III fiscal modeling. 
 
• Estimates reflect 2008 legacy costs and General Obligation Bond debt while acknowledging 
that those amounts will vary in future years. 
   
• It is assumed that roughly $50 million (10%) of the county’s debt could not be transferred to 
an alternative government body under any scenario because certain debt is associated with 
functions that no longer exist or that would not exist if county government was eliminated.  
This includes debt on the former Doyne Hospital ($13.5 million), County Stadium ($13.5 
million), and another unidentified $23 million in miscellaneous debt tied to central service 
functions or unidentifiable projects.  The annual debt service to cover such debt is assumed to 
be approximately $5 million. 
 
• The county’s annual debt service payment is assigned to each function based on its share of 
the county’s overall long-term debt. 
 
• The state’s shared revenue payment is reduced at a rate equal to the percentage of total 2008 
county expenditures that has been transferred with departing functions.  
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• Certain departments receive non-levy offsetting revenues from outside sources for each 
dollar of expenditure incurred.  It is assumed that as functions move out of county 
government, any such “matching” revenues that previously supported legacy costs are lost. 
 
• In the two scenarios in which county government is restructured but not eliminated, the 
following assumptions are used: 
 
o The county retains all $67 million from its existing .5% sales tax.   
o Central service/overhead expenditures are reduced at a rate equal to the percentage of 
total 2008 central service/overhead expenditures that are transferred with departing 
functions.  Positions within central servicing departments are reduced at that same rate.  
 
• In each scenario, overall county expenditure and property tax levy amounts were developed 
using 2008 expenditure and property tax levy amounts and deducting the following: 
 
o Expenditure and levy amounts associated with GAMP (except for the remaining $5.8 
million county payment to the state for Badger Care Plus).  
o Expenditure and levy amounts associated with functions transferred out of county 
government.  
o Associated shared revenue and debt service per the description above. 
 
• A similar process of deduction was used to develop full-time-equivalent position counts. 
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SECTION I 
 
THE FINANCING OF FRINGE BENEFITS 
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During the past decade, fringe benefits have become the financial issue for Milwaukee County.  
In 2000, fringe benefits represented a modest share of overall expenditures.  By 2008, they had 
grown to be one of the largest items in the county’s budget.  Given the size of these costs and the 
way they are budgeted, the financing of fringe benefits will play a key role in any county 
organizational change. 
  
Fringe benefits typically are defined as compensation in addition to salaries and wages.  For this 
analysis, our discussion of fringe benefits refers exclusively to pension and health care, the costs 
of which constituted about 98% of the $179 million spent by the county on fringe benefits in 
2008.  The county also spent about $1.7 million for life insurance benefits and $543,000 for 
employee transit passes net of employee contributions.   
 
It is critical to understand that the county’s fringe benefits expenditures are comprised of health 
care and pension costs both for active employees and retirees/inactive employees.  Retiree fringe 
benefit costs often are referred to as “legacy costs,” which county fiscal officials formally define 
as the “cost of retiree benefits Milwaukee County is legally committed to pay, but has not yet 
funded.”1  This report contains considerable discussion about these two distinct components of 
the fringe benefits budget and their impacts on existing county functions and potential alternative 
governance structures.     
   
The county’s $179 million expenditure on fringe benefits obviously is a major cost driver in the 
$1.4 billion county budget, and it is particularly noteworthy when one considers that fringe costs 
have nearly tripled since the beginning of this decade.  In previous decades, fringe benefit costs 
were a part of budget building, but they were not a primary concern.  In contrast, as fringe 
benefit costs have skyrocketed in recent years, the county has had to draw resources from other 
areas and cut positions and services.  No part of county government remains unaffected by this 
insistent fiscal force. 
 
Why have these costs risen?  Will the past trend continue and, if so, how can fringe benefit costs 
best be controlled and managed?  Such issues are now central to Milwaukee County’s finances 
and its future.   The county, of course, has been aware of this problem and, in recent years, has 
undertaken efforts to curtail costs.  Some of these measures have been effective, while others 
have created further difficulties and had unforeseen consequences.  In addition, two factors over 
which the county has no control have had a major influence upon rising costs: the price of health 
care has increased dramatically throughout Wisconsin and the United States; and the stock 
market fell precipitously from October 2007 to March 2009, causing a serious decline in the 
value of pension assets.  In short, the factors at play in fringe benefit financing are complicated, 
but the issue does yield to analysis and is essential to this report. 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 Milwaukee County Department of Administrative Services, “Presentation to Long Range Strategic Plan Steering 
Committee,” December 14, 2009.  
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OVERALL GROWTH IN FRINGE BENEFITS 
 
The two tables below show the combined rise of total pension and health care costs for 
Milwaukee County (for both active employees and retirees) and their relationship to overall 
expenditure and revenue changes in the past decade.   As demonstrated in Table 1, fringe 
expenditures grew most rapidly in the first half of the decade, but the 26.5% increase from 2004 
to 2008 still is substantial.        
 
Table 1: Milwaukee County Expenditures for Pension and Health Care, 2000 to 2008  
(in millions) 
Year Pension 
Health 
care 
Combined 
expenditures 
2000 $0.9  $65.6  $66.5  
2001 $3.3  $72.5  $75.8  
2002 $3.6  $84.4  $88.0  
2003 $18.1  $88.7  $106.8  
2004 $37.8  $103.6  $141.4  
2005 $37.5  $124.9  $162.4  
2006 $29.1  $129.1  $158.2  
2007 $51.0  $128.0  $179.0  
2008 $40.9  $138.0  $178.9  
2004-2008 Difference $3.1  $34.4  $37.5  
2004-2008 % Change 8.2% 33.2% 26.5% 
2000-2008 Difference $40.0  $72.4  $112.4  
2000-2008 % Change 4444% 110% 169% 
 
Table 2 compares fringe benefit expenditures with property tax revenue and salary/wage 
expenditures for the past decade.  Given their inexorable growth, it is not surprising that fringe 
benefits represent an increasing share of the county’s property tax levy.  The eight-year rise in 
fringe benefits of $112 million was more than double the increase in levy revenues of $53 
million.  The need to fund health care and pension obligations was a major cause of cutbacks in 
personnel and flat salary and wage expenditures.  As a result, fringe benefits expenditures (on 
both active and retired/inactive employees) grew from 25.3% of salaries and wages expenditures 
in 2000 to 67.7% in 2008.  
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Table 2: Combined Health and Pension Expenditures as a Percentage of Salaries and Tax 
Levy, 2000 to 2008 (in millions) 
    Salary funding Tax levy funding 
Year 
Health & pension 
expenditures 
Total 
salary 
Health & pension 
as % of salary Total levy  
Health & pension 
as % of tax levy 
2000 $66.5  $263.2  25.3% $198.5  33.5% 
2001 $75.8  $267.6  28.3% $209.1  36.3% 
2002 $88.0  $267.0  33.0% $220.4  39.9% 
2003 $106.8  $261.5  40.8% $221.3  48.3% 
2004 $141.4  $249.6  56.7% $220.6  64.1% 
2005 $162.4  $243.6  66.7% $228.6  71.0% 
2006 $158.2  $248.2  63.7% $234.3  67.5% 
2007 $179.0  $254.2  70.4% $243.1  73.6% 
2008 $178.9  $264.1  67.7% $251.5  71.1% 
 
PENSION FUNDING 
 
Milwaukee County operates one of three public pension funds in Wisconsin.  The State of 
Wisconsin and the City of Milwaukee operate the other two.  Created in 1937 (and subject to 
state oversight until 1965), Milwaukee County’s Employees’ Retirement System is governed by 
a nine-member pension board.  A “mature” fund, the number of retirees, disabled, and survivors 
participating in the fund (7,308 members in 2008) exceeds the number of active employee 
participants (4,837 members) and inactive but not-yet-retired vested members (1,397 members) 
combined.  Graph 1 shows the breakdown of the approximately 13,500 pension fund 
participants, while Graph 2 shows the percentage of current eligible county employees who 
have achieved vested status, which now occurs after five years of service.    
 
Graph 1: Pension Fund Participants      Graph 2: Current Pension Eligible Workforce 
 
54%
10%
36%
Total of 13,500 participants
Retirees & beneficiaries
Deferred vested
Active employees
76%
24%
Total of 4,800 eligible, active employees
Active vested employees
Active non‐vested employees
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The county’s $2 billion fund is modest in size compared with major public funds.   It is about 
half the size of the city’s fund and only about 2.5% of Wisconsin’s Employment Retirement 
System.  The Public Fund Survey—which collects data from 125 of the nation’s largest public 
pension funds—reports that in 2008, the average pension system participating in its survey had 
about $20 billion in assets. 
 
Milwaukee County’s pension fund is known as a defined benefit plan, as are the funds of most 
local and state governments.  While many private companies once had these types of plans, 
many have terminated them and have moved toward defined contribution plans for their 
employees’ retirement needs.  Under a defined benefit program, an employer legally binds and 
commits itself to providing current employees with specific benefits in their retirement.  Under 
defined contribution, an employer agrees to manage employee pension savings and may provide 
a discretionary matching contribution.  The amount an employee draws in retirement depends 
upon the accumulation of savings in his or her personal account. A 401(k) program is a type of 
defined contribution fund. 
 
A defined benefit fund is attractive to employees since their retirement benefits are predictable 
and secure.  Historically, local and state governments’ ability to recruit high-quality employees 
has rested in part upon the strength of such benefits.  The defined benefit approach is less 
advantageous to the employer, however, who must assume the financial risk. 
 
In addition, under a defined benefit approach, the variability of investment earnings makes the 
employer’s future fiscal position hard to predict.  Pension projections require actuarial 
calculations based on multiple assumptions, such as the length of the average employee’s 
working years, final average salary and years in retirement.   If changes occur that do not 
correspond to such assumptions—such as a change in the customary age of retirement or in the 
rate of return of investments—the fund balance is affected.  When actuarially determined assets 
do not meet actuarially determined liabilities, an unfunded liability is identified and the employer 
is expected to contribute sufficient funds to address the liability.   
Each year, the county pension board’s actuary produces an actuarial calculation of fund assets 
and liabilities that indicates the amount of the Annual Required Contribution (ARC) needed to 
bring the fund into balance.  The ARC includes the so-called “normal cost,” which is the 
projected growth in the present value of benefits generated by active employees in the upcoming 
year; as well as any payment required to address the unfunded liability.  The pension board 
transmits the ARC to the county executive and county board, which act on this recommendation 
in the annual budget.  
 
During the past decade, the county experienced a significant deterioration in the condition of its 
pension fund, which contributed to a precipitous increase in unfunded liabilities.  As shown in 
Table 3, assets exceeded liabilities by $171 million in 2000.  However, by 2005, the tables had 
turned and liabilities exceeded assets by $455 million, a net decline in fund balance of $626 
million in just five years.  Put another way, the pension fund had an “overfunded” status in 2000, 
as the value of its assets calculated as a percentage of liabilities was 111%.  By 2005, however, it 
had dropped to a serious level of “underfunding,” with assets comprising only 76% of actuarially 
projected liabilities. 
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To address this deficiency, the county’s Annual Required Contribution jumped from less than  
$1 million in 2000 to $25.2 million in 2003, $52.4 million in 2007, and to a budgeted $68 million 
in 2010.  In most years, the county appropriated the requisite funds required to meet the ARC.  
However, in a few years, actual county funding was lower than this amount.  In 2006, for 
example, the county provided only 53% of the $52.5 million required contribution.  According to 
county ordinances, any underpayment that occurs in a given year is repaid over the next five 
years.    
 
In the face of estimates that the county’s ARC would continue to rise dramatically in future 
years, Milwaukee County issued $398 million in Pension Obligation Bonds (POBs) in 2009 to 
finance its unfunded liability.  The State of Wisconsin had enacted legislation that permitted this 
action contingent upon the county taking certain measures to lower bond risk.  As shown in 
Table 3, the actuarial calculation at the end of 2008—made after the county authorized the 
issuance of POBs—determined that the anticipated issuance would eliminate most of the 
unfunded liability.  However, the fall-off in the stock market lowered the value of pension assets, 
and a re-calculation of fund position early in 2009 concluded that the county’s unfunded liability 
was back to $400 million. That number likely has been reduced because of strong investment 
returns during the remainder of 2009, but it also likely remains significant.   
 
Table 3: Milwaukee County Pension Funds, Assets, Liabilities,  
and Unfunded Liabilities, 2000 to 2008 (in millions) 
Year 
Actuarial value of 
assets 
Actuarial accrued 
liabilities 
Unfunded 
liabilities 
Percent 
funded 
2000 $1,670.6  $1,499.0  $171.6 111.4% 
2001 $1,620.2  $1,492.0  $128.2 108.6% 
2002 $1,446.9  $1,542.0  ($95.1) 93.8% 
2003 $1,446.7  $1,708.0  ($261.3) 84.7% 
2004 $1,424.9  $1,782.9  ($358.0) 79.9% 
2005 $1,454.3  $1,909.3  ($455.0) 76.2% 
2006 $1,525.5  $1,931.2  ($405.7) 79.0% 
2007 $1,627.3  $2,024.9  ($397.6) 80.4% 
2008* $1,968.5  $2,057.4  ($88.9) 95.7% 
* Includes projected issuance of POBs (issued March 2009 for $397 million) 
Source:  Milwaukee County, Annual Pension Board Reports 
 
It should be emphasized that the issuance of POBs does not relieve the county of a pension cost, 
but rather provides an alternative mechanism for financing that cost.  In effect, the county has 
exchanged a “soft liability” funded through annual budget deliberations for a “hard liability,” a 
legally binding obligation to pay bond holders.  The county anticipates that the difference 
between the bond’s interest rate and the anticipated rate of return of invested POB proceeds will 
generate a surplus of about $237 million when the 2009 POB debts are paid off in 30 years, 
assuming that the projected return rate is realized.  Another advantage is that scheduled POB 
debt service payments are the same each year.  In contrast, the ARC has varied considerably in 
recent years, exacerbating the challenges faced in each annual budget.  From 2002 to 2003, for 
example, the ARC rose by $17 million, and from 2005 to 2006 it climbed by $15 million. 
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Because a substantial unfunded liability remains, the county projects that its pension funding 
requirements will continue to rise.  Table 4 presents the county’s most recent projection for 
pension costs for 2010 and in the next five years (which do not take into account 2009 
investment performance).  In addition to including the normal cost and amortization of the 
unfunded liability, these costs also now include approximately $33 million annually for debt 
service on the POBs.   
 
Table 4: Projected Annual Required Contribution to County Pension Fund 2010 to 2015 
Year    Amount required 
2010* $68,284,400  
2011 $79,548,900  
2012 $88,997,500  
2013 $98,018,300  
2014 $100,284,200  
2015 $102,633,900  
* Budgeted 
 
Why have pension costs risen so rapidly that they now threaten Milwaukee County’s fiscal 
health?   One factor was the significant pension enhancements adopted by the county in 2000 and 
2001.  Those enhancements included a change in the multiplier used to calculate each retiree’s 
benefits (from 1.5% to 2% for most county employees).  At the same time, the county also 
approved two new pension benefits: a lump sum “backdrop” payment that employees could opt 
to receive at the time of retirement that provided a lucrative additional benefit for years worked 
past normal retirement age in exchange for a reduction in monthly pension income; and an extra 
25% boost to final average salary for county employees hired before 1982.  Those changes 
turned out to be very expensive and contributed significantly to a rise in unfunded liability.   
 
As the decade progressed, the county also suffered a series of investment blows that weakened 
the fund’s financial position.  From 2001 to 2003, for the first time since the second World War, 
the county’s pension fund sustained three consecutive years of investment losses.  Contrary to 
expectations, the fund earned an average rate of return of only 4% for the first nine years of the 
decade.  Many more county retirees also took backdrop payments than anticipated, and by 2008 
the county had paid out $142 million for that benefit.  Finally, fear that the benefit would be 
withdrawn led to a spike in retirements from 2002-2004, further weakening actuarial assets and 
liabilities. 
   
The county eliminated the backdrop benefit for non-represented county employees in 2002 and 
for represented employees between 2005 and 2007, but the elimination only applied to new 
employees.  The county considered nullifying all of the 2000-01 pension enhancements shortly 
after the pension scandal erupted in 2002, but its legal counsel opined that a pension benefit once 
granted constitutes a property right that government cannot take away.  
 
By 2007, the year before the decision to issue POBs was made, the pension fund’s financial 
profile for the decade had taken on a different character than the state’s two other pension funds 
and, indeed, many other major funds nationally.  As shown in Table 5, assets did not increase at 
all from 2000 to 2007, in contrast with other funds.  Also, while the overall percentage rise in the 
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 26 
 
county’s pension liabilities was similar to the general trend, liability increases occurred without 
any increase in payroll, normally a significant factor contributing to liability growth. 
  
Table 5: Changes in Pension Assets and Liabilities, and Payroll Milwaukee County, State 
of Wisconsin, and City of Milwaukee, 2000 to 2007* 
Year 
Change in 
actuarial value 
of assets 
Change in actuarial 
accrued liabilities 
Change in 
unfunded 
liabilities 
Change in 
payroll 
Milwaukee County         
Difference ($43.3) $525.9  ($569.2)  ($10.8) 
% Change -2.6% 35.1% -4.5% 
City of Milwaukee         
Difference $990.0  $970.0  $20.0  $73.1  
% Change 23.6% 32.5% 15.9% 
State of Wisconsin         
Difference $27,967.3  $26,086.1  $1,881.0 $2,398.0  
% Change 54.0% 48.3% 25.7% 
Public Fund Survey**         
Difference $459  $870  ($411) n/a 
% Change 23.0% 43.9% n/a 
* Dollars in millions except for Public Fund Survey, which are in billions 
** Survey of 125 major public pension funds; 2000 data not available, change is from 2001 to 2007 
 
In light of the mounting problems facing the county’s pension fund, a logical question is whether 
the pension benefits afforded county employees are competitive with other governments.  Table 
6 compares 2008 Milwaukee County pension benefits with those of the State of Wisconsin and 
the City of Milwaukee for full-time, union-represented general government employees.  This 
group constitutes about half the county’s current workforce (or two-thirds when part-time 
employees are not included).  A complete comparison of all employee groups would require 
separate study given the number of bargaining units and pension classifications.  Nevertheless, 
this comparison is useful in part because the benefits offered to general employees are similar in 
broad respects to benefits provided most other groups, with the exception of protective services. 
 
As Table 6 shows, some county pension benefits, such as the pension multiplier (2%) and 
minimum retirement age (60 years), mirror the city’s and are more generous than the state’s.  
The county also permits a larger maximum retirement payment (80% of final average earnings) 
than the city or state (70% of final average earnings), and unlike the city, has no employee 
pension contribution.  A study by the county’s audit department in 2005 comparing the county’s 
pension and health care benefits with public plans in Wisconsin and across the United States 
found the county benefits were “on the high end of the market” in regard to the pension plan’s 
formula multiplier and minimum age of retirement.  The report also found major components of 
the county’s health care plan, such as employee premiums, deductibles and co-pays, were 
comparable to other public plans, although, as explained below, the county pays the entire health 
insurance monthly premium of most retirees, a costly benefit rescinded in 1994 for new hires.   
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Table 6: Retirement Benefits Comparison of Milwaukee County, State of Wisconsin, and 
City of Milwaukee General Represented Employees Participating in Major Retirement 
Systems 
Characteristics Milwaukee County State of Wisconsin City of Milwaukee 
Type of benefit 
Defined benefit based on 
employee’s average earnings in 
final three consecutive years, 
years of service, and a formula 
factor 
Defined benefit based on 
employee’s average earnings in 
highest three years, years of 
service, formula multipliers and 
age at retirement. Money 
purchase paid if benefit based 
on contributions and 
investment earnings exceed 
formula benefit 
Defined benefit based on 
employee’s average 
earnings in three highest 
paid years, years of service, 
and formula factor 
Normal retirement age 
60 years of age (or when 
service + age = 75  
if hired before 1/1/94)* 
65 or 57 with 30 years of 
service 
60 years of age or 55 with 
30 years of service 
Minimum retirement age 55 (with 15 yrs of service) 55 55 (w/15 years of service) 
Employee contribution Non-contributory Employer contributes employee share 
Employer contributes 
employee share except 
employees hired after 
1/1/2000 pay 1.6% for first 
8 years of service and 
employees hired after 
1/1/2010 pay full employee 
share 
Vesting Period 5 years Immediate in most cases 4 years 
Benefit formula multiplier   2%* 1.765% for pre-2000 service  1.6% for post-1999 service 2% 
Benefit limitation 80% of final average earnings 70% of final average earnings 70% of average salary 
DROP benefit 
Option of lump-sum payment 
for a portion of pension payout, 
with reduced monthly payment 
thereafter, if hired before 
2/1/07 
None None 
Yearly post-retirement 
increases 2% 
Depends on investment 
earnings (no guarantee) 
1.5% after 12 months and 
after the 2nd, 3rd, & 4th 
years, and 2% thereafter 
Paid health insurance 
premiums** 
If hired before 1/1/94 +  
w/15 yrs of service No 
Pre-Medicare retirees (at 55 
yrs. w/30 yrs. of service or 
60 yrs. w/15 yrs. of service) 
have no charge for HMO & 
pay $30-$60/month for the 
Basic plan (a type of PPO)  
* In December 2009, the county adopted a change for non-represented workers (except elected officials) that 
extends the normal retirement age from 60 to 64 for new employees and reduces the multiplier from 2% to 1.6% for 
new employees and future years of service for existing employees.  Those changes have not yet been negotiated for 
represented employees.  
** County employees hired after 1993 and state employees can apply the value of unused sick leave at time of 
retirement toward health insurance premiums.  
  
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 28 
 
HEALTH CARE FUNDING 
 
Health care is Milwaukee County’s most costly fringe benefit, with actual expenditures of $138 
million in 2008, nearly three times pension expenditures.  In the early years of this decade, as 
shown earlier in Table 1, the county saw significant annual increases in health care expenditures, 
including increases of 16% in 2004 and 21% in 2005.  In recent years, this cost trajectory has 
moderated due to a number of cost saving measures, some one-time in nature.  To its credit, the 
county achieved cost control despite the fact that regional health care charges climbed 9% to 
11% in recent years.  
 
The county currently offers two health care options for its employees and retirees: an HMO-type 
plan that has no deductibles and limited out-of-pocket costs but requires members to use a 
specific network of providers; and a Preferred Provider Option (PPO) plan that features 
comprehensive benefits with deductibles and co-pays at both in- and out-of-network providers.  
Table 7 shows monthly and annual premium costs for the two plans, including the shares paid by 
employees and the county. 
  
Table 7: Employee and County Shares of Health Insurance Premiums in 2009 
  
Employee
monthly 
Employee
annual 
County 
monthly 
County 
annual 
Total 
monthly 
Total 
annual  
Active HMO comparable plan:   
Single  $35  $420  $485  $5,824  $520  $6,244  
Family $70  $840  $1,387  $16,642  $1,457  $17,482  
Active PPO comparable plan:   
Single  $75  $900  $905  $10,866  $980  $11,766  
Family $150  $1,800  $1,476  $17,713  $1,626  $19,513  
 
Milwaukee County’s health care costs are driven by a variety of factors, including the per-
employee premium rate, health care utilization, plan provisions (such as deductibles and co-pays) 
and administrative costs.  From 2006 to 2009, the county made a number of management 
changes that reduced the rate of cost increases.  The county achieved the greatest savings, 
amounting to more than $20 million, by shifting from a fully-insured to a self-insured health 
insurance model for the PPO and HMO plans.  Other savings resulted from changes in labor 
agreements, negotiation of deeper discounts with health care and pharmacy providers, and 
creation of a new Division of Employee Benefits to devote additional staff resources to 
controlling health care costs.  In January 2009, the county signed a contract with a new third-
party administrator that is expected to yield significant annual savings.  In December 2009, the 
county credited its new administrator for keeping health care expenditures about $8 million 
below budgeted levels.  
 
The health insurance premiums paid by county employees are roughly similar to those paid by 
the city and higher than those paid by state employees, with the employer in each case picking up 
the lion’s share of the total insurance charge.  County employees currently pay $35 to $75 per 
month toward individual insurance premiums and $70 to $150 per month for family premiums.  
City employees pay from $20 to $75 for individual premiums and $40 to $150 for family 
premiums.  More than 98% of state employees pay an individual rate of $31 or a family rate of 
$78.   
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Across the United States, public and private employers vary widely in their required employee 
health insurance contributions. According to the Employer Health Benefits 2008 Summary of 
Findings from The Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, the 
average monthly insurance payment made by public and private employees last year was $60 for 
single and $280 for family coverage.  
A striking portion of the county’s budgeted health care cost is for retired employees.  The county 
recently estimated, for example, that 49% of its actual health care expenditures in 2009 were 
attributed to retirees.  According to the county’s Employee Benefits Division, of the 10,318 
subscribers to county health care plans, 5,996 (58%) are retirees.  If dependents are included, 
9,121 (46%) of the total 19,666 county health care recipients are retirees or their family 
members.  
 
The significant proportion of retiree expenditures is due to several factors in addition to the sheer 
number of retired plan participants, including the following: 
 
• All workers who began employment before 1994 and have accumulated 15 years of service 
receive fully-paid health insurance premiums for themselves, their spouses and eligible 
dependents during retirement.  Hence, the cost to the county of insuring those individuals is 
not offset with any corresponding revenue other than co-payments and deductibles.  While 
the county ended this free health care benefit for new employees 15 years ago, most retirees 
were hired before that date.  In addition, the audit department reports that as of the end of 
2008, 2,054 active county employees were eligible for this benefit. 
 
• The mix of retirees in the county’s PPO plan versus its less expensive HMO plan is almost 
the reverse of the mix for active employees.  Of the 5,996 retired county health care 
subscribers, 4,272 (71%) subscribe to the PPO plan.  Conversely, of the 4,322 active 
subscribers, only 815 (19%) subscribe to the PPO.  This dynamic is attributable both to the 
fact that the significantly lower premium contributions for the HMO hold no attraction to 
retirees, who do not have premium contributions; and the fact that many retirees wish to 
retain the ability to utilize out-of-network providers, even if those providers cost more.  Until 
the county switched to a nationwide HMO network a few years ago, another factor was that 
those retirees who lived outside of Milwaukee County did not have access to the HMO 
network. 
 
• The biggest problem for the county from a fiscal perspective is insuring the subset of “early 
retirees” who retire prior to reaching the age of Medicare eligibility.  When such a retiree 
becomes eligible for Medicare, the county provides a less expensive supplemental insurance 
plan that essentially pays the difference between Medicare coverage and the cost of services 
provided under the county plan.  Up until that time, the county pays the entire health care 
premium cost for a large population of individuals who are predominantly enrolled in its 
more expensive health care option.  Of the 5,996 retired health care subscribers, 2,091 (35%) 
fall into this “early retiree” category.      
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The county will be paying the cost of this retirement benefit for many decades.  An actuarial 
analysis conducted on behalf of the county by Cambridge Associates indicates costs will not 
reach their peak for about another 15 years, growing over this period by two to four million 
dollars per year.  Table 8 provides Cambridge Associates’ estimate for retiree health care costs 
for the next five years.  Cambridge projects these payments will gradually begin to decline in the 
2020s and end in about 2065.  
     
Table 8: Projected Health Care Costs For Retirees, 2011 to 2015 
Year Health care costs 
2011 $91,956,800  
2012 $95,310,700  
2013 $98,318,500  
2014 $101,105,600  
2015 $103,691,200  
Source: Cambridge Advisory Group, 2009 
 
The explanation for the long life of these costs lies in demographics.  An employee who joined 
the county in 1992, works for 30 years, and then draws retirement for another 30 years, will 
continue to receive this benefit until 2053.  This dynamic also speaks to the early age of 
retirement of county employees, many of whom have taken advantage of the “Rule of 75” 
(allowing for retirement when combined age and years of service equal 75) to retire in their late 
40s or early 50s.  While the Rule of 75 was phased out during the 1990s and earlier this decade, 
the department of audit estimates that more than 2,300 active employees still qualify for this 
provision. 
 
Retiree health insurance is a so-called Other Post-Employment Benefit (OPEB) that the county 
budgets on a pay-as-you-go basis.  Unlike its pension liability, there is no obligation for the 
county to fund annually any portion of the actuarially projected OPEB liability (except the small 
portion attributed to enterprise fund departments).  In 2004, the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB), concerned that many state and local governments were failing to set 
aside funding for future OPEB liabilities, issued GASB Rule #45, requiring governments to 
include in their financial statement “the total amount that will be owed to all employees when 
they retire.”  The purpose of GASB #45 is to shine a light on this serious problem and stimulate 
local governments to address their unfunded retiree health care costs. 
 
Since issuance of GASB #45, Milwaukee County has contracted for two independent analyses of 
its unfunded OPEB liability.  The Cambridge Advisory Group conducted an actuarial evaluation 
in June 2009 that calculated unfunded OPEB liabilities at $1.5 billion.  In a 2006 analysis, the 
firm had estimated this amount at $1.3 billion.  Cambridge determined that the county would 
need to allocate an additional $54 million per year – above the annual amount spent on a pay-as-
you-go basis  – for 30 years to pay off this unfunded liability. A 2008 Wisconsin Policy Research 
Institute report found that Milwaukee County has the second largest unfunded health care 
liability of local governments in southeastern Wisconsin—behind the Milwaukee Public Schools 
at $2.2 billion and ahead of the City of Milwaukee at $806 million. 
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Most local and state governments address their unfunded OPEB costs in one of three ways:  
eliminate or reduce the benefit; issue a variation of pension obligation bonds to fund the liability; 
or continue to pay only the costs incurred in a particular budget year.   
 
In 2003, the State of Wisconsin issued $600 million in bonds for unfunded retiree health care 
costs (unrelated to health insurance premiums), becoming the first state to bond for this purpose.  
Milwaukee County could seek to reduce the amount and duration of its OPEB costs by issuing 
bonds as well.  However, the debt service payments would exceed $50 million annually and 
would continue for 30 years.  The alternative is to continue pay-as-you-go for the life span of the 
retirees.  This practice spreads county costs but maintains the funding of a defunct benefit for a 
very long period of time.  
 
With regard to the question of eliminating or reducing the benefit, county attorneys previously 
have opined that because the free health insurance benefit is contained in the section of the 
county ordinances that stipulates pension benefits, this benefit similarly is considered a “property 
right” for those who already are receiving it and therefore cannot be legally changed.  According 
to a 2006 article in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, county officials did consider attempting to 
eliminate the benefit for future retirees, but feared another huge spike in retirements and certain 
litigation.2 
 
The county does have the ability to attempt to reduce retiree health care costs by providing a 
lower level of health care benefit (such as increasing co-payments or deductibles or providing 
more limited coverage).  The legal opinion of county attorneys in that case, however, is that 
retirees must have access to the same health care plans and coverage as active employees.  
Consequently, any such changes would need to similarly apply to represented workers and would 
need to be negotiated as part of collective bargaining. 
 
Finally, the county could attempt to make changes to its health care offerings and co-payment 
and deductible structure that would make the HMO option more attractive to pre-Medicare 
retirees.  These options are somewhat limited in light of the fact that adjustments to premium 
contributions are not possible, and any such changes would have to apply to active employees 
and be negotiated with county labor unions.  Still, the county has been discussing options with its 
unions that may result in less discrepancy between the number of retirees and active employees 
subscribing to the less expensive HMO plan. 
 
Overall, one of the county’s major success stories in recent years has been its ability to control 
health care expenditures.  This success has resulted largely from its decision to retain expert 
consultants and hire employee benefits professionals to better manage its health care program.  
The more troublesome news, however, is that the county’s ability to control costs by overhauling 
the structure of its health care operations – as opposed to modifying its health care benefits – has 
been largely exhausted.  Consequently, county expenditures likely will approximate the future 
rate of health care cost increases in the region barring significant changes in plan design.  In light 
of the $138 million health care budget, that could mean annual increases of at least $10 million 
to $15 million annually for the foreseeable future.         
                                                 
2 Avrum D. Lank and Dave Umhoefer, “Retiree Benefits Drain Finance,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 7, 2006. 
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BUDGETING FRINGE BENEFITS 
 
Milwaukee County’s procedures for budgeting fringe benefit expenditures at the departmental 
level have substantially impacted the overall operating condition of the county.  Customarily, 
fringe benefits are included in a department’s budget.  The reason for this practice is that 
department managers should have responsibility and accountability for their full administrative 
costs.  Indeed, it is difficult to properly manage a department’s finances without such control.  If 
fringes are not part of a department’s budget, a department administrator might not set user fees 
that adequately support some costs of operations.  Or, he or she might be unable to properly 
advise elected officials about the fiscal effects of proposed program and personnel changes. 
 
This textbook approach to budgeting fringe benefits assumes that fringe costs are part of program 
operations.  How should fringe benefits be budgeted, however, when they are not related to this 
purpose but are benefits guaranteed to retirees?  The question is not theoretical.  The county’s 
controller estimated in mid-2009 that Milwaukee County’s total fringe benefit costs in that year 
would total $178 million, with $76 million of that amount attributed to unfunded obligations to 
retirees.   
 
The county’s response to this question has been to choose to allocate all fringe benefit costs to 
departments, including legacy costs related to those no longer working for county government.  
The allocation is based on a formula that assigns each department a flat fringe amount for each 
of its full-time-equivalent employees (FTEs).    
 
Because of differences in the composition of departmental revenues, fringe benefit financing 
impacts some departments differently than others.  Departments supported by fees and contracts 
are favored since their budgetary revenues are more easily raised in accordance with rising costs, 
or because they have a smaller proportion of personnel costs to other costs.  In contrast, 
departments supported primarily by property taxes and with a high proportion of FTEs have a 
more difficult time.  Many property tax levy-supported units have cut back on programs and 
personnel to a substantial degree in order to finance their active and legacy fringe costs.  As these 
fiscal pressures continue from year to year, they shape the overall structure and composition of 
Milwaukee County government itself.   
 
The original idea behind the fringe methodology undoubtedly was to encourage departments to 
undertake program efficiencies and propose new sources of revenue as a way of addressing the 
county’s escalating pension and health care costs.  Department heads arguably are best placed to 
identify cost efficiencies and to develop alternative revenue sources that might sustain rapidly 
increasing expenditures.  It also could be argued, however, that the level of expenditures on 
fringe benefits soon went beyond what program efficiencies or fee increases might sustainably 
support.   
 
The Forum’s March 2009 evaluation of Milwaukee County’s fiscal condition demonstrated how 
fringe benefits had grown and affected departmental budgets over a five-year period from 2003 
to 2007.  In Table 9, this information is updated for select departments.  As shown, all units have 
experienced increases in their fringe costs over this seven-year span.  Fringe costs vary among 
the departments because of differences in personnel.  Some departments, such as the county 
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parks, employ seasonal workers who receive lesser fringe benefits, and other departments have a 
greater share of non-personnel expenditures, such as contract costs. 
 
Table 9: Fringe Benefits as a Proportion of Total Expenditures, 2003 to 2009 
  2003 2009* 
Department 
Fringe 
benefits Fringe % 
Fringe 
benefits Fringe % 
County Board $1,172,500 24.8% $2,196,800 33.1% 
Procurement $192,900 23.7% $259,600 29.1% 
County Ex--General Office $272,900 28.3% $400,400 29.6% 
Corporation Counsel $618,300 38.6% $937,700 50.7% 
Human Resources $1,078,200 25.1% $1,149,900 38.0% 
Fiscal Affairs $984,100 30.2% $1,816,900 43.7% 
Combined Court Related Operations  $5,608,200 15.1% $10,367,000 20.3% 
County Treasurer $146,900 12.0% $299,200 19.3% 
Register of Deeds $783,900 18.9% $1,444,400 33.8% 
Sheriff** $28,036,200 25.5% $33,430,700 35.9% 
District Attorney $3,068,800 23.1% $5,694,100 27.7% 
Department of Human Services $12,688,700 7.9% $25,434,400 12.8% 
Department of Parks $5,997,500 14.9% $9,630,800 22.0% 
Zoo $2,073,000 11.1% $4,366,300 18.3% 
Behavioral Health $15,795,100 11.5% $28,440,500 16.6% 
* Budgeted 
** Includes House of Correction 
 
The Forum’s March 2009 report showed that one of the major consequences of the county’s 
budget strategy was to reduce the purchasing power of small and/or administrative units that rely 
almost exclusively upon property tax revenue.  The report found that, after subtracting fringe 
benefit expenditures from total expenditures, some departments had suffered a major cut to their 
expenditure budgets, including key central services departments that are critical to the 
performance of every county function. These included procurement, corporation counsel, fiscal 
affairs, and human resources.  
 
For the purposes of this report, which is focused on governance reform, the county’s fringe 
benefit methodology creates a certain impetus toward the status quo and against large-
scale change.  While perhaps unintended, embedding legacy costs in departmental budgets has 
made governance reform more difficult.  Reform proposals that would establish new authorities 
for transit or parks, or that would shift responsibilities for judicial or social services from the 
county to the state, also now must resolve retiree fringe benefit financing issues.   
 
Problems arise because it is assumed, and probably rightfully so, that the new organizational 
home of a transferred program would be unwilling to assume responsibility for liabilities 
attributed to former employees.  As a result, it seems likely that program operations and related 
revenues and expenditures would transfer to the new governing body, but the parts of the 
department’s budget now dedicated to retiree benefit costs would remain the responsibility of the 
county.  The county then might have to budget these legacy costs across fewer departments, 
further exacerbating their budget pressures.     
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While doing nothing to reduce the cost of legacy obligations, a methodology in which retiree 
benefit costs were isolated in a distinct part of the county budget at least would lead to a simpler 
analysis of the true costs associated with each county function.  Later sections of this report 
discuss this issue in more detail. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
During the past decade, fringe benefit costs have overwhelmed the Milwaukee County budget.  
Combined annual pension and health care expenditures climbed from $67 million in 2000 to 
$179 million in 2008 despite a dramatic decrease in the size of the county workforce.  It is 
anticipated that fringe increases will continue to accumulate in future years, driven by unfunded 
pension liabilities and the rising cost of health care.   
 
As a result of those increases and its other fiscal pressures, Milwaukee County has made major 
budget cuts and edged closer to a full-blown fiscal crisis.  While the county has sought to curtail 
fringe benefit costs, its measures have not proved equal to the task, in part because outside events 
such as the fall in the stock market have worsened the problem and undermined solutions.  
Proposed changes in the 2010 budget may indicate the county is headed in a new direction.3  
Nevertheless, prudence and a decade worth of experience suggest that escalating fringe benefit 
costs will continue to be a major contributor to the county’s structural deficit.      
 
It is important to note that there have been times in the county’s history when it was able to 
shoulder significant retiree benefit costs.  In the 1980s, for example, the county made substantial 
contributions to its pension fund that exceeded the amount it is contributing today when adjusted 
for inflation and considered as a percentage of total county property taxes.  Prior to this decade, 
however, the county enjoyed much larger average annual returns on its pension fund 
investments, much greater elasticity in its state revenue streams, and a much larger workforce 
across which to spread its retirement benefit costs.  It is the county’s current fiscal condition and 
prospects that necessitate consideration of changes to its retirement benefits structure.   
 
The county also should strongly consider a change in budgeting philosophy and methodology 
with regard to retiree benefits.  The linkage of legacy costs to departmental operations has 
seriously weakened many functions of county government in a non-strategic manner.  An 
alternative approach in which budget allocations are driven instead by clearly articulated 
priorities is needed.   
 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the financing of fringe benefits is inextricably connected 
to large-scale organizational reform.  Potential governance changes that would place certain 
county functions under independent governing authorities or state government must take into 
account the legacy costs of those departments.  No governance reform can occur unless and until 
it is decided how those costs would be financed under alternative governance arrangements.  The 
following chapters will discuss those costs and policy options.    
                                                 
3 The 2010 county budget includes several fringe benefit changes, including a reduction in the pension multiplier 
from 2% to 1.6% for future service effective in 2010; an increase in the normal retirement age from 60 to 64 for new 
hires; and higher deductibles, out-of-network co-payments and premium contributions.   Those modifications, 
however, are subject to collective bargaining for the roughly 85% of county workers represented by unions. 
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CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE WILL IMPACT PUBLIC  
RETIREMENT BENEFITS IN COMPLEX WAYS  
 
The county’s legacy obligations not only have a considerable impact on its financial outlook, but 
those obligations also create complexities with regard to the potential transfer of county functions 
to other governments.  Two relatively recent examples shed light on the nature of those 
complexities and how they might be addressed. 
Transfer of assistant district attorneys to the state  
In January 1990, the state adopted legislation requiring the transfer of all Wisconsin prosecutors 
from county to state employment.  Most Milwaukee County district attorneys were given the 
option to retain county benefits or take benefits from the state.   Section 978.12 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes spelled out the specific options given prosecutors: 
• All transferring district attorneys could choose to retain county health insurance.  For those 
prosecutors who retained county health insurance, the state provides the county with a 
reimbursement payment that is equal to the cost incurred by the county or an amount 
equivalent to comparable coverage under the state insurance plan, whichever is less.  The 
county is responsible for funding the difference between the state’s payment and the actual 
cost of the county plan.   
• All vested district attorneys could choose to remain in the county pension system.  Those not 
vested in the county system were required to transfer to the state retirement system.  For 
those prosecutors who retained county pension benefits, the state provides the county with a 
payment that is equal to the county’s employer contribution rate or an amount equivalent to 
the state’s employer contribution rate, whichever is less.  The county is responsible for 
supporting the difference between the state’s payment and the actual employer contribution 
made by the county on the prosecutor’s behalf.  Until recently, the state fully reimbursed 
Milwaukee County for the actual employer contribution made on behalf of prosecutors that 
remained in the county system.  However, when the county’s pension costs spiraled, the state 
capped its reimbursement to 14.3% of salary.    
• All transferring Milwaukee County prosecutors that reached 15 years of service, regardless 
of whether those years accrued as a county or a state employee, were deemed eligible for free 
health care at retirement to be paid by the county.   
Litigation arose out of the second provision above, regarding non-vested Milwaukee County 
prosecutors who moved to the state retirement system.  Roughly 40 prosecutors were short of 
vesting in the county system at the time of their transfer to state employment but were not 
expected to forego their prior service credits.  The question was who would pay for the liabilities 
already incurred by that prior service.   
State legislation required Milwaukee County to transfer employer contributions made on behalf 
of those prosecutors from the county retirement plan to the state plan.  That decision triggered a 
lawsuit from Milwaukee County, which charged that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment and 
unconstitutionally took funds intended for the benefit of vested county employees and retirees.   
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The case made its way to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which ruled in 1996 that a pension 
fund’s liabilities, assets, and annual contributions are managed collectively and in such a manner 
that if any fraction of any piece is removed, it could jeopardize the system’s strength and is 
therefore generally prohibited.  While the court opinion also recognized that there are certain 
situations where changes are needed and acceptable, such as when a fund is insolvent or 
financially strained, its ruling caused the state to establish a different mechanism for addressing 
prior service costs for non-vested district attorneys.   
Transfer of the Milwaukee Public Museum from the county to a new non-profit organization 
In 1992, Milwaukee County peeled off Milwaukee Public Museum operations from county 
government and housed them instead in a new independent non-profit organization, Milwaukee 
Public Museum, Inc. (MPM).   As part of that arrangement, the county and MPM established an 
agreement that required MPM to offer jobs to all former county museum workers and to provide 
benefits that were substantially equivalent to the benefits provided by the county.   
Consequently, two pension plans were created: a new defined benefit plan for employees who 
had transferred from the county and had already vested in the county system; and a defined 
contribution plan for new workers and former county workers who had not yet met county 
vesting requirements.   
Unlike the assistant district attorneys, vested county museum employees did not have the option 
of retaining county pension benefits, which meant that many of those employees would retire 
having vested in two pension systems.  These cases are similar, however, in that the county 
pension system retained the prior service liability of anyone already vested in the system.  Like 
the Wisconsin Retirement System, the MPM defined contribution plan did face some past 
liability in terms of recognizing the prior service of non-vested county employees.  The county 
did not transfer any funds to MPM in order to support that cost. 
In regard to retiree health care benefits, MPM was contractually bound to provide benefits similar 
to those of the county.  Upon retirement, former county employees having 15 years of county 
service can choose whether or not to be part of the county health care plan or that of MPM.  
Employees who did not have 15 years of service as of the time of the transfer were required to 
receive health care through the MPM plan.  The county supports the cost of eligible employees 
choosing county health care, while MPM supports those who opt into its plan.   
Summary 
These examples provide insight into the types of benefits-related issues that would need to be 
resolved in any potential transfer of functions and employees from county government to 
alternative government entities.   Issues that would need to be decided or negotiated would 
involve not only the retirement benefits already earned by active vested employees, but issues 
such as prior service credit of non-vested employees, and calculation and payment of differences 
in the value of health care plans.    
In addition, the Supreme Court ruling that arose from the transfer of assistant district attorneys 
reflects the fact that Milwaukee County’s pension system represents a collective property right, 
which ensures that any effort to transfer any of the fund’s assets or contributions to other 
retirement systems would receive considerable legal scrutiny.   
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SECTION II 
 
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSES 
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County government in Wisconsin dates back to 1818, when the territorial governor created three 
counties to perform law enforcement and taxing functions.4  Today, county governments exist as 
creations of the State of Wisconsin, with specific reference in the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Article IV, Section 23 empowers the legislature to “establish one or more systems of county 
government,” while Section 22 allows the legislature to “confer upon the boards of 
supervisors…such powers of a local, legislative and administrative character as they shall from 
time to time prescribe.”  A separate article identifies county officers, including sheriffs and 
district attorneys.  Consequently, any effort to eliminate Milwaukee County government likely 
would engender debate about the necessity of a constitutional amendment to do so. 
Notwithstanding that question, consideration of a new structure for Milwaukee County 
government also should take into account the constitutional and statutory purpose of counties.  
Unlike cities and villages, counties do not have constitutional “home rule” authority, which 
means they only may undertake functions expressly granted to them by state statutes.  In fact, 
many refer to counties as “administrative arms of state government” 5 to connote their design by 
the state to administer local functions on its behalf, but not necessarily to do anything more.   
Milwaukee County, of course, does much more, which is a reason for its unique nature and, 
arguably, its unique problems.  A good deal of the public debate about Milwaukee County’s 
financial challenges, for example, has centered on the condition of its parks, cultural facilities 
and transit system – three functional areas that Milwaukee County government elected to assume 
with the permission of state government, but not at its behest.   
In this section, with this brief history in mind, we temporarily put aside the question of 
eliminating Milwaukee County government, and instead examine each major county function 
individually.  This approach allows us to explore why the county is performing the function; 
whether transferring it to a different government body is logistically and politically viable; and 
whether doing so would improve its quality and cost effectiveness.  If the answer turns out to be 
affirmative, then perhaps the transfer should be considered notwithstanding the larger question of 
county government’s overall future.  Furthermore, if that conclusion is reached for enough major 
functions, then the idea of eliminating the government altogether becomes more attractive.    
Conversely, if this analysis yields the conclusion that Milwaukee County government is the 
appropriate administrator for most of its existing functions, then consideration might turn to 
streamlining the government, reforming its governance structure, or simply focusing on its far-
reaching financial problems.     
In analyzing each major function of Milwaukee County government, we break down functional 
budgets to demonstrate the impact of legacy costs; explore alternative government bodies that 
might logically house the function; and briefly examine pros, cons and logistical considerations.  
Major functions are defined primarily based on the size of their workforce and budget and their 
community impact.  There are several other important functions of county government that also 
merit discussion, but those are discussed in lesser detail for the sake of brevity.    
                                                 
4 UW Extension Local Government Center, “County Government in Wisconsin,” March 2003. 
5 Wisconsin Counties Association, “County Government: History, Services Funding.”  
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AIRPORTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Milwaukee County’s Airport Division provides and manages air transportation services at 
General Mitchell International Airport (GMIA) and Lawrence J. Timmerman Field.  GMIA is 
the state’s largest airport and provides commercial, military and general aviation services.  
Timmerman Airport serves primarily general aviation and is a reliever airport for GMIA.  The 
county’s authority to operate airports is granted under Chapters 59 and 114 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes.    
 
The Airport Division operates under the purview of the county’s Department of Transportation 
and Public Works.  The division operates as an enterprise fund in county government, which 
means that it functions as an independent business unit that is designed to pay and recover its 
own costs.  The Airport Division maintains a long-term agreement with GMIA’s signatory 
airlines, under which all operating expenses and debt service costs at GMIA are recovered 
through rates and charges assessed to users, including terminal and land rentals, concession fees 
and landing fees.  
 
Milwaukee County has owned and operated GMIA since 1926, when the county purchased a 
small airport at the current site from a private individual.  GMIA has undergone significant 
expansion in recent years to keep up with its growing demand, including a 16-gate expansion in 
1990, a 3,000-space parking garage expansion in 2002, and an eight-gate expansion in 2007.  
GMIA’s passenger totals have increased steadily for most of this decade, from about six million 
passengers annually at the beginning of the decade to a record total of just below eight million in 
2008.  The airport is served by 12 airlines and offers non-stop service to 50 cities. 
 
According to a November 2006 report prepared by a work group consisting of county fiscal and 
legal staff, the current value of the county’s airport land, structures, furnishings and equipment 
was $437 million, with a net value after accumulated depreciation of $227 million.  A similar 
report in 2006 also noted that the county had provided $244 million in capital investment at 
GMIA during the previous 10 years.  An additional $142 million in capital projects for the 
airport was authorized as part of a recently approved three-year countywide capital improvement 
program for 2009 and 2010.    
 
The total budget for the Airport Division in 2009 was about $77 million, consisting of $76 
million for GMIA and $590,000 for Timmerman.  As noted above, all airport expenditures are 
recovered from charges to airlines and fees paid by other users, meaning that no county property 
tax levy is required to fund airport operations.  In addition to being fully reimbursed for direct 
costs associated with active employees and operations, the county charges the airlines on an 
annual basis for the airport’s share of county legacy and other indirect costs. 
 
It is important to note that the Airport Division, while operating as a separate business enterprise, 
is a significant purchaser of county services.   Consequently, a shift in airport governance could 
have significant impacts on other county departments if the new governing body did not 
similarly utilize county services.  For example, the 2009 budget authorized 63 sheriff positions to 
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provide security services at GMIA at a cost of $7.2 million.  The sheriff charges the airport for 
this service.  Charges to the airlines and about $250,000 of citation and grant revenue pay the 
security bill.   The county also bills the airport for more than $3.5 million annually for 
administrative services, including audit, legal services, fleet management, accounting/payroll and 
human resource functions.    
 
The Airport is the sixth largest county organizational unit in terms of its number of employees, 
with 270 full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) in the 2009 budget. 
 
BUDGET BREAKDOWN 
 
Table 10 breaks down the Airport Division’s actual expenditures and revenue in 2008, showing 
both total costs and costs when legacy obligations are subtracted .  This analysis shows that the 
Division spent $3.7 million on central service charges from other county departments, $20.9 
million on its own personnel, and $48.4 million on non-personnel expenditures, including fuel 
and commodities, security services, and capital outlays.   
 
The analysis also shows that $356,000 of the airport’s central service charges and $3.2 million of 
its personnel expenditures were not directly connected to the cost of providing or administering 
aviation services, but instead were county legacy costs distributed to the department by the 
central budget office.  This tells us that if a different entity had provided the same services, 
secured administrative overhead at the same price, and paid the same wages and benefits 
to its active employees in 2008, it potentially could have administered airport operations for 
$3.5 million less if it was not responsible for the Airport Division’s share of the county’s 
legacy costs.   
 
As explained in Section I, the county budget office allocates legacy costs to departments based 
on their number of active employees, as opposed to their actual number of retirees.  Our analysis 
shows that if legacy costs had been distributed to the airport on the basis of its actual number of 
retirees, those costs would have totaled $2.2 million.  This $2.2 million figure represents a more 
accurate depiction of the approximate annual county legacy obligation held by the Airport 
Division.  As with every other function analyzed in this report, under a change in governance 
these legacy costs either could be assumed by the function’s new governing body, or they could 
remain the responsibility of county government or county taxpayers (if county government no 
longer existed).      
 
Finally, in terms of the division’s overall share of the county’s outstanding liabilities, its share of 
the county’s pension fund liability (consisting of both pension obligation bond (POB) debt and 
the unfunded liability) is $11.4 million, and total General Obligation debt on airport facilities is 
$4.6 million.  A much larger portion of the airport’s long-term debt consists of revenue bonds 
that are paid off with dedicated airport revenues.  The airport also has been able to avoid debt 
financing by funding many of its capital projects on a “pay-as-you-go” basis with Passenger 
Facility Charge revenue collected on airline fares.  As an enterprise fund, the airport has been 
charged for its share of the county’s other post-employment benefit (OPEB) liability on an 
annual basis, so no outstanding OPEB liability exists.   
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Table 10: Breakdown of Airport Division’s 2008 Actual Expenditures and Revenues and 
Legacy Costs 
Airport 
Cost to operate 
as county 
department 
(current practice) 
Cost to operate 
minus legacy 
costs Legacy costs 
      
Using 2008 
fringe allocation 
method* 
Based on 
retiree history** 
Administrative $1,606,960  $1,450,104  $156,856  $152,160  
Information technology $274,732  $247,915  $26,817  $26,014  
Legal counsel $310,008  $279,748  $30,260  $29,354  
Facility management $329,082  $296,960  $32,122  $31,160  
Fleet management*** $1,131,453  $1,021,012  $110,441  $107,135  
Central charges/overhead $3,652,235  $3,295,739  $356,496  $345,822  
Salary and wages $10,265,495  $10,265,495  $0  $0  
Social security $761,464  $761,464  $0  $0  
Employee healthcare $2,650,691  $2,650,691  $0  $0  
Employee pension $1,047,250  $1,047,250  $0  $0  
Retiree healthcare $2,650,691  $0  $2,650,691  $1,570,121  
Retiree pension $523,625  $0  $523,625  $320,448  
OPEB liability (proprietary fund) $2,191,590  $2,191,590  $0  $0  
Other $803,940  $803,940  $0  $0  
Personnel costs $20,894,746  $17,720,430  $3,174,316  $1,890,569 
Non-personnel expenditures $48,350,582  $48,350,582  $0  $0  
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $72,897,563  $69,366,751  $3,530,812  $2,236,391  
State revenue $0  $0  $0  $0  
Federal revenue $0  $0  $0  $0  
Other revenue $75,655,542  $72,124,730  $0  $0  
TOTAL REVENUES**** $75,655,542  $72,124,730  $0  $0  
          
TOTAL LEVY ($2,757,979) ($2,757,979) $3,530,812  $2,236,391  
Unfunded pension liability***** $11,402,938  $11,402,938 $11,402,938  $11,402,938  
Outstanding debt/interest $4,616,071  $4,616,071  $4,616,071 $4,616,071 
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT $16,019,009  $16,019,009 $16,019,009 $16,019,009 
*  In 2008, the county distributed legacy costs evenly to all departments based on number of active employees and 
salary levels. 
**  This method distributes legacy costs according to a department's retiree history. 
*** Beginning in 2009, the Airport Division assumed responsibility for its own fleet management expenses, which 
eliminated most of the fleet management central service charge. 
****Because airport legacy costs are paid by signatory airlines, revenues are reduced by the same amount as 
legacy expenditures.    
***** Estimated liability allocated to department is based on the department's retiree history. 
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POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
The potential alternative governance structure for aviation services in Milwaukee County that 
has received the most public discussion is creation of a separate airport district to govern the 
operations of GMIA and Timmerman Field.  Unlike general purpose governments, special 
districts only provide one or two particular services.  Districts typically are created by legislative 
action, court action, or popular referendum.  They also generally are given authority to dictate 
their own budget, issue bonds, and tax citizens within district boundaries.  Management is 
provided by a board of commissioners that can be appointed or elected.  The section below 
provides a brief analysis of that option. 
 
Another concept that has been proposed for study by the current county executive is a long-term 
lease of the airport to a private operator.  That concept is not discussed in this section of the 
report, which focuses on alternative governance (as opposed to alternative operators) of county 
services.  It is mentioned, however, in a later section regarding potential strategies for addressing 
the county’s fiscal crisis. 
 
Discussion 
 
The concept of a separate airport authority for Milwaukee County was the subject of heated 
debate earlier this decade.  In December 2005, State Representative Jeff Stone and State Senator 
Jeff Plale – both of whom represent parts of Milwaukee County – announced their intention to 
draft legislation to authorize creation of airport districts throughout the state.  After a series of 
meetings that included the county executive and other members of his administration, as well as 
area business leaders, Assembly Bill 1089 was introduced by Representative Stone and others in 
the Wisconsin Legislature on March 6, 2006.  That legislation included the following provisions: 
 
• Mandated creation of an airport district in Milwaukee County.  For other areas of the state, 
authorization was provided for one or more local governmental units to elect to create airport 
districts upon passage of resolutions by appropriate governing bodies. 
 
• Specified that the Milwaukee County district would be governed by a board consisting of 
four persons appointed by the governor and three persons appointed by the county executive, 
each of whom would be subject to confirmation by the relevant legislative body.  One of the 
governor’s appointees and one of the county executive’s appointees would have to be from 
Cudahy, Oak Creek, St. Francis, or South Milwaukee.  No member of the board could hold a 
state or local elective office. 
 
• Required Milwaukee County to transfer and assign all of its rights, title, and interest in the 
airport and airport facilities that it owns or operates to the district upon its creation.  In turn, 
the district would be required to accept all obligations and liabilities of the county related to 
the airport and airport facilities. 
 
This legislation was not adopted by the Legislature, though a Special Committee on Airport 
Authorities was established by the Legislature’s Joint Legislative Council in June 2006.  The 
special committee met six times between September 2006 and July 2007 and produced 
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 43 
 
recommended legislation in December 2007.  The recommended legislation – which was not 
introduced in either the Assembly or Senate – differed from AB 1089 in a few key ways.  Instead 
of mandating creation of an airport authority for Milwaukee County, for example, it authorized 
creation of such an authority.  It also had a different board composition that granted additional 
appointing authority to chief elected officials in municipalities surrounding GMIA and adjacent 
counties.  Finally, the proposed legislation called for transfer agreements to be negotiated 
between local governmental units and local airport authorities that would dictate treatment of 
liabilities and obligations. 
 
Although legislative proposals to authorize creation of airport districts have not taken hold in 
Wisconsin, they are not uncommon elsewhere in the country.  Such districts typically take one of 
two forms: authorities designed for the sole purpose of maintaining, operating and improving 
aviation facilities; and authorities that administer and operate a broad range of transportation 
functions, including aviation.   
 
In regard to the former, Table 11 provides examples of airport districts from Wayne County, 
Michigan; Metropolitan Washington, DC; Columbus, Ohio; Orlando, Florida; and San Diego, 
California. 
 
The authorities listed in this table vary by location and scope of service provision, but a close 
examination of their structure illustrates several similarities.  First, the responsibilities tasked to 
the districts are very similar, with each district granted authority to operate, maintain, and 
improve airport facilities and operations.  Beyond these functions, the authority generally has 
some influence over land use in or around their properties.  Second, the governance structure of 
these authorities is similar.  The districts generally are controlled by a board of commissioners 
that can range from seven to 13 members.  A board serves as the controlling body of each district 
and it hires management staff to oversee daily operations.  Third, none of the authorities shown 
in Table 11 are taxpayer-funded.  Revenue is obtained from fees, rents, concessions and grants.  
The authorities also are allowed to issue debt in order to fund significant capital projects.  
Finally, four of the five authorities listed in Table 11 operate more than one airport facility.   
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Table 11: County, Metro and Regional Airport Authorities 
  Wayne County 
Airport Authority 
Metropolitan 
Washington 
Airports Authority
Columbus Regional 
Airport Authority 
Greater Orlando 
Aviation Authority 
San Diego County 
Regional Airport 
Authority 
Established The Wayne County 
Airport Authority was 
created under 
legislation that was 
signed into law in 
March 2002 and 
became effective in 
April 2002. 
The U.S. DOT 
transferred control of 
the airports to the 
Authority on June 7, 
1987, for a 50-year 
period; in 2003, the 
lease was extended for 
30 years. 
The Columbus Regional 
Airport Authority was 
created in July 1990 by an 
action of the Columbus 
City Council as provided by 
the Ohio Revised Code. 
The Authority was 
established in 1957 by 
legislation passed by the 
Florida Legislature.  
The City of Orlando 
owns both airports. 
The Authority assumed 
ownership and operations of 
San Diego International 
Airport from the Unified Port 
of San Diego in January 
2003. 
Population 
served 
Wayne Co.: 2,061,162 Washington: 572,059 Columbus: 711,470 Orlando: 185,951 San Diego Co.: 2,813,833 
Detroit MSA: 
4,452,557 
Wash. MSA: 4,796,183 Columbus MSA: 1,612,694 Orlando MSA: 
1,644,561 
San Diego MSA:2,813,833 
Facilities -Detroit Metro Wayne 
County Airport 
-Dulles Intl. Airport -Port Columbus Intl. 
Airport 
-Orlando Intl. Airport -San Diego Intl. Airport 
-Willow Run Airport -Reagan National 
Airport 
-Rickenbacker Intl. Airport -Orlando Executive 
Airport 
    -Bolton Filed   
Responsibilities Responsibilities 
include the ability to 
plan, promote, extend, 
maintain, improve, 
repair, enlarge, and 
operate both airports. 
The Authority is 
responsible for the 
maintenance, 
operation, and 
improvement of airport 
facilities and for the 
Dulles Corridor 
Metrorail project. 
The Authority is 
responsible for the 
maintenance, operation and 
improvement of three 
airport facilities in the 
Columbus area.  
In 1976, the Authority 
was given custody, 
control and 
management authority 
over each airport.  The 
delegation was for a 
period of 50 years. 
The Authority is tasked with 
the operation of San Diego 
Intl Airport.  The Authority’s 
leadership also serves as the 
Airport Land Use 
Commission. 
Air passengers 
(2008) 
35,135,828 41.9 million 
(combined) 
6.9 million (Port 
Columbus) 
35,660,742 18,125,633 
Governance The Authority is 
managed by a seven-
member Board of 
Directors. Four 
members are appointed 
by the Wayne Co. 
Executive; two 
members are appointed 
by the Governor; and 
one member is 
appointed by the 
Wayne Co. 
Commission. Terms 
range from two to 
eight years. 
The Authority is 
governed by a 13-
member Board of 
Directors, with five 
members appointed by 
the Governor of 
Virginia, three by the 
Mayor of the District 
of Columbia, two by 
the Governor of 
Maryland and three by 
the President of the 
United States. 
A Board of Directors is 
composed of nine members.  
Four are appointed by the 
Mayor of the City of 
Columbus, four are 
appointed by the Franklin 
County Board of 
Commissioners and one 
member is jointly 
appointed.  Members serve 
four-year staggered terms. 
The authority is 
governed by a seven-
member Board.  Five 
are appointed by the 
governor of the State of 
Florida, one is a 
member of the Orlando 
City Council and one is 
a member of the Orange 
County Commission.   
An executive director is 
appointed by the Board. 
The Authority is governed by 
a 12-member board with 
three members serving as an 
executive committee.  The 
members are appointed by a 
class of offices ranging from 
the mayor of San Diego and 
the governor of California to 
the mayors of other county 
municipalities. 
Revenue The Authority is self- 
supporting, not 
taxpayer funded.  
Aircraft landing fees, 
terminal fees and 
revenue from parking 
and concessions (etc.) 
fund operating 
expenses.  Bonds also 
can be issued. 
The Authority is not 
taxpayer-funded but is 
self-supporting, using 
aircraft landing fees, 
rents and revenues 
from concessions to 
fund operating 
expenses at both 
airports.  Bonds also 
can be issued. 
The Authority is not 
taxpayer-funded but is self-
supporting, using aircraft 
landing fees, rents and 
ticket taxes (etc.) to fund 
operating expenses at each 
airport.  Bonds also can be 
issued. 
Authority revenue is 
obtained from landing 
fees, rents, ticket fees, 
and concession sales 
(etc.).  Bonds also can 
be issued.  The 
Authority does not have 
taxing authority. 
The authority is funded 
through user fees (i.e. 
landing fees, rents, tickets 
fees, and concessions).  The 
airport is not supported with 
local taxes. 
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Another potential option that has been employed elsewhere – and that may be relevant to 
Milwaukee County in light of ongoing discussion regarding creation of a Regional Transit 
Authority – is to move a wide array of transportation functions to a special transportation district 
that operates on a regional scale.  Regional authorities in other states operate airports, rail lines, 
bus routes, bridges, tollways, and highways.   Although basic road development and maintenance 
is still performed by public works departments from component municipalities, larger functions 
are transferred to the regional authority.  Table 12 provides three examples of these types of 
authorities. 
 
Table 12: Transportation and Airport Authorities 
  South Jersey Transportation 
Authority 
Niagara Frontier 
Transportation 
 Authority 
The Port Authority of  
New York and  
New Jersey 
Established The South Jersey Transportation 
Authority was established in 1991 
by an act of the New Jersey 
Legislature. 
A Niagara transit system was 
replaced by the Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority (NFTA) 
in 1967 by the State of New York. 
The Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey was established in 1921 
as allowed by U.S. interstate compact 
provisions. 
Area served The Authority serves six counties: 
Atlantic, Camden, Cape May, 
Cumberland, Gloucester, and 
Salem. 
The Authority serves the two-
county region of Erie and 
Niagara. 
The area served consists of a radius of 
approx. 25 miles surrounding the 
Statue of Liberty.  
Population served 1,329,206 (2000) 1,170,111 (2000) 17.2 million (2007 est.) 
Responsibilities The Authority coordinates 
southern New Jersey’s 
transportation system, which 
includes a highway network, 
aviation facilities, and other 
transportation-related needs.  This 
also includes construction, 
maintenance, and operation of 
facilities and infrastructure.  The 
Authority serves as the regional 
transportation planning authority. 
The Authority is multi-modal in 
nature with a responsibility for 
aviation, traffic, bus, rail and 
water forms of transit.  This 
includes the maintenance, 
operation and capital 
improvement of the facilities and 
infrastructure listed below.  
Additionally, the Authority 
manages a significant amount of 
real estate. 
The Authority maintains, operates and 
provides capital improvements to 
airports, tunnels, bridges, terminals, 
ports, bus systems, and a rail system.  
The Authority also controls and 
operates a significant amount of real 
estate in its coverage region. 
Facilities The Authority is responsible for 
the Atlantic City Expressway, 
Atlantic City Intl Airport terminal, 
and parking facilities and bus 
management in Atlantic City. 
The Authority is responsible for 
the NFTA Metro bus and rail 
system, the Greater Buffalo 
Niagara Intl Airport, the Niagara 
Falls Intl Airport, and the NFTA 
Small Boat Harbor.  
The authority is responsible for six 
airports or heliports, four bridges, two 
tunnels, a bus system, five sea ports or 
terminals, the PATH rail system, a 
transportation center, and other real 
estate. 
Governance  The Authority is governed by a 
nine-member Board of 
Commissioners.  These include the 
State Commissioner of 
Transportation, the State Secretary 
of Commerce and Economic 
Growth and seven members 
appointed by the Governor. 
The Authority is governed by the 
Board of Commissioners.  The 
Commission is an 11-member 
body that includes a chairman, 
treasurer and secretary.  
The Governor of each state (New 
York and New Jersey) appoints six 
members to the Board of 
Commissions, which is the governing 
body for the Authority.  The 
Governors are allowed to veto actions 
of commissioners from their 
respective states. 
Revenue Revenue comes from a variety of 
sources that include: tolls, 
concessions, parking fees, rents, 
bus permits and airport fees.  Tolls 
represent over two thirds of the 
total revenue. 
Revenue is obtained from fares, 
rents, concessions, commissions, 
airport fees, and other services.  
Transportation fares constitute the 
largest source of revenue (31%). 
The Authority receives no tax revenue 
and has no taxing authority.  Revenue 
is received from facility operations 
such as fees, tolls, rents, and various 
other sources. 
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Comparison of the two types of aviation-related authorities reveals that combined airport and 
transportation authorities tend to cover a much larger geographic region.  Instead of a single 
county area associated with some airport districts, these authorities can cover six counties or 
more (i.e. South Jersey Transportation Authority or the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey).   In terms of similarities, both airport districts and regional transportation authorities that 
include aviation are not supported by segregated sales, income or property taxes, but instead are 
self-supporting.  These districts also have similar governance structures consisting of individuals 
appointed to a board of commissioners by local or state political officials.  These boards govern 
the district but hire specific administrators to oversee the daily operations of the authority.   
 
The following discusses the key pros, cons and logistical obstacles associated with the potential 
transfer of Milwaukee County’s airports to a separate authority. 
  
Key pros 
 
• Airline officials have argued that creation of an airport district or regional transportation 
authority to administer aviation services in Milwaukee County would be attractive because it 
could relieve the signatory airlines from having to help pay for county legacy costs and other 
overhead.  This could encourage them to provide greater service levels at GMIA.    
 
• Because a separate airport district likely would not be subject to the county’s personnel rules 
and may not be subject to its labor contract obligations, and because it could seek overhead 
services (including security) from non-county sources, some have argued that its services 
could be administered more cost effectively and with enhanced efficiency.   
 
• Business leaders have argued that because GMIA serves residents from throughout the 
southeast Wisconsin region, it is more appropriate to have it administered by a regional 
governing entity.  In particular, it has been argued that unlike the county board, an airport 
district board would be primarily focused on enhancing airport operations for the betterment 
of the region, and not as heavily influenced by the parochial concerns of nearby residents 
regarding airport noise, runway expansion, etc. 
 
• Business leaders also have argued that county government’s financial problems are of 
sufficient magnitude that they could threaten the fiscal health of GMIA, which they refer to 
as the region’s most important economic asset.  Transferring it to an independent district 
would alleviate that threat. 
 
Key cons 
 
• GMIA has a reputation as one of the best run and most cost-effective airports in the country, 
with passenger use continuing to set records and costs lower than in other similar-sized 
airports.  County board leaders have argued that changing the governance structure makes 
little sense in light of that success. 
 
• Direct oversight of the county’s airports by elected officials provides greater accountability 
to taxpayers and the general public than would occur under an appointed board. 
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• Transfer of the airport to a separate district could result in a direct shift of millions of dollars 
of legacy and county overhead costs (if a new governing body chooses to use non-county 
security and administrative service providers) to county taxpayers, which some might argue 
is unfair and inappropriate in light of the significant commitment county government has 
made to the airport during the past 80-plus years. 
 
• It could be argued that Milwaukee County already has enough separate governmental or 
quasi-governmental bodies, and creation of a new airport district simply would create another 
layer of unneeded government bureaucracy. 
 
Key logistical questions/obstacles 
 
• In developing legislation authorizing creation of an airport district to govern Milwaukee 
County’s airports, the state would need to determine whether the new authority would 
assume responsibility for the Airport Division’s legacy liabilities, which are significant.  The 
legislation also would need to address whether the district would be required to purchase the 
airport’s assets from the county. 
 
• County fiscal officials raised questions in the 2006 discussion regarding the more than $100 
million in revenue bond debt held by the airport.  The resolution for the revenue bonds 
contains a covenant that the county maintain ownership of the airport while the bonds are 
outstanding.  Consequently, consideration would need to be given to reimbursing the county 
for costs associated with defeasance of the bonds should airport ownership change hands. 
 
• County fiscal officials also raised concerns in 2006 that the transfer of GMIA to a new 
authority would create cash flow problems for the county, which depends on annual 
temporary transfers from the airport to cover cash flow gaps in the general fund prior to the 
receipt of state shared revenue and property taxes.   That issue would have to be considered 
and potentially addressed by state and county officials. 
  
• The authorizing legislation would need to determine whether, to the extent that the new 
airport district would be a direct provider of services, county workers would become 
employees of the district and, if so, whether county labor contracts would remain in force.  
Also, it would need to determine whether district employees who formerly worked for the 
county would be able to remain in the county pension system and receive county health 
insurance and other benefits, whether they would become members of the state retirement 
system and receive health care and other benefits from the state, or whether a new benefits 
structure would need to be created in the district. 
 
• The composition of the board overseeing the district would need to receive careful 
deliberation by state officials, who would need to determine whether it should be appointed 
or elected, whether it would be paid or volunteer, and whether there should be representation 
from all municipalities adjacent to GMIA and adjacent counties.  
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BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Milwaukee County’s Behavioral Health Division (BHD) provides a variety of inpatient, 
emergency and community-based care and treatment to children and adults with mental health 
and substance abuse disorders.   The county’s role is dictated primarily by the Wisconsin 
Statutes, which specifically assign to Milwaukee County government responsibility for the 
“management, operation, maintenance and improvement of human services” in the county, 
including mental health treatment and alcohol and substance abuse services (Section 46.21). 
 
Section 51.42 of the Wisconsin Statutes lays out more specifically the mandated role for 
Milwaukee County pertaining to the provision of behavioral health services:  
 
“The county board of supervisors has the primary responsibility for the well−being, 
treatment and care of the mentally ill, developmentally disabled, alcoholic and other drug 
dependent citizens residing within its county and for ensuring that those individuals in need 
of such emergency services found within its county receive immediate emergency services.  
This primary responsibility is limited to the programs, services and resources that the 
county board of supervisors is reasonably able to provide within the limits of available state 
and federal funds and of county funds required to be appropriated to match state funds.” 
 
The county has interpreted this language as a legal requirement to provide immediate emergency 
services for persons with mental illness and substance abuse disorders.  That interpretation, in 
turn, has been defined as a requirement that the county also provide a broad range of inpatient, 
long-term care and outpatient services to indigent persons in order to curtail the need for 
emergency services and meet the more general statutory language pertaining to well-being, 
treatment and care.  
 
Milwaukee County owns and runs an inpatient hospital consisting of five licensed, 24-bed units 
(one of which is for children and adolescents); two nursing home facilities (a 70-bed nursing 
home for individuals with complex needs who require long-term treatment and a 72-bed facility 
for individuals diagnosed with both developmental disability and serious behavioral health 
needs); a Psychiatric Crisis Service that serves persons in need of emergency mental health 
treatment, 65% of whom are brought in by law enforcement on an Emergency Detention; a 
Mental Health Crisis Walk-in Clinic; and an Observation Unit.  It also contracts for a wide 
variety of community-based services, including targeted case management, community support 
programs, community residential services, outpatient treatment, substance abuse treatment and 
recovery support, crisis respite and specialized services for children and adolescents. 
 
The total budget for BHD in 2009 was $172 million6, making it the second largest budget in 
Milwaukee County after the Department on Aging Care Management Organization.  BHD’s 
                                                 
6 Beginning in 2010, BHD’s budget includes approximately $16 million in expenditures and $14 million of property 
tax levy for County Health Programs, which prior to the 2010 budget existed as its own organizational unit.  These 
programs consist of Emergency Medical Services and a $6.8 million tax levy appropriation to the State of Wisconsin 
for its Badger Care Core program, which replaced the county-administered General Assistance Medical Program, 
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2009 property tax levy was $57 million, again ranking it second after the Office of the Sheriff.  
Other key revenue sources are state/federal revenue and direct reimbursement from patient care.   
  
BHD also is one of the county’s largest functions in terms of individuals served.  For example, 
the 2009 budget estimated BHD would handle more than 4,000 inpatient and 13,000 Psychiatric 
Crisis Service admissions, provide services to more than 2,000 individuals in targeted case 
management or the community support program, and provide community-based substance abuse 
services to more than 4,500 individuals.  
 
Finally, BHD is the second largest county organizational unit in terms of its number of 
employees (first is the sheriff), with 859 FTEs in the 2009 budget. 
 
BUDGET BREAKDOWN 
 
Table 13 breaks down BHD’s actual expenditures and revenue in 2008, showing both total costs 
and costs when legacy obligations are subtracted.  This analysis shows that the Division spent $7 
million on central service charges from other county departments, $76.7 million on its own 
personnel, and $91.3 million on non-personnel expenditures, which primarily involved the 
purchase of mental health and substance abuse services from community providers, as well as 
commodities such as prescription drugs. 
 
The analysis also shows that $687,000 of BHD’s central service charges and $13.6 million of its 
personnel expenditures were not directly connected to the cost of providing or administering 
behavioral health services, but instead were county legacy costs distributed to the department by 
the central budget office.  This tells us that if a different governing body had provided the 
same services, secured administrative overhead at the same price, and paid the same wages 
and benefits to its active employees in 2008, it potentially could have administered and 
provided behavioral health services for $14.3 million less if it was not responsible for 
BHD’s share of the county’s legacy costs.   
 
In addition, the analysis shows that if legacy costs had been distributed to BHD on the basis of 
its actual number of retirees, as opposed to its share of the existing county workforce, those costs 
would have totaled $12.3 million.  This $12.3 million figure represents a more accurate depiction 
of the approximate annual county legacy obligation held by BHD.  As with every other function 
analyzed in this report, under a change in governance these legacy costs either could be assumed 
by the function’s new governing body, or they could remain the responsibility of county 
government or county taxpayers (if county government no longer existed).      
 
Finally, in terms of the Division’s overall share of the county’s outstanding liabilities, its share of 
the county’s OPEB liability is $222.9 million, its share of the pension fund liability (consisting 
of both POB debt and the unfunded liability) is $70.1 million, and total General Obligation debt 
on BHD facilities is $7.9 million. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
and for which the state still requires a county contribution.  While Emergency Medical Services is now part of the 
BHD budget, it is discussed in the “Other Functions” subsection of this report.  
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Table 13: Breakdown of BHD 2008 Actual Expenditures and Revenues and Legacy Costs 
BHD only 
Cost to operate 
as county 
department 
(current practice) 
Cost to 
operate minus 
legacy costs Legacy costs 
      
Using 2008 fringe 
allocation method* 
Based on 
retiree history** 
Administrative $2,649,179  $2,390,592  $258,587  $250,845  
Information technology $1,560,344  $1,408,038  $152,306  $147,746  
Legal counsel $560,773  $506,036  $54,737  $53,098  
Facility management $2,235,233  $2,017,051  $218,182  $211,649  
Fleet management $39,910  $36,014  $3,896  $3,779  
Central charges/overhead $7,045,439  $6,357,732  $687,707  $667,117  
Salary and wages $45,344,617  $45,344,617  $0  $0  
Social security $3,340,462  $3,340,462  $0  $0  
Employee healthcare $11,236,674  $11,236,674  $0  $0  
Employee pension $4,816,180  $4,816,180  $0  $0  
Retiree healthcare $11,236,674  $0  $11,236,674  $9,657,866  
Retiree pension $2,408,090  $0  $2,408,090  $1,971,083  
Other ($1,670,414) ($1,670,414) $0  $0  
Personnel costs $76,712,283  $63,067,519  $13,644,764  $11,628,949 
Non-personnel expenditures $91,306,906  $91,306,906  $0  $0  
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $175,064,628  $160,732,157  $14,332,471  $12,296,067  
State revenue $57,806,589  $57,806,589  $0  $0  
Federal revenue $547,080  $547,080  $0  $0  
Other revenue $68,062,270  $68,062,270  $0  $0  
TOTAL REVENUES $126,415,939  $126,415,939  $0  $0  
          
TOTAL LEVY $48,648,689  $34,316,218  $14,332,471  $12,296,067  
Unfunded OPEB liability *** $222,885,177  $222,885,177  $222,885,177  $222,885,177  
Unfunded pension liability*** $70,139,829  $70,139,829  $70,139,829  $70,139,829  
Outstanding debt and interest $7,853,557  $7,853,557  $7,853,557  $7,853,557  
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT $300,878,562  $300,878,562  $300,878,562  $300,878,562  
*  In 2008, the county distributed legacy costs evenly to all departments based on number of active employees 
and salary levels. 
**  This method distributes legacy costs according to a department's retiree history. 
*** Estimated liability allocated to department is based on the department's retiree history. 
 
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE SERVICE PROVIDERS 
 
Two potential alternative governing bodies for behavioral health services in Milwaukee County 
are the State of Wisconsin or a new mental health authority.  The following provides brief 
analysis of those options. 
 
State of Wisconsin 
 
Discussion 
 
A state takeover of behavioral health services in Milwaukee County would be similar to state 
takeovers of several other major social services programs in Milwaukee County within the past 
decade: welfare-to-work in the late 1990s, child welfare early in this decade, and income 
maintenance services in 2009-10. 
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At first glance, such a move would run somewhat counter to national trends, however.  In a 
recent report, the federal Center for Mental Health Services noted that “the public mental health 
system has shifted from centralized hospital-based institutional care administered by state 
agencies to decentralized community-based outpatient settings administered by county-level 
agencies.”7 
In order to get a better sense of how behavioral health services are provided in other states, we 
examined the Grading the States 2006 and Grading the States 2009 reports published by the 
National Association of Mental Illness (NAMI).  Because of their focus on individual state 
structures, innovations, and characteristics, the reports illustrated, to a certain degree, how each 
state is providing mental health services to its citizens.  When the reports were ambiguous about 
a certain state structure, state and local government web pages were examined to obtain 
additional information. 
We found that while mental health services typically are administered at the county or regional 
level, the structure for delivering services varies significantly across states.  For example, in 
Wisconsin and California, behavioral health services are provided through a county-based 
system.  In Georgia and Idaho, services are provided on a regional or district basis.  In South 
Carolina and Rhode Island, services are rendered though both county agencies and regional 
districts.  Finally, in Ohio, services are provided through a system of special purpose 
governments.8 
We also found that while service delivery typically is administered at the local level, many state 
governments play a primary role in terms of establishing statewide policies and objectives and 
funding mental health services at the local level to ensure consistent service levels across 
counties.  Wisconsin appears somewhat unique in the extent to which it leaves both 
administration and significant funding responsibility for behavioral health services in the hands 
of county governments, as reflected by the following passage in NAMI’s Grading the States 
2009: 
“The state [of Wisconsin] funds services in 72 counties, but the counties provide the non-
federal share of Medicaid funding and are responsible for providing or purchasing most 
services.  Counties and localities contribute varying amounts to mental health care 
spending, above what the state provides.  The decentralized nature of the system limits the 
Division of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services’ (DMHSAS) control over local 
services. Availability and quality vary widely.” 
 
Our research uncovered one example of a state that is considering moving away from a county-
directed and administered human services system to a state-supervised, regionally administered 
approach.  In Colorado, a blue ribbon committee examining significant problems in the child 
welfare system has recommended that those services be place under direct state control.  This 
recommendation is based on the belief that “the lack of consistency in guidance from the (state), 
performance by the counties, and data management resources has made child welfare a 
                                                 
7 Center for Mental Health Services National Advisory Council Subcommittee on Consumer/Survivor Issues found 
at http://mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/cmhs/AdvisoryCouncil/attachment1.asp 
8 Municipalities in Colorado also have the ability to create special purpose governments to provide mental health 
services.  As of 2006, only a few municipalities have utilized the opportunity. 
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‘patchwork quilt’ in Colorado, where the quality of a family’s child welfare experience is 
dependent on where they happen to live.” 9   
 
The committee’s recommendation does not stop with the child welfare function, but further 
suggests that all social services be provided under direct state supervision, as “child welfare is 
inherently dependent on the joint efforts of multiple social service modalities to meet the needs 
of its clients.”10  Such a suggestion may hold relevance for Milwaukee County, where some have 
criticized lack of coordination between the state-administered child welfare system and county-
administered behavioral health system. 
 
If the State of Wisconsin were to take over the administration of behavioral health services in 
Milwaukee County, it could follow the model employed for child welfare by creating a 
Milwaukee-based bureau (similar to the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare) to act as its local 
service administrator.  Under such an approach, it could continue to contract for community-
based services while utilizing state employees to provide inpatient and other services currently 
provided by county employees, or it could shift to an even greater mix of contracted services.  
Another model would be to purchase all behavioral health services in the community (similar to 
the model employed for W-2) and manage those contracts from Madison. 
 
Key pros 
 
• Having the State of Wisconsin directly responsible for the administration of behavioral health 
services in Milwaukee County could improve accountability by linking the entity responsible 
for mandating (and significantly funding) the services with service outcomes and could 
improve coordination with state-administered child welfare and public assistance programs.  
Under the current arrangement, when issues arise regarding the quality and accessibility of 
behavioral health services, the county can blame the state for providing insufficient funding 
for a mandated service, while the state can blame the county for poor management.  If the 
state is in charge, then it may be more compelled to provide the fiscal and/or management 
resources deemed necessary to achieve the service outcomes it deems important. 
 
• It is possible that the state could bring to bear a variety of additional resources to the 
immensely challenging task of providing quality behavioral health services in Milwaukee 
County, ranging from expertise with federal funding streams, to legal resources, to additional 
programmatic expertise. 
 
• Moving behavioral health services outside of county government could better shield those 
services from the county’s overall budget difficulties, legacy costs, competition with other 
county priorities, personnel rules, and poor reputation (which hurts recruitment and retention 
of medical and nursing personnel).  Some have argued that county government is particularly 
ill equipped to effectively govern a mental health hospital and emergency department, which 
requires the type of administrative flexibility and independence that cannot be 
                                                 
9 Colorado Child Welfare Organizational Structure and Capacity Analysis Project, September 24, 2009. 
10 Ibid. 
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accommodated under the county governance structure.  State government, on the other hand, 
oversees its own mental health hospitals with less oversight from elected officials. 
 
• While the state takeovers of child welfare, public assistance programs and even the General 
Assistance Medical Program (GAMP) have produced mixed results, the state has poured 
greater fiscal resources into these functions as part of the takeovers and, in particular, as 
problems have been identified.   This shows that if the state is accountable for program 
results, it will have no choice but to provide additional funding.    
 
Key cons 
 
• The community-based services upon which the county’s behavioral health system is largely 
built might be best administered, delivered and overseen by entities that are close to the 
community, and not based in Madison.   
 
• While Milwaukee County’s behavioral health services have come under intense scrutiny in 
recent years, the county also has achieved success.  For example, the county has administered 
an award-winning program for children and adolescents with mental illness (Wraparound 
Milwaukee) and its WIser Choice substance abuse treatment program has been nationally 
acclaimed.  Transferring administration of behavioral health programs to the state could 
result in the loss of talented administrators, clinicians and front-line workers who have 
produced positive results. 
 
• The State of Wisconsin has its own serious budget woes, and those woes could produce 
funding challenges that are at least equal to those currently faced by the Milwaukee County 
behavioral health system. 
 
• Despite state takeovers, significant problems still exist in Milwaukee County’s child welfare 
and public assistance programs, and even the conversion from GAMP to Badger Care has 
been problematic.  This may indicate that the state is no better equipped than the county to 
administer these programs.  Some also might argue that if the state had provided the same 
fiscal resources to the county as it did for itself, then the county’s performance may have 
exceeded that of the state.  
 
Key logistical questions/obstacles 
 
• In 2008, Milwaukee County spent $34 million of local property taxes to support non-legacy 
behavioral health services.  State officials would need to decide whether the state would be 
willing to spend that amount, whether it would intercept an equivalent amount of Community 
Aids and/or shared revenue from the county as it does for child welfare, or whether it would 
seek a direct payment from the county as it does for income maintenance.  If Milwaukee 
County government is eliminated, then the state would need to determine whether it would 
fill the gap, or instead attempt to assess county taxpayers for an equivalent amount. 
 
• BHD has one of the highest legacy liabilities of any county function, amounting to 
approximately $12 million annually for the cost of health care and pensions for BHD retirees, 
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and nearly $8 million in outstanding debt on BHD facilities.  The state would need to 
determine whether those costs would be left with the county (or its taxpayers in the case of 
elimination) as they were for the child welfare takeover, or whether it would assume them. 
 
• Notwithstanding the fiscal implications, the state would need to determine whether, in light 
of its own variety of major challenges, state government has the capacity and will to take on 
Milwaukee County’s most complicated and challenging human services responsibility which 
involves, among other things, dozens of community-based contracts and more than 800 full-
time employees.  If its solution to easing the complexity would be to purchase all behavioral 
health services from private hospitals and other community-based providers, then it would 
have to determine whether sufficient community capacity and willingness to provide those 
services exists.  
 
• The state’s 71 other counties also have bitterly complained about unfunded or underfunded 
human services mandates.  A consideration for the state would be whether, to the extent it 
was willing to assume financial and programmatic responsibility for this underfunded 
mandate in Milwaukee County, it could justify not doing so in other counties.      
 
Milwaukee County Mental Health Authority 
 
Discussion 
 
Just as policymakers and community leaders have discussed establishment of a separate board or 
authority to administer airports in Milwaukee County, a separate board or authority to administer 
behavioral health services in the county also could be considered. 
Ohio employs such an approach, with mental health services administered by a system of 54 
mental health boards (similar in structure and purpose to special authorities or districts).  Boards 
typically consist of 18 volunteer members appointed by a mix of county and state officials.  For 
example, the 18-member Alcohol, Drug Addiction and Mental Health Services Board of 
Cuyahoga County has 10 of its members appointed by the Board of County Commissioners, four 
by the Ohio Department of Mental Health, and four by the Ohio Department of Alcohol and 
Drug Addiction Services.  
The overall system, while administered by the local boards, is supervised by the Ohio 
Department of Mental Health and the Ohio Department of Alcohol and Drug Addiction Services.  
Because of this structure, the system is financed by a combination of federal, state and local 
dollars.11  In particular, the boards are able to levy a local property tax within their jurisdiction to 
partially cover the costs of services and administration subject to a vote of the jurisdiction’s 
citizens at regular intervals.  The State of Ohio also provides a significant portion of each board’s 
annual budget. 
                                                 
11 Honeck, Jon. 2009. “Proposed Funding Levels Push Community Mental Health System to Brink of Collapse.” 
The Center for Community Solutions June: 1-4. 
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While the boards are responsible for financing and administering mental health services, they are 
legally prohibited from directly providing the services.  The revenue raised and received by the 
boards is used to pay community groups, organizations, nonprofits, and hospitals to provide 
behavioral health services in the community.  Thus, the Ohio approach allows for local discretion 
in system design and service delivery while also including supplemental state aid and direction.  
Advocates support this system by arguing that “local communities are best able to identify their 
unique needs and to plan and administer services.”12 
Ohio’s mental health care system has been in place for more than 40 years and has received 
significant positive ratings from NAMI when compared to other states.13  However, the system 
has been hindered by funding problems in recent years.  Because state assistance can consist of 
25-35% of any board’s budget, financial constraints on the state budget can have a significant 
impact on board revenue.  Several boards, especially those serving large cities, have been forced 
to reduce services in recent years because state contributions have decreased significantly. 
 
Also, the ability of citizens to customize the level of services available within their district 
through periodic property tax levy votes has created a scenario in which several jurisdictions 
provide little additional financing above what is offered by the state.  Overall, in fact, there has 
been a wide variation in the amount and quality of offered services among Ohio districts.  Board 
tax levies range from a mill rate of .30 to 5.21, while 14 districts do not have a tax levy.  Several 
boards utilize alternate funding sources such as state and federal aid, grants, and donations to 
provide sufficient mental health services in counties with low or no levies. 
 
Key pros 
 
• Creation of a new authority to administer behavioral health services in Milwaukee County 
could retain a critical role in system design and service delivery for local citizens while 
freeing behavioral health services from the weight of the county’s overall budget difficulties, 
legacy costs, competition with other priorities, personnel rules, labor contract obligations, 
and poor reputation (which hurts recruitment and retention of medical and nursing 
personnel).  In particular, if all mental health services (including inpatient and emergency) 
were purchased from community providers as they are in Ohio, removal of the county’s 
bureaucratic regulations could allow those services to be administered more effectively.     
 
• Housing the behavioral health function in a separate authority could heighten prospects for 
non-public funding from foundations and other sources to support substance abuse treatment, 
supportive housing and other critical system elements.  
 
• Having the authority board directly supervised by the State of Wisconsin could improve 
accountability by vesting state government with greater responsibility for outcomes.  Also, 
this governance structure could improve administration by eliminating redundant oversight 
by two major governments with their own budget timelines, administrative rules and laws.  
 
                                                 
12 National Alliance on Mental Illness. 2009. “Values.” http://www.oacbha.org/about_us/values.html. 17 August 
2009. 
13 NAMI, Grading the States, 2006 and 2009. 
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Key cons 
 
• If the authority board was granted authority to levy taxes without a vote of the electorate, 
then local taxing and spending on behavioral health services could increase because of lack 
of competition with other locally funded services, which forces policymakers to prioritize 
among a wide variety of programs and services and make difficult spending choices.   
 
• On the other hand, if a vote of the electorate was required to establish the county property tax 
or other tax levy to support behavioral health services, then it is possible that funding for 
those services could suffer because of the potential unwillingness of voters to support a set of 
services from which all would not directly benefit.   
 
• It could be argued that Milwaukee County already has enough separate governmental or 
quasi-governmental agencies, and creation of a new behavioral health authority simply would 
create another layer of unneeded government bureaucracy. 
 
Key logistical questions/obstacles 
 
• In developing legislation authorizing creation of a behavioral health board or authority in 
Milwaukee County, the state would need to determine whether the new authority would 
assume responsibility for BHD’s legacy liabilities and the outstanding debt on BHD 
facilities.  This decision would have a significant impact on the amount of funding needed to 
operate the authority. 
 
• The authorizing legislation would need to determine whether, to the extent the new authority 
would be a direct provider of services, county workers would be employed by the authority 
and, if so, whether county labor contracts would remain in force. 
 
• The authorizing legislation would need to determine whether former county workers 
employed by the new authority would be able to remain in the county pension system and 
receive county health insurance and other benefits, whether they would become members of 
the state retirement system and receive health care and other benefits from the state, or 
whether a new benefits structure would need to be created within the authority. 
 
• The composition of the board overseeing the authority would need to receive careful 
deliberation by state officials, who would need to determine whether it should be appointed 
or elected, whether it would be paid or volunteer, the necessary qualifications of board 
members, and whether a citizen board could be constructed to have the necessary expertise 
and experience to oversee both a budget and menu of services as large and complex as that 
currently in place in Milwaukee County.  
 
• State officials would need to determine whether it would be possible to grant an independent 
authority the legal means to bill for Medicaid reimbursement, receive a license to run a 
mental health hospital and nursing homes, apply for grant funding from the federal 
government, etc.   
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CARE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION – FAMILY CARE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the largest but least understood programs in Milwaukee County government is its Care 
Management Organization (CMO).  The CMO is an integral component of the Department on 
Aging’s Family Care program in Milwaukee County, which has been in existence for county 
residents age 60 and older since July 2000.   
 
Milwaukee County’s program was one of five pilot Family Care programs launched by the 
Wisconsin Department of Health Services beginning early in this decade (under Section 46 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes) with the intent of transforming Wisconsin’s long-term care system for the 
elderly and for individuals with physical and developmental disabilities.  The hope was to create 
a managed care approach that would better serve clients and save money by emphasizing cost-
effective, comprehensive and flexible care in community-based settings when appropriate.  
Milwaukee’s pilot program was the only one of the five pilots that was limited exclusively to 
adults 60 years of age and older.   
 
Unlike other long-term care programs offered by counties, which typically maintain waiting lists 
for services due to fiscal constraints, the Family Care program is offered as an entitlement to all 
individuals certified as functionally and financially eligible.  A broad array of health and long-
term care services are integrated into one inclusive benefit.  Participating counties receive a 
monthly per person payment from the state to manage and purchase care for Family Care 
enrollees, who may be living in their own homes, group living situations, or nursing facilities. 
 
The Family Care model consists of two primary organizational components: 
 
1. Aging and disability resource centers, which are designed to be a single entry point where 
older people and people with disabilities (and their families) can get information and 
guidance regarding the resources available to them in their local communities.   
 
2. Managed care organizations that manage and deliver the Family Care benefit, which is to be 
tailored to each individual’s needs, circumstances and preferences. 
 
Since the Department on Aging became a Family Care pilot in 2000, it has administered both an 
aging resource center and the sole care management organization for the elderly in Milwaukee 
County.  While federal requirements frown upon a single entity operating both components, state 
statutes have allowed for this arrangement under the condition that the two entities be kept 
structurally separate.  The financial structures of the CMO and resource center traditionally have 
been distinct, with the CMO operating as a separate business enterprise within county 
government.  The CMO became its own organizational unit in county government in 2008, 
though it continued to be under the purview of the Department on Aging.   
 
The CMO is charged with developing and managing a comprehensive network of long-term care 
services and support.  In Milwaukee County, this network has been built primarily through 
contracts with community-based providers.  The CMO is responsible for assuring a level and 
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quality of care and services that is required under both state statutes and the county’s contract 
with the state.  Services offered by the CMO include long-term care, direct health care services, 
coordination of primary health care, daily living skills training and other supports.  The emphasis 
is on working with clients to create an individualized care plan that will best serve their needs 
and provide for both independence and cost-effective care and treatment. 
 
State statutes require the CMO to have a governing board that reflects the ethnic and economic 
diversity of the county and that includes representatives of client groups (or their family 
members) served by the CMO.  Milwaukee County’s CMO is governed by a 16-member board 
that meets those requirements.  While the governing board provides oversight of the CMO, its 
budget and contracts are approved by county elected officials similar to other county 
departments.   
 
In February 2006, the state announced plans to expand Family Care statewide and eliminate 
waiting lists for long-term care programs during the next five years.  Milwaukee County 
subsequently decided to submit a proposal to the state in 2008 to expand the CMO to serve 
individuals with disabilities under the age of 60.  That proposal was accepted by the state, though 
it also accepted proposals from two private entities to operate CMOs in Milwaukee County.  The 
county also received approval from the state to expand its Disabilities Resource Center (housed 
in the Disabilities Services Division of the Department of Health and Human Services) to meet 
Family Care guidelines.    
 
In November 2009, the CMO began serving both eligible individuals over age 60 and eligible 
persons with disabilities under age 60.  In addition, the CMO is now a separate department in 
county government outside of the purview of the Department on Aging.  The two resource 
centers – one for individuals served by the Department on Aging and one for those served by the 
Disabilities Services Division – will remain distinct entities within those departments.  As a 
result of Family Care expansion, in 2010, the CMO is expected to add 791 clients under the age 
of 60 to the approximately 6,800 elderly individuals it currently serves.  The complete 
conversion of eligible clients with disabilities under age 60 to Family Care is expected to take 36 
months.  Once completed, it is expected to double the size of the existing CMO.    
 
The total budget for the CMO in 2009 was $262 million, making it the largest departmental 
budget in Milwaukee County government.  There is little property tax levy associated with the 
program, as virtually all expenditures are offset with revenue from the state.  While most 
program expenditures are linked to contracts with community-based providers, the CMO also 
had 91 county FTEs in its 2009 budget.  County positions include managerial, contract 
monitoring, quality assurance, clerical and fiscal positions, as well as a limited number of direct 
care coordinators and providers who function on county-operated care management units.    
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BUDGET BREAKDOWN 
 
Table 14 breaks down the CMO’s actual expenditures and revenue in 2008, showing both total 
costs and costs when legacy obligations are subtracted.  This analysis shows that the CMO spent 
$663,000 on central service charges from other county departments, $4.9 million on its own 
personnel, and $193 million on non-personnel expenditures, which primarily involved the 
purchase of long-term care, health care and other services from community providers. 
 
Because of the relatively small number of county staff employed by the CMO, its legacy costs 
are small when compared to the overall size of its budget.  Table 14 shows that $65,000 of the 
CMO’s central service charges and $905,000 of its personnel expenditures were not directly 
connected to the cost of providing or administering CMO services, but instead were county 
legacy costs distributed to the CMO by the central budget office.  This tells us that if a 
different entity had provided the same services, secured administrative overhead at the 
same price, and paid the same wages and benefits to its active employees in 2008, it 
potentially could have administered CMO services for about $970,000 less if it was not 
responsible for the CMO’s share of the county’s legacy costs.   
 
In addition, the analysis shows that if legacy costs had been distributed to the CMO on the basis 
of its actual number of retirees, as opposed to its share of the existing county workforce, those 
costs would have totaled $1.4 million.  This $1.4 million figure represents a more accurate 
depiction of the approximate annual county legacy obligation held by the CMO.  As with every 
other function analyzed in this report, under a change in governance these legacy costs either 
could be assumed by the function’s new governing body, or they could remain the responsibility 
of county government or county taxpayers (if county government no longer existed).      
 
Finally, in terms of the CMO’s overall share of the county’s outstanding liabilities, its share of 
the county’s OPEB liability is $26 million and its share of the pension fund liability (consisting 
of both POB debt and the unfunded liability) is $8.2 million. 
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Table 14: Breakdown of CMO 2008 Actual Expenditures and Revenues and Legacy Costs 
CMO 
Cost to operate as 
county 
department 
(current practice) 
Cost to operate 
minus legacy 
costs Legacy costs 
      
Using 2008 
fringe allocation 
method* 
Based on 
retiree 
history** 
Administrative $431,597  $389,469  $42,128  $40,867  
Information technology $38,353  $34,609  $3,744  $3,632  
Legal counsel $189,668  $171,154  $18,514  $17,959  
Facility management $0  $0  $0  $0  
Fleet management $3,787  $3,417  $370  $359  
Central charges/overhead $663,405  $598,650  $64,755  $62,816  
Salary and wages $2,791,866  $2,791,866  $0  $0  
Social security $210,013  $210,013  $0  $0  
Employee healthcare $753,857  $753,857  $0  $0  
Employee pension $302,292  $302,292  $0  $0  
Retiree healthcare $753,857  $0  $753,857  $1,128,508  
Retiree pension $151,146  $0  $151,146  $230,318  
Other ($103,058) ($103,058) $0  $0  
Personnel costs $4,859,972  $3,954,970  $905,003  $1,358,826 
Non-personnel expenditures $193,046,737  $193,046,737  $0  $0  
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $198,570,114  $197,600,356  $969,758  $1,421,642  
State revenue $0  $0  $0  $0  
Federal revenue $393,974  $393,974  $0  $0  
Other revenue $197,735,156  $196,765,398  $0  $0  
TOTAL REVENUES $198,129,130  $197,159,372  $0  $0  
          
TOTAL LEVY $440,984  $440,984  $969,758  $1,421,642  
Unfunded OPEB liability *** $26,043,814  $26,043,814  $26,043,814  $26,043,814  
Unfunded pension liability*** $8,195,739  $8,195,739  $8,195,739  $8,195,739  
Outstanding debt and interest $0  $0  $0  $0  
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT $34,239,552  $34,239,552  $34,239,552  $34,239,552  
*  In 2008, the county distributed legacy costs evenly to all departments based on number of active employees 
and salary levels. 
**  This method distributes legacy costs according to a department's retiree history. 
*** Estimated liability allocated to department is based on the department's retiree history. 
 
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE SERVICE PROVIDERS 
 
Section 46.284 of the Wisconsin Statutes indicates that counties may elect to apply to operate 
care management organizations either within their county or on a multi-county basis, but are not 
required to do so.  Alternatively, Section 46.284 allows counties to create long-term care districts 
to operate care management organizations and allows Family Care CMOs to be operated by 
private organizations that meet state guidelines.  Consequently, if Milwaukee County 
government was eliminated, state policymakers could consider creating a long-term care district 
to administer the CMO in Milwaukee County, or they could simply contract with a private CMO 
operator or operators.   
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The provision allowing for creation of long-term care districts to operate Family Care CMOs was 
driven in part by a desire to allow counties to band together to create CMOs on a regional basis 
(which was particularly important for smaller counties who could not reach a large enough 
enrollment to achieve a viable managed care organization), while maintaining public sector 
control and employing public sector workers to do so.  This provision also reflected a perceived 
need to allow county officials the option of moving forward with a public CMO without having 
county government itself take on the associated financial risks.  Milwaukee County was 
encouraged by state officials to consider this option as part of its Family Care expansion plan, 
but it elected not to do so.    
 
The following are some of the specific statutory provisions associated with the long-term care 
district approach: 
 
• A long-term care district is defined as “a local unit of government, that is separate and 
distinct from, and independent of…the county or tribe or band that created it.” The county 
must adopt an enabling resolution to create the district and establish the size of the long-term 
care board.  The board is to be appointed by the county board or, in counties with county 
executives, by the county executive subject to county board approval. 
 
• The district is granted all of the powers “necessary…to carry out the purposes and 
provisions” of the Family Care program.  It is empowered to negotiate and enter into leases 
or contracts and establish risk reserves, but it cannot issue bonds or levy taxes. 
 
• The district board is empowered to hire a director and staff, establish a personnel structure 
and employment policies, contract for legal services and establish annual budgets.  The 
statutes stipulate, however, that any district employee formerly employed as a long-term care 
worker for a county that participated in the creation of the district and covered under an 
existing collective bargaining agreement shall receive wages and benefits from the district 
per that agreement.  Also, years of service accrued while at the county shall be recognized by 
the district. 
 
• The district board may opt to have the long-term care district included in the Wisconsin 
Retirement System provided that the county that created it does not have its own retirement 
system.  If Milwaukee County created a district, then the district’s employees would be 
covered under the county’s retirement system.   Also, county employees who transfer to the 
district must be provided with health care coverage that is “similar” to what they received at 
the county. 
 
• The statute protects counties from financial risk by specifying that “the obligations and debts 
of a long−term care district are not the obligations or debts of any county that created the 
district.  If a long−term care district is obligated by statute or contract to provide or pay for 
services or benefits, no county is responsible for providing or paying for those services or 
benefits.” 
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Another option enabled under the statutes is for counties to opt out of being a Family Care CMO, 
and for the state instead to contract with private sector entities.  This option is being utilized in 
other areas of the state and, beginning in late 2009, also is being utilized to some degree in 
Milwaukee County, where two private sector entities have established CMOs that will compete 
with Milwaukee County’s CMO for clients.  Private sector CMOs are subject to the same 
requirements as county or district CMOs in terms of certification by the state, establishment of 
risk reserves, and establishment of governing boards.    
 
The following are some pros, cons and logistical issues that would exist for both the long-term 
care district and private CMO options. 
 
Key pros 
 
• Moving the CMO outside of county government could shield it from the county’s legacy 
costs and  internal service charges, which some might argue make it more difficult for the 
county to compete with private sector CMOs and divert financial resources from direct care.   
 
• Some have argued that county government is ill equipped to effectively govern a large 
managed care organization, which requires the type of administrative flexibility and 
independence that cannot be accommodated under the county governance structure.   
 
• Entities administering Family Care CMOs must take on considerable financial risk in light of 
the entitlement nature of the program and the provision of a capitated funding stream that 
requires the CMO to make do with the dollars provided.  It could be argued that an entity 
with the overall financial challenges of Milwaukee County government is in no position to be 
assuming such risk, and that moving the program out of the county therefore would be a 
prudent move for taxpayers.         
 
Key cons 
 
• After experiencing severe financial difficulties earlier this decade, the Family Care program 
has rebounded to achieve considerable popularity among older adults and significant fiscal 
and programmatic success.  Eliminating county government’s critical role in administering 
this program could threaten that success. 
 
• Some have argued that a public sector role is paramount to the success of Family Care, which 
depends on individuals with little or no profit motive to provide appropriate levels of care to 
vulnerable individuals.  Turning administration of this program solely to the private sector 
could threaten that important principle. 
 
• It could be argued that Milwaukee County already has enough separate governmental or 
quasi-governmental agencies, and creation of a new long-term care district simply would 
create another layer of unneeded government bureaucracy. 
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Key logistical questions/obstacles 
 
• The state would need to determine whether a new long-term care district would assume 
responsibility for the CMO’s legacy liabilities.  If, under a scenario in which county 
government no longer existed, a district was not created and the state relied exclusively on 
private sector CMOs, then the state would need to determine whether it would absorb those 
liabilities or assess county taxpayers for them.   
 
• If county government was eliminated, then state statutes may need to be modified to 
authorize the state to establish a long-term care district in Milwaukee County, as currently 
only counties are permitted to do so.  Also, if there was no longer a county retirement system, 
the existing statute would need to be amended to consider whether county workers moving 
over to the new authority would be able to join the state retirement system and receive health 
care and other benefits from the state, or whether a new benefits structure would need to be 
created within the district. 
 
• The state would need to determine how to provide for resource center services in the absence 
of county government.  If a new district was created, then the district could not be both the 
CMO and resource center administrator, which means that the resource center function 
would need to be provided either by a community-based non-profit organization or the state 
itself.  If the private sector option was pursued for the CMO, then in addition to those 
options, the state could consider creating a district to administer the resource center. 
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COURTS AND DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
 
The courts and district attorney are discussed in tandem in this section because both functions 
share the distinction of already having been partially transferred to state government.  
  
COURT SERVICES 
Milwaukee County’s Combined Court Related Operations department houses the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court system, which consists of 47 circuit court judges and 22 court 
commissioners.  The circuit courts were created to serve as a single, unified trial court under the 
Court Reorganization Act of 1978, adopted after voters passed several amendments to Article 
VII of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1977.  Prior to the reorganization, “county courts” handled 
probate, juvenile, and traffic matters, and the circuit courts handled civil and criminal jury trials.   
The circuit courts in Wisconsin are funded with a combination of state and county dollars.  
Beginning in 1980, circuit court judges and official court reporters became state employees.  
Today, state funds are used to pay the salaries of the judges, official court reporters, and reserve 
judges, as well as travel and training for the judges.  By law, counties are responsible for all 
other operating costs (including court commissioners and other support staff and costs associated 
with housing the courts), with a few exceptions that are enumerated by statute.  The state, for 
example, pays for costs associated with the circuit courts automation program (CCAP), 
reimburses counties for a portion of court interpreter expenses, and provides circuit court support 
and guardian ad litem grants to counties to help offset a portion of their costs. 
In terms of administration, the state is divided into 10 judicial districts.  Because of its size, 
Milwaukee County is its own judicial district.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court appoints a chief 
judge in each of the districts to supervise and direct administration of the circuit courts.  The 
Wisconsin Constitution stipulates that each county organized for judicial purposes also have a 
clerk of circuit court, who is elected on a county-wide basis every two years to work in close 
cooperation with the chief judge and district court administrator to administer the courts.  The 
clerk of circuit court is statutorily charged with several administrative duties, including jury 
management, custodian of court records, and court finances. 
Milwaukee County’s court operations department includes the chief judge and three divisions: 
Family Court Commissioner, Register in Probate and County-Funded State Court Services.  The 
department’s total budget in 2009 was $51 million.  The budget does not reflect the full cost of 
operating the courts, but only those costs for which the county is responsible.  Of the $51 million 
total, $9.5 million was allocated to the sheriff for bailiff services, and $5.5 million to the 
Facilities Management Division for Courthouse space rental.   The budget also included $3 
million for alternatives to incarceration programming. 
The courts’ budgeted property tax levy in 2009 was $40 million, ranking it third among all 
county departments.  Other key revenue sources are grant funding from the state (including $3.5 
million in circuit court support funds) and revenue from fines and forfeitures (which are shared 
in varying degrees between the state and county).  The courts are one of the county’s largest 
organizational units in terms of staff, with 277 county-funded FTEs in the 2009 budget. 
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DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
 
Like the circuit courts, the Milwaukee County district attorney’s office is supported by county 
government despite the fact that the district attorney and other prosecutorial staff are employees 
of state government.  Under Wisconsin Act 31, which was adopted by the state in 1989, the state 
assumed responsibility for funding the salaries of the district attorney (who is still elected 
countywide), deputy district attorneys and assistant district attorneys, while responsibility for 
funding support staff and services was left with counties.   
 
The Milwaukee County district attorney’s office includes five deputy district attorneys and 
approximately 125 assistant district attorneys.  Their primary function is to represent the State of 
Wisconsin in Milwaukee County Circuit Court, generally in connection with criminal cases.  The 
office includes a number of specialized units for various offenses, including units for homicides, 
drug violations, sexual assaults, white collar crimes, domestic violence, and consumer fraud.  
There also are units that prosecute felonies, misdemeanors, and offenses involving juveniles.  
 
The county’s total budget for the district attorney’s office totaled $21 million in 2009, including 
about $12 million in property tax levy.  The budget includes about $2.9 million in federal grants 
and $3.2 million in state grants, which are mainly associated with specific criminal justice 
initiatives, including domestic violence, sexual assaults and drug crimes.  The 2009 budget 
included 149 county-funded FTEs in the district attorney’s office. 
 
BUDGET BREAKDOWN 
 
Tables 15 and 16 break down the courts and district attorney’s actual expenditures and revenue 
in 2008, showing both total costs and costs when legacy obligations are subtracted.  This analysis 
shows that the courts spent $7.6 million on central service charges from other county 
departments, $25.1 million on its own personnel, and $18.7 million on non-personnel 
expenditures, including bailiff services and rental charges.  The district attorney, meanwhile, 
spent $2.2 million on central service charges from other county departments, $13.5 million on its 
own personnel, and $3.4 million on non-personnel expenditures. 
 
The analysis also shows that $742,000 of the courts’ central service charges and $4.7 million of 
its personnel expenditures were not directly connected to the cost of administering and 
supporting court services, but instead were county legacy costs distributed to the department by 
the central budget office.  For the district attorney, $215,000 of its central service charges and 
$2.6 million of its personnel expenditures were tied to legacy costs.   This tells us that if the 
state had provided the same services, secured administrative overhead at the same price, 
and paid the same wages and benefits to its employees in 2008, it potentially could have 
administered the courts and district attorney’s office for a combined $8.3 million less if it 
was not responsible for the courts’ and district attorney’s share of the county’s legacy 
costs.   
 
In addition, the analysis shows that if legacy costs had been distributed to the courts and district 
attorney on the basis of their actual number of retirees, as opposed to their share of the existing 
county workforce, those costs would have totaled $5.6 million.  This $5.6 million figure 
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represents a more accurate depiction of the approximate annual county legacy obligation held by 
the courts and district attorney’s office. Under a change in governance these legacy costs either 
could be assumed by the state, or they could remain the responsibility of county government or 
county taxpayers (if county government no longer existed).      
 
Finally, in terms of the overall share of the county’s outstanding liabilities held by the two 
functions, their combined share of the county’s pension fund liability (consisting of both POB 
debt and the unfunded liability) is $28.1 million, and their share of the county’s OPEB liability is 
$89.3 million.   
 
Table 15: Breakdown of Courts 2008 Actual Expenditures and Revenues and Legacy Costs  
Courts 
Cost to operate 
as county 
department 
(current practice) 
Cost to operate 
minus legacy 
costs Legacy costs 
      
Using 2008 fringe 
allocation 
method* 
Based on 
retiree history** 
Administrative $886,653  $800,107  $86,546  $83,955  
Information technology $537,469  $485,007  $52,462  $50,892  
Legal counsel $0  $0  $0  $0  
Facility management $6,180,188  $5,576,938  $603,250  $585,189  
Fleet management $176  $159  $17  $17  
Central charges/overhead $7,604,486  $6,862,210  $742,276  $720,052  
Salary and wages $13,905,509  $13,905,509  $0  $0  
Social security $1,007,629  $1,007,629  $0  $0  
Employee healthcare $4,000,322  $4,000,322  $0  $0  
Employee pension $1,499,219  $1,499,219  $0  $0  
Retiree healthcare $4,000,322  $0  $4,000,322  $2,925,158  
Retiree pension $749,609  $0  $749,609  $596,998  
Other ($44,046) ($44,046) $0  $0  
Personnel costs $25,118,564  $20,368,633  $4,749,931  $3,522,156 
Non-personnel expenditures $18,676,152  $18,676,152  $0  $0  
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $51,399,202  $45,906,995  $5,492,207  $4,242,208  
State revenue $6,021,195  $6,021,195  $0  $0  
Federal revenue $76,467  $76,467  $0  $0  
Other revenue $4,741,112  $4,741,112  $0  $0  
TOTAL REVENUES $10,838,774  $10,838,774  $0  $0  
          
TOTAL LEVY $40,560,428  $35,068,221  $5,492,207  $4,242,208  
Unfunded OPEB liability *** $67,507,074  $67,507,074  $67,507,074  $67,507,074  
Unfunded pension liability*** $21,243,829  $21,243,829  $21,243,829  $21,243,829  
Outstanding debt/ interest**** $0  $0  $0  $0  
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT $88,750,903  $88,750,903  $88,750,903  $88,750,903  
*  In 2008, the county distributed legacy costs evenly to all departments based on number of active employees and 
salary levels. 
**  This method distributes legacy costs according to a department's retiree history. 
*** Estimated liability allocated to department is based on the department's retiree history. 
****Data limitations prevented an accurate calculation of courthouse debt attributed to the courts, as opposed to 
other courthouse inhabitants. 
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Table 16: Breakdown of District Attorney’s 2008 Actual Expenditures and Revenues and 
Legacy Costs 
District Attorney 
Cost to operate 
as county 
department 
(current practice) 
Cost to operate 
minus legacy 
costs Legacy costs 
      
Using 2008 
fringe allocation 
method* 
Based on 
retiree 
history** 
Administrative $351,664  $317,338  $34,326  $33,298  
Information technology $421,337  $380,210  $41,127  $39,895  
Legal counsel $0  $0  $0  $0  
Facility management $1,350,707  $1,218,864  $131,843  $127,896  
Fleet management $76,695  $69,209  $7,486  $7,262  
Central charges/overhead $2,200,403  $1,985,621  $214,782  $208,351  
Salary and wages $7,383,970  $7,383,970  $0  $0  
Social security $544,372  $544,372  $0  $0  
Employee healthcare $2,166,697  $2,166,697  $0  $0  
Employee pension $798,699  $798,699  $0  $0  
Retiree healthcare $2,166,697  $0  $2,166,697  $946,375  
Retiree pension $399,349  $0  $399,349  $193,147  
Other $9,681  $9,681  $0  $0  
Personnel costs $13,469,464  $10,903,418  $2,566,046  $1,139,521 
Non-personnel expenditures $3,440,063  $3,440,063  $0  $0  
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $19,109,930  $16,329,102  $2,780,828  $1,347,872  
State revenue $5,824,132  $5,824,132  $0  $0  
Federal revenue $2,558,227  $2,558,227  $0  $0  
Other revenue $80,361  $80,361  $0  $0  
TOTAL REVENUES $8,462,720  $8,462,720  $0  $0  
          
TOTAL LEVY $10,647,210  $7,866,382  $2,780,828  $1,347,872  
Unfunded OPEB liability *** $21,840,524  $21,840,524  $21,840,524  $21,840,524  
Unfunded pension liability*** $6,873,003  $6,873,003  $6,873,003  $6,873,003  
Outstanding debt/ interest**** $0  $0  $0  $0  
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT $28,713,527  $28,713,527  $28,713,527  $28,713,527  
*  In 2008, the county distributed legacy costs evenly to all departments based on number of active employees 
and salary levels. 
**  This method distributes legacy costs according to a department's retiree history. 
*** Estimated liability allocated to department is based on the department's retiree history. 
****Data limitations prevented an accurate calculation of courthouse debt attributed to the DA, as opposed to 
other courthouse inhabitants. 
 
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
The obvious alternative governance structure for the courts and district attorney’s office in 
Milwaukee County is to transfer responsibility for the support functions currently provided by 
the county to state government, which already pays the salaries and related costs for judges and 
prosecutors.  The section below provides a brief analysis of that option. 
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Discussion 
 
Counties have long complained that inadequate state funding for circuit court support services is 
one of the most egregious examples of an under-funded state mandate.  They argue that circuit 
courts are part of the state’s judicial system and, therefore, should be fully supported by the state 
without the use of county property tax levy.   
 
Counties also have argued that the state made a commitment to move toward full funding of 
court support services when it created the circuit court support and guardian ad litem grant 
programs in the mid 1990s, but that it has failed to live up to that commitment.  The Wisconsin 
Counties Association (WCA), for example, notes that the two programs have been funded at the 
same level for more than a decade and only fund a fraction of the costs they were intended to 
offset.  In fact, according to WCA, counties reported spending more than $150 million to support 
the circuit courts in 2007, but received only about $19 million in circuit court support grants.  
WCA also points out that the state retains $26 million in court fees collected annually from 
litigants to fund other portions of its budget.14 
 
State officials, meanwhile, have argued that counties have a long tradition of providing funding 
for the trial courts, which is both understandable and justifiable given that courthouses are the 
traditional home of county government and that courts are headed by county elected officials.  
They argue further that while court-related grants only cover a fraction of the costs incurred by 
counties for court support services, shared revenue payments are provided to supplement those 
grants, and it is up to county leaders to determine the best use of those revenues to support 
mandated services.  
 
The issue of who should fund the state’s circuit courts has been addressed by several committees 
and commissions during the past two decades.  One of the most recent – the Governor’s Blue-
Ribbon Commission on State and Local Partnerships in the 21st Century (also known as the Kettl 
Commission) – recommended in 2001 that “state government ought to move, as soon as 
practical, to full funding of the justice system.” 
 
In 2002, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Planning and Policy Advisory Committee created a 
Subcommittee on Court Financing to conduct an in-depth examination of the issue.  The 
subcommittee, which included a Supreme Court justice, circuit court chief judges and judges, 
clerks of circuit court, and county officials, met periodically for more than a year and produced a 
comprehensive report in February 2004.15  The following were some of its key findings: 
 
• After reviewing prior court financing studies and the current Wisconsin circuit court funding 
model, and examining court financing models in other states, the subcommittee concluded 
that there is no “right” way to finance the circuit courts.  It found strengths and weaknesses in 
both the current model and models in which states fully fund court operations, and concluded 
that “the ideal of providing a stable, sufficient court financing mechanism impervious to the 
political and fiscal forces that affect the other branches of government is not realistic.” 
 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Counties Association 2009-10 Legislative Agenda, p. 5. 
15 http://www.wicourts.gov/about/committees/docs/ppaccourtfinancerpt.pdf 
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• Upon concluding that there was no “magic bullet” that would guarantee stable and sufficient 
funding for the courts, the subcommittee suggested that an effort be made to refine the 
distinction between county-funded and state-funded court operations by re-establishing the 
definition of “court services.”  It stated that “the trial court system in Wisconsin should 
continue to remain a partnership between counties and the State, with the long-term goal of 
the State increasing its responsibility for funding certain core court services.”   
 
• The subcommittee identified certain core court services currently funded in part or in whole 
by counties that could be transitioned to state funding and laid out a “blueprint” for doing so.  
The blueprint described the current funding arrangement along with its strengths or 
weaknesses, followed by the potential strengths or problems with a transfer to state funding.   
 
• The report emphasized that personnel-related court services presented the “most difficult” 
challenges, explaining that “the first decision is whether these court staff positions should 
remain county employees or become state employees.  Transfer to state employment may 
offer the most opportunities for uniformity and equity and improved services, but also 
present the greatest administrative challenges and would be more expensive.” 
 
• The subcommittee reported that “the national trend of trial court funding has been a shift to 
state financing.”  It noted, however, that the services funded by different states vary widely, 
and that many states “have excluded certain items, such as clerks of court offices and, most 
commonly, security and facility costs. Full state responsibility for trial court facilities is 
generally the last and most difficult cost to assume, since it involves great cost and a variety 
of legal, political and architectural complexities.” 
 
• In reviewing the experience of other states that had moved to full funding of circuit court 
services, the subcommittee found that several also converted county court employees to the 
state payroll.  In doing so, many experienced unanticipated logistical hurdles and took on 
additional costs, including higher health care premiums due to more generous state health 
care plans.  
 
The Subcommittee on Court Financing report contains several important insights regarding a 
possible statewide transfer of courts funding and, potentially, courts personnel to state 
government.  Those insights also are extremely relevant to the discussion of pursuing this 
strategy solely in Milwaukee County, and in doing so for the district attorney’s office as well.   
 
One of the report’s fundamental conclusions is that if a transfer of court services is to occur, it 
ought to occur over several years in a phased approach.  If policymakers sought the elimination 
of county government, of course, then a phased approach may not be possible, and an approach 
under which the state fully funded court and district attorney services without assuming county 
personnel certainly would not be possible.   
 
County funding of support services for district attorney’s offices has not been as contentious, 
though WCA has included some district attorney’s functions in its definition of “court services” 
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 70 
 
that should be fully funded by the state.16  A key area of contentiousness, however, has been state 
funding of its own district attorney positions, with district attorneys complaining that salaries are 
not sufficient to recruit and retain assistant district attorneys and that not enough prosecutor 
positions are funded across the state.       
 
The following discussion of pros, cons and logistical issues speaks only to the potential transfer 
of Milwaukee County courts and district attorney support services to the State of Wisconsin, as 
opposed to a statewide transfer. 
 
Key pros 
 
• Having the State of Wisconsin directly responsible for the administration of court and district 
attorney support services in Milwaukee County would improve accountability by linking the 
entity responsible for mandating and funding the services with service outcomes.   
 
• State funding and administration of Milwaukee County’s courts and district attorney’s office 
could provide the chief judge and district attorney – who are state employees – with a better 
opportunity to make the case with state leaders for the operational support that is necessary 
for them to efficiently carry out their state-mandated functions.  It also could produce better 
coordination with other elements of the state criminal justice system and allow the chief 
judge and district attorney to have greater input into legislative decisions that impact their 
operations.  
 
• Moving court and district attorney support services outside of county government could 
better shield those services from the county’s overall budget difficulties, legacy costs, 
competition with other county priorities and personnel rules (which some argue prevent the 
two offices from filling positions on a timely basis), thus improving the quality and cost 
effectiveness of those services.   
 
Key cons 
 
• It could be argued that court and district attorney’s services in Milwaukee County have 
evolved over the years to be responsive to the county’s unique needs, and that placing those 
services under state control could result in a more standardized and less responsive approach 
that would sacrifice local prerogatives. 
 
• While the chief judge and district attorney are state employees, some might argue that their 
input on fiscal and policy issues carry more weight at the county level, and that such input 
would be diluted in a state government that is more attuned to broader, statewide interests.  
Furthermore, the State of Wisconsin has its own serious budget woes, and those woes could 
produce funding challenges that are at least equal to those currently faced by the courts and 
district attorney under the existing governance structure. 
 
                                                 
16 Subcommittee on Court Financing Final Report, February 2004, p. ii.  
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• It could be argued that a local funding component that is overseen by local elected officials 
who must go before the voters on a regular basis produces greater fiscal accountability than a 
scenario under which those officials simply need to justify budgetary needs and expenditure 
patterns to state government officials. 
 
Key logistical questions/obstacles 
 
• In 2008, Milwaukee County spent about $43 million of local property tax levy to support 
non-legacy court and district attorney services.  State officials would need to decide whether 
the state would be willing to spend at that level, whether it would intercept an equivalent 
amount of shared revenue from the county if county government was not eliminated, or 
whether it would seek to assess county taxpayers if county government was eliminated.   
 
• The courts and district attorney have an annual combined liability of nearly $5 million for the 
cost of health care and pensions for their retirees, and an undetermined amount of 
outstanding debt on courthouse facilities linked to the courts.  The state would need to 
determine whether those costs would be left with the county (or its taxpayers in the case of 
elimination), or whether it would assume them. 
 
• The state’s 71 other counties also have bitterly complained about underfunding of mandated 
court services.  A consideration for the state would be whether, to the extent it was willing to 
assume financial and programmatic responsibility for this underfunded mandate in 
Milwaukee County, it could justify not doing so in other counties.  
 
• When the state transferred district attorney, deputy district attorney and assistant district 
attorney positions to the state payroll in 1990, litigation arose over the issue of how and 
whether individuals in those positions in Milwaukee County should be provided the option to 
retain their county pension and retiree health care benefits.  The result was a complicated 
arrangement (which is described in greater detail in Section I) in which some prosecutors 
remained part of the county pension system and continued to receive other county fringe 
benefits, while others shifted to the state.  Similar complexities could arise under an attempt 
to transfer support staff in the district attorney’s office and courts to state employment.  
 
• Because the clerk of circuit court is a constitutionally established position in Milwaukee 
County, legal issues could arise under a transfer of this position to state government.  It is 
possible that if the position continued to be elected on a countywide basis, despite having its 
salary and the positions associated with it being placed in state government, then a 
constitutional change would not be necessary.  That question, however, likely would have to 
be decided by state attorneys.   
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CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Milwaukee County government plays a significant role in the community’s cultural scene as 
owner and financial contributor to several cultural institutions, as well as owner and operator of 
the Milwaukee County Zoo.  Cultural facilities owned but not operated by the county include the 
Milwaukee Public Museum, Milwaukee County War Memorial, Marcus Center for the 
Performing Arts, Milwaukee County Historical Society headquarters, Villa Terrace Decorative 
Arts Museum and the Charles Allis Museum.  The county provides annual operating assistance 
to the non-profit organizations that administer each of those entities and also pays for some or all 
capital improvements, typically under a memorandum of understanding.  The Milwaukee County 
Zoo, meanwhile, is administered as a typical county department, which means that its employees 
are county employees and it is subject to the same internal services and charges, budgeting 
processes, oversight by the county board, etc. 
 
The county also provides lesser amounts of funding to several additional cultural/educational 
organizations that it does not own, including the Federated Library System, UW Extension, 
VISIT Milwaukee and the Milwaukee County Fund for the Performing Arts.   Table 17 shows 
the county property tax levy devoted to each cultural entity in the county’s 2009 adopted budget. 
 
Table 17: 2009 Budgeted Tax Levy Allocations to Cultural Entities 
Cultural entity 
2009 Budgeted  
tax levy 
Zoological Department $5,455,950 
Milwaukee Public Museum $3,502,376 
War Memorial $1,504,594 
Marcus Center for the Performing Arts $1,280,000 
Fund for the Performing Arts $377,688 
UW Extension $373,729 
Villa Terrace/Charles Allis $243,656 
Historical Society $242,550 
Federated Library System $66,650 
VISIT Milwaukee $25,000 
TOTAL $13,072,193 
 
The county’s ownership, operation and/or financial contributions to these cultural entities are not 
statutorily mandated.  State statutes contain provisions indicating that the county may own, 
acquire or appropriate monies to museums, university extensions, historical societies, war 
memorials, etc., but there is no requirement that they do so.   
 
Milwaukee County’s relationships with cultural institutions generally trace back several decades, 
though many have evolved over time.  The War Memorial Corporation, for example, was 
established as an independent non-profit organization shortly after World War II, and it partnered 
with the county to secure the county-owned land on the lakefront on which the War Memorial 
Center was built in the 1950s.  Since that time, the Corporation has added the Performing Arts 
Center, Villa Terrace and Charles Allis Museum under its umbrella; each of the buildings was 
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deeded to the county as a public trust, but each of the entities is overseen by both the War 
Memorial Corporation and its own board of directors. 
   
The Milwaukee Public Museum, meanwhile, originally was operated as a county department 
after ownership was shifted to the county from the City of Milwaukee in 1976.  In 1992, the 
county established a private non-profit organization to assume administration of museum 
operations, in part as an effort to wean it from dependence on county property tax levy. 
 
The cultural entities’ dependence on county funding also differs.  As a county department, the 
zoo is heavily dependent upon county funding for its operations, with a $6.4 million property tax 
levy contribution in 2008 accounting for 27% of its revenue.  The zoo also receives a direct 
contribution of more than $400,000 from the Zoological Society of Milwaukee County, as well 
as an additional $2.4 million from the Society from parking revenues associated with the Zoo 
Pass Plus membership, corporate sponsorships, and other funds.    
 
With regard to the county-owned but privately operated cultural institutions, the War Memorial 
relies on the county’s $1.5 million property tax levy contribution for nearly 70% of its operating 
budget.  The Milwaukee Public Museum’s annual funding of $3.5 million from the county 
comprised about 18% of its revenue budget in 2008, while the Marcus Center’s $1.3 million 
county contribution comprised about 28% of its operating budget.  The $624,000 combined 
budget of the Villa Terrace/Charles Allis Museum in 2008 counted on county tax levy for 
approximately 39% of its budget, while the Historical Society’s $838,000 budget was reliant on 
levy support for about 29% of its budget.  
 
Capital funding is an equally important consideration for the county-owned institutions, which 
depend upon new and improved exhibits and other amenities to maintain or expand earned 
income.  As owner of the buildings, the county generally has taken responsibility for capital 
repairs and major maintenance, while expecting the private operators to address minor 
maintenance issues in their operating budgets.  Major capital improvements, meanwhile, like the 
Historical Society headquarters renovation, the Public Museum’s butterfly exhibit, and the 
Marcus Center’s mid-1990s facility revnovation, generally have involved private sector and 
county funding and/or county financing that is repaid by the non-profit operator over the life of 
county-issued bonds.  Even the county-owned and operated zoo has seen significant private 
sector participation in capital improvements, with the county and Zoological Society splitting the 
cost of a multi-year, $30 million capital improvements program launched earlier this decade. 
   
During the past several years, significant public attention has been devoted to the physical 
condition of several of the county-owned institutions.  In its November 2008 comprehensive 
evaluation of the fiscal condition of the cultural institutions (which can be accessed at 
http://www.publicpolicyforum.org/pdfs/Parks&Culture.final.pdf), the Forum noted that “major 
maintenance and basic infrastructure repair needs are significant and growing at each of the 
county-owned assets, with the exception of the Milwaukee County Historical Society 
headquarters, which is in the final stages of a major renovation.” 
The total amount of budgeted county expenditures on cultural institutions in 2009 was $31.6 
million.  Of that total, the zoological department accounted for $23.8 million, while the other 
cultural entities accounted for $7.8 million.  The zoological department’s 2009 budgeted 
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property tax levy was $5.5 million.  Other key revenue sources are admissions fees, parking fees, 
concessions revenue and the contribution from the Zoological Society.  The zoo was the sixth 
largest organizational unit in the county in 2009 in terms of its number of employees, with 252 
FTEs in the 2009 budget.   
 
Virtually all of the $7.8 million contributed by the county to the other cultural entities was 
property tax levy (the county share of the UW Extension budget also includes about $120,000 of 
direct revenue).  As discussed above, the $7.8 million county expenditure represents only a 
fraction of the total budgets of those entities.  Those total budgets are not included in the 
county’s overall budget because the entities are operated by non-county entities that are not 
county departments.   
 
BUDGET BREAKDOWN 
 
The budget breakdown included in other subsections is limited in this section to the zoological 
department, which is the only cultural institution operated by the county, and therefore is the 
only one impacted by legacy costs.17  Table 18 breaks down the zoological department’s actual 
expenditures and revenue in 2008, showing both total costs and costs when legacy obligations 
are subtracted.  This analysis shows that the department spent $1.8 million on central service 
charges from other county departments, $12.4 million on its own personnel, and $9.6 million on 
non-personnel expenditures, including services and commodities such as advertising, fuel and 
utilities. 
 
The analysis also shows that $179,000 of the zoo’s central service charges and $2 million of its 
personnel expenditures were not directly connected to the cost of running the zoo, but instead 
were county legacy costs distributed to the department by the central budget office.  This tells us 
that if a different entity had provided the same services, secured administrative overhead 
at the same price, and paid the same wages and benefits to its active employees in 2008, it 
potentially could have operated the zoo for $2.1 million less if it was not responsible for the 
zoo’s share of the county’s legacy costs.   
 
In addition, the analysis shows that if legacy costs had been distributed to the zoological 
department on the basis of its actual number of retirees, as opposed to its share of the existing 
county workforce, those costs would have totaled $1.8 million.  This $1.8 million figure 
represents the approximate annual county legacy obligation held by the zoological department.  
As with every other function analyzed in this report, under a change in governance these legacy 
costs either could be assumed by the function’s new governing body, or they could remain the 
responsibility of county government or county taxpayers (if county government no longer 
existed). 
 
                                                 
17 The one exception is the Milwaukee Public Museum, to which the county still attributes approximately $564,000 
in legacy costs annually for retired county employees who worked for the Museum when it was a county 
department.  Under the allocation methodology utilized by the county, however, which is based on number of 
departmental employees, there are no legacy costs included in the portion of the Museum budget that is reflected in 
the county budget.  
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 75 
 
Finally, in terms of the department’s overall share of the county’s outstanding liabilities, its share 
of the county’s OPEB liability is $31.5 million, while its share of the pension fund liability 
(consisting of both POB debt and the unfunded liability) is $9.9 million.  In addition, the total 
General Obligation debt on zoo facilities is $32.4 million, which either would have to be picked 
up by the receiving entity or assumed by county taxpayers if the zoo was transferred elsewhere. 
 
Table 18: Breakdown of Zoo 2008 Actual Expenditures and Revenues and Legacy Costs 
Zoo 
Cost to operate 
as county 
department 
(current practice) 
Cost to operate 
minus legacy 
costs Legacy costs 
      
Using 2008 fringe 
allocation 
method* 
Based on 
retiree 
history** 
Administrative $1,047,432 $945,192 $102,240 $99,179 
Information technology $479,781 $432,949 $46,832 $45,429 
Legal counsel $0 $0 $0 $0 
Facility management $101,880 $91,935 $9,945 $9,647 
Fleet management $205,368 $185,322 $20,046 $19,446 
Central charges/overhead $1,834,461 $1,655,399 $179,062 $173,701 
Salary and wages $7,868,347 $7,868,347 $0 $0 
Social security $450,218 $450,218 $0 $0 
Employee healthcare $1,564,050 $1,564,050 $0 $0 
Employee pension $772,249 $772,249 $0 $0 
Retiree healthcare $1,564,050 $0 $1,564,050 $1,365,790 
Retiree pension $386,124 $0 $386,124 $278,746 
Other -$243,381 -$243,381 $0 $0 
Personnel costs $12,361,656 $10,411,482 $1,950,174 $1,644,536 
Non-personnel expenditures $9,584,741 $9,584,741 $0 $0 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $23,780,858 $21,651,622 $2,129,236 $1,818,237 
State revenue $0 $0 $0 $0 
Federal revenue $0 $0 $0 $0 
Other revenue $17,359,729 $17,359,729 $0 $0 
TOTAL REVENUES $17,359,729 $17,359,729 $0 $0 
          
TOTAL LEVY $6,421,129 $4,291,893 $2,129,236 $1,818,237 
Unfunded OPEB liability *** $31,519,847 $31,519,847 $31,519,847 $31,519,847 
Unfunded pension liability*** $9,918,994 $9,918,994 $9,918,994 $9,918,994 
Outstanding debt and interest $32,438,429 $32,438,429 $32,438,429 $32,438,429 
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT $73,877,270 $73,877,270 $73,877,270 $73,877,270 
*  In 2008, the county distributed legacy costs evenly to all departments based on number of active employees and 
salary levels. 
**  This method distributes legacy costs according to a department's retiree history. 
*** Estimated liability allocated to department is based on the department's retiree history. 
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POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE SERVICE PROVIDER 
 
If county government was eliminated, an obvious alternative approach for governing the county-
owned but independently operated cultural institutions would be simply to give or sell the 
properties and buildings to the non-profit organizations that operate them.  In the case of the 
Milwaukee County Zoo, a new not-for-profit corporation could be created per the concept 
suggested by the county executive in his 2010 recommended budget, and the zoo property and 
buildings could be gifted or sold to that entity.  
 
Such an approach is problematic, however, for two primary reasons: 1) several of the properties 
have been deeded to the county as a public trust, which means that optimally some other type of 
public entity should take control of them; and 2) each institution is heavily dependent upon 
taxpayer assistance and would have great difficulty surviving without such assistance. 
 
Alternatively, the institutions could be transferred to the state or City of Milwaukee, but both of 
those governments have pressing fiscal problems and likely would be extremely reluctant to 
assume the county’s funding commitment.  Another option might be to transfer administrative 
control and ownership of the institutions to the Wisconsin Convention Center District or Stadium 
districts, which are public entities with limited local taxation authority, though those districts 
have their own funding challenges as well.  
 
A final option, which we explore in greater detail, is the possibility of creating a separate district 
that would be responsible for owning and administering both parks and cultural institutions.  The 
concept is similar to that discussed in a later section on parks, but with a few additional nuances.  
The following provides a brief analysis of that option. 
 
Discussion 
 
Special purpose governments have proliferated across the country in order to meet community 
needs ranging from sewage treatment and cemetery plots to airport governance and 
transportation planning.  Special districts to govern both parks and cultural facilities are among 
the least common, but we have uncovered two: the Scientific and Cultural Facilities District of 
metropolitan Denver and, on a smaller scale, the Rockford Parks District.  Each of these districts 
incorporates cultural and art functions with its provision of park and open space areas. 
Created in 1989, the Scientific and Cultural Facilities District (SCFD) of metropolitan Denver 
was designed to financially support, at least in part, cultural, artistic, and outdoor institutions in 
the greater Denver region.  Prior to the creation of the district, the State of Colorado provided 
significant funding to cultural institutions in Denver and around the state.  However, in 1982, the 
state removed its funding from these organizations.  Cultural institutions, particularly the large 
museums and botanical gardens in Denver, began to struggle financially without state support.18   
                                                 
18 Scientific and Cultural Facilities District. 2007.  “History”; http://www.scfd.org/?page=about&sub=1. 2 
September 2009. 
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While the City of Denver provided funds to its cultural institutions, many visitors were from 
surrounding suburbs.  Consequently, key officials from Denver and its neighboring suburbs 
backed state legislation that allowed for the creation of a regional culture district that would 
support Denver’s major institutions but also benefit suburban facilities and organizations.  Voters 
in a seven-county region surrounding Denver agreed and passed a 0.1% sales and use tax to fund 
the district.19  The district is now the primary source of funding for several major institutions in 
the City of Denver and provides supplemental revenue to a wide variety of groups, organizations 
and cultural landmarks within the region. 
There are two aspects of this special purpose district that are particularly unique.  First, the 
regional cooperation utilized to create and maintain the district generally is not common among 
other urban areas (especially for a seven-county region).  Second, the district supports cultural, 
arts, zoological and botanical facilities, as opposed solely to parks.     
The Rockford Park District, meanwhile, was formed in 1909.  In contrast to the many park 
districts within the State of Illinois, but similar to the SCFD of metropolitan Denver, the 
Rockford special district also encompasses a variety of museums and cultural facilities.  The 
district is associated with five museums and one museum “park area.”  In several cases, the 
museums are located on district land, which makes the funding and operations of these facilities 
somewhat of a natural combination.20 
The district also oversees the operation and maintenance of parks and facilities outside of the 
city’s boundaries.  These service areas include three neighboring cities and a variety of adjacent 
unincorporated land.  This also makes the Rockford Park District unique among Illinois districts 
because most others generally are confined to more limited boundaries.   
The following are profiles of the SCFD of metropolitan Denver and the Rockford Park District.  
The SCFD of metropolitan Denver provides an example of a large, relatively recent regional 
district, while the Rockford Park District represents a smaller regional district that has remained 
viable for a long period of time.  While their structure, operations, and scope certainly are 
different, their overall goals of providing art, culture and park facilities are similar. 
  
                                                 
19 Following the 1988 vote, the tax was re-approved by voters in 1994 and 2004. 
20 Rockford Park District. 2009. “About Us.” http://www.rockfordparkdistrict.org/home/aboutus/aboutus.cmsx. 2 
September 2009. 
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Table 19: A profile of the Scientific and Cultural Facilities District (SCFD) 
Denver Metropolitan Region, Colorado 
Establishment In 1982 the State of Colorado cut its funding for cultural institutions around the state.  In 1989, as a 
response to reduced funding, the citizens of metropolitan Denver overwhelmingly voted (3-1 ratio) to 
increase sales taxes to support arts and culture organizations through a regional cultural asset district. 
Property Through its taxing authority the district provides financial support to over 300 regional organizations.  
However, receiving over 65% percent of the financial resources are five institutions: the Denver Art 
Museum, the Denver Botanic Gardens, the Denver Museum of Nature and Science, the Denver Zoo, 
and The Denver Center for the Performing Arts.  Medium to small organizations share the remainder 
of the funding. 
Population served Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Broomfield, Denver, Douglas, and Jefferson Counties 
Population (Combined): 2,438,842 
Governance The SCFD Board of Directors is comprised of eleven members. Board members are chosen by county 
commissioners in each participating county (city councils in Denver and Broomfield). In addition, four 
members are appointed by the governor.  The executive director reports to the board of directors and 
oversees the distributions and work of the district staff.  Each county has a board to represent 
constituents and distribute small funding amounts. 
Budget process The SCFD executive director and district staff prepare an annual budget which is subject to review and 
approval by the SCFD Board of Directors. 
Financial planning The SCFC Board of Directors considers and documents long-term planning and financing options.  In 
2008, this was accomplished by board retreat focused on long-term planning options.  Financial 
reserves were enough to cover six months of operations in 2008. 
Revenue The SCFD is funded by a sales and use tax of 0.1% that is applied to the seven counties listed above.  
The tax was approved overwhelmingly in 1988, 1994, and 2004.  Because of the number and scope of 
groups supported by the SCFC, supported institutions must also generate other sources of revenue 
from grants, fees and sales, or donations in order to completely cover total expenditures. 
 
 
Table 20: A profile of Rockford Park District 
Rockford, Illinois 
Establishment The Rockford Park District was formed in 1909 as a special purpose government with the 
primary objective of establishing and maintaining public park and recreation facilities for 
district residents. 
Property There are 175 park sites within the Rockford Park District, containing 4,833 acres of land 
covering 125 square miles.  Included in the parks are two community centers, skateboard and 
bike areas, a disc golf course, walking/bike paths, three golf courses, an ice arena, and a green 
house.  Cultural facilities include: the Burpee Museum of Natural History, the Discovery 
Center Museum, Midway Village Museum, Riverfront Park Museum, Rockford Art Museum, 
and the Tinker Swiss Cottage Museum. 
Population served The cities of Rockford, Loves Park, Cherry Valley, New Milford and adjacent unincorporated 
areas in Boone and Winnebago Counties. 
  Population (Approx. Combined): 172,891 
Governance The Rockford Park District is governed by an elected five-member board of commissioners 
that serve six-year terms without compensation.  Reporting to the commissioners is an 
executive director and a group of specialized deputy directors. 
Budget process The budget is prepared and presented to the district commissioners by the executive director 
and the chief financial officer.  The board of commissioners examines and approves the 
budget. 
Financial planning The board of commissioners develops a series of priorities that provide staff with a general 
direction concerning financial, staff and other resources. 
Revenue The property tax rate was 71.27 cents per $100 of assessed value in 2008.  Property taxes from 
homeowners and businesses make up half of the revenue of the operating funds for the Park 
District (51%). Fees paid for services (e.g. golf, ice skating, swimming, camps, etc.) make up 
36%.  The remainder (13%) comes from other sources such as grants, donations, sponsorships, 
and advertising. 
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In Milwaukee County, combining the county’s parks and recreational facilities has been 
discussed most prominently in the context of discussion about a dedicated funding source.   A 
November 2008 advisory referendum on a potential 1% sales tax in Milwaukee County included 
both parks and cultural institutions under the list of functions that would receive sales tax 
proceeds and end reliance on property tax levy.  Neither the referendum nor subsequent 
legislative initiatives at the state level to implement the tax have spelled out the percentage of the 
sales tax proceeds that would be directed to either function, however, nor have these initiatives 
specified which specific cultural institutions would receive sales tax proceeds and how much 
each would receive individually.  Also, while the notion of combining cultural institutions with 
the parks in a separate district has been discussed by some park district proponents, the sales tax 
referendum did not envision that option. 
 
A potential parks and culture district in Milwaukee County could be organized in many different 
ways.  The following discussion of pros, cons and logistical issues focuses on the general 
concept and does so solely from the perspective of the cultural institutions, as a similar 
discussion on parks is presented in the next section of this report. 
  
Key pros 
 
• Creation of a parks and culture district with its own dedicated funding source would remove 
the cultural institutions from competition with other county functions for annual operating 
assistance, and would end the necessary prioritization of mandated county functions over 
those institutions.  It also could provide greater certainty about funding, which is essential for 
long-term planning for each of the institutions.   
 
• If the new district is regional in nature, it would allow cultural institutions that are enjoyed by 
visitors from throughout southeast Wisconsin to receive financial support from that larger tax 
base.   
 
• Transferring ownership of the institutions to a new authority perhaps would be even more 
beneficial on the capital side, as the institutions currently struggle to access needed capital 
dollars from the county even for fundamental physical repairs that – when left unaddressed – 
impact attendance and other sources of earned revenue.  It is also extremely difficult for 
some of the institutions to develop business plans and raise private dollars without knowing 
how they will fare in the steep competition for county support for physical improvements.   
 
• For the zoo, being part of an independent district could allow it to function more efficiently, 
because it would be freed from having to utilize county internal services (e.g. facilities, 
fiscal, human resources and legal).  The Forum’s 2008 report on the county-owned parks and 
cultural institutions cited an official from the Zoological Society who argued that the zoo 
needs to “constantly refresh itself” with new exhibits to draw visitors in the area’s very 
competitive tourism climate, but that the county’s bureaucratic climate and high overhead 
costs impeded it from doing so. 
 
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 80 
 
• Transferring ownership of the cultural institutions to a separate authority could heighten 
prospects for non-public funding for capital improvements from foundations and other 
sources.  
 
Key cons 
 
• Housing the cultural institutions in a separate district could lead to a significant increase in 
taxing and spending on the institutions because of lack of competition with other locally 
funded services, which forces policymakers to prioritize among a wide variety of programs 
and services and make difficult spending choices. 
  
• The non-county-operated cultural institutions fare well under administration of the War 
Memorial Corporation and/or separate boards of directors with little interference from county 
officials.  It is possible that the board of a new parks and culture district could become more 
involved in operational oversight in a non-constructive manner. 
 
• Several of the institutions have benefited from county ownership by being able to take 
advantage of county financing for capital improvements and county financial assistance in 
instances of emergency (e.g. the county’s critical role in helping the Milwaukee Public 
Museum get back on track after its fiscal crisis earlier this decade).  A separate district may 
not possess the capacity to be as helpful in that regard. 
 
• Creation of a regional arts and culture district could engender significant opposition from 
policymakers and taxpayers in surrounding counties, who may contest paying taxes to 
support institutions that are located in Milwaukee County.  
 
• It could be argued that Milwaukee County already has enough separate governmental or 
quasi-governmental agencies, and creation of a new parks and culture district simply would 
create another layer of unneeded government bureaucracy. 
 
Key logistical questions/obstacles 
 
• The zoo has significant legacy liabilities amounting to $1.8 million annually for the cost of 
health care and pensions for its retirees, and more than $32 million in outstanding debt on 
zoo facilities and infrastructure.  The other county-owned cultural facilities also have more 
than $35 million in outstanding debt that is currently being paid by the county.  In developing 
legislation authorizing creation of a parks and culture district in Milwaukee County, the state 
would need to determine whether the new authority would assume responsibility for the 
zoo’s legacy liabilities and the outstanding debt on the zoo and other cultural facilities.   
 
• In a memorandum prepared by county board and administrative services staff for the 
county’s Intergovernmental Relations Committee in December 2007, concern was expressed 
over the transfer of equipment and infrastructure to a proposed park district without a similar 
transfer of debt service, as the county would remain responsible for paying debt service for 
equipment it no longer owned.  This same concern would arise for the zoo and would need to 
be addressed in authorizing legislation.   
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• Some of the zoo’s assets have been donated to the county, and legal attention would be 
required to determine if those could be turned over to another entity.  
 
• Significant legal questions regarding the transfer of ownership from the county to a newly 
established authority and the status and potential continuation of existing memoranda of 
understanding between the county and the institutions would need to be researched and 
resolved.    
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PARKS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Milwaukee County’s Department of Parks, Recreation and Culture administers and operates the 
Milwaukee County Park System.  The county park system consists of approximately 15,000 
acres of parkland that includes 150 parks, 120 lane miles of park roads and parkways, 15 golf 
courses, nine outdoor pools, two family aquatic centers, five beaches, 117 tennis courts, 178 
picnic areas, 23 major pavilions, 178 athletic fields, the 108-mile Oak Leaf Trail, the Mitchell 
Park Horticultural Conservatory, Boerner Botanical Gardens, McKinley Marina, Wehr Nature 
Center, and the O’Donnell Park Parking Structure.   
 
In addition to maintaining this immense variety of physical assets, the Parks Department operates 
or oversees dozens of recreational programs and activities, including 37 organized sports leagues 
and a variety of aquatics and exercise programs; coordinates activities with dozens of community 
organizations and more than 40 “friends” groups; and assists with special events including the 
Great Circus Parade and Milwaukee Air and Water Show. 
 
Administration and operation of a comprehensive parks and recreation system is not a statutorily 
mandated function like most other county functions, but instead is one that the county assumed at 
its own discretion.  That decision occurred in the 1930’s, when the City of Milwaukee, facing 
financial difficulties that were hampering its efforts to manage the parks, transferred ownership 
of most parks to the county.  From that point until the early 1980s, the parks were owned by the 
county and their employees were county employees, but their administration and budget were 
overseen by a separate Milwaukee County Parks Commission.  In 1982, the county executive 
and county board dissolved the commission and placed the parks and its budget under the direct 
control of county government.  
 
During the past several years, there has been significant public attention focused on the future of 
the parks in light of a significant backlog in infrastructure repairs and a significant reduction in 
full-time staffing and funding.  The Public Policy Forum called attention to those challenges in a 
comprehensive analysis released in December 2002.  That analysis found that while the parks 
were not necessarily “failing the residents of the county” as some had suggested, the county’s 
financial commitment to parks, recreation and culture was two-thirds of what it was in the 1970s 
(after adjusting for inflation), and county park employment had declined from 1,195 FTEs in 
1985 to 802 in 2002, a 33% decrease.   
In an updated assessment published in November 2008, the Forum found that “with an estimated 
$277 million backlog of infrastructure maintenance and repairs, declining attendance at pools 
and golf courses, and dependence on a property tax levy funding source that has diminished by 
two-thirds during the past 30 years, it is clear that the Milwaukee County Department of Parks, 
Recreation and Culture faces huge challenges.”   
The Forum report also noted, however, that “despite the bleak outlook…there are signs of hope.”  
It said “the department’s success in turning around the Milwaukee County Sports Complex, and 
its impressive efforts (with the help of private contributions) to recreate Bradford Beach as a 
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premier summer destination, show that creative management and successful private fundraising 
can make a big difference.  Also, a recent public opinion survey conducted by the Public Policy 
Forum indicates that despite the poor physical condition of many parks system assets, county 
residents generally remain pleased with the parks.” 
The total budget for the parks department in 2009 was $44 million.  The department’s 2009 
budgeted property tax levy was $25 million, ranking it fourth among all county departments 
(behind the Office of the Sheriff, Behavioral Health Division and Courts).  Other key revenue 
sources are admissions/user fees, rental revenue and concessions revenue.   
 
The parks department also is one of the county’s largest organizational units in terms of its 
number of employees, with 548 full-time equivalent positions in the 2009 budget. 
 
BUDGET BREAKDOWN 
 
Table 21 breaks down the Parks Department’s actual expenditures and revenue in 2008, showing 
both total costs and costs when legacy obligations are subtracted .  This analysis shows that the 
department spent $5.7 million on central service charges from other county departments, $27.6 
million on its own personnel, and $9.9 million on non-personnel expenditures, including services 
and commodities such as fuel and utilities. 
 
The analysis also shows that $560,000 of the Parks Department’s central service charges and 
$3.9 million of its personnel expenditures were not directly connected to the cost of providing or 
administering parks, recreational and cultural services, but instead were county legacy costs 
distributed to the department by the central budget office.  This tells us that if a different entity 
had provided the same services, secured administrative overhead at the same price, and 
paid the same wages and benefits to its active employees in 2008, it potentially could have 
administered and operated the parks for $4.5 million less if it was not responsible for the 
parks department’s share of the county’s legacy costs.   
 
In addition, the analysis shows that if legacy costs had been distributed to the Parks Department 
on the basis of its actual number of retirees, as opposed to its share of the existing county 
workforce, those costs would have totaled $9.5 million.  This $9.5 million figure represents a 
more accurate depiction of the approximate annual county legacy obligation held by the Parks 
Department.  As with every other function analyzed in this report, under a change in governance 
these legacy costs either could be assumed by the function’s new governing body, or they could 
remain the responsibility of county government or county taxpayers (if county government no 
longer existed). 
      
Finally, in terms of the department’s overall share of the county’s outstanding liabilities, its share 
of the county’s OPEB liability is $171.7 million, while its share of the pension fund liability 
(consisting of both POB debt and the unfunded liability) is $54 million.  In addition, the total 
General Obligation debt on parks facilities is $119.7 million, a significant amount that also either 
would have to be picked up by the receiving entity or assumed by county taxpayers if the parks 
were transferred elsewhere. 
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Table 21: Breakdown of Parks Department 2008 Actual Expenditures and Revenues and 
Legacy Costs 
Parks 
Cost to operate 
as county 
department 
(current practice) 
Cost to operate 
minus legacy 
costs Legacy costs 
      
Using 2008 fringe 
allocation 
method* 
Based on 
retiree 
history** 
Administrative $1,946,424  $1,756,433  $189,991  $184,303  
Information technology $713,649  $643,990  $69,659  $67,574  
Legal counsel $0  $0  $0  $0  
Facility management $321,011  $289,677  $31,334  $30,396  
Fleet management $2,755,837  $2,486,839  $268,998  $260,944  
Central charges/overhead $5,736,921  $5,176,939  $559,982  $543,217  
Salary and wages $17,544,931  $17,544,931  $0  $0  
Social security $985,466  $985,466  $0  $0  
Employee healthcare $3,190,052  $3,190,052  $0  $0  
Employee pension $1,439,239  $1,439,239  $0  $0  
Retiree healthcare $3,190,052  $0  $3,190,052  $7,441,945  
Retiree pension $719,619  $0  $719,619  $1,518,834  
Other $556,302  $556,302  $0  $0  
Personnel costs $27,625,661  $23,715,990  $3,909,671  $8,960,779 
Non-personnel expenditures $9,920,300  $9,920,300  $0  $0  
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $43,282,882  $38,813,228  $4,469,654  $9,503,996  
State revenue $144,995  $144,995  $0  $0  
Federal revenue $0  $0  $0  $0  
Other revenue $19,476,488  $19,476,488  $0  $0  
TOTAL REVENUES $19,621,483  $19,621,483  $0  $0  
          
TOTAL LEVY $23,661,399  $19,191,745  $4,469,654  $9,503,996  
Unfunded OPEB liability *** $171,745,937  $171,745,937  $171,745,937  $171,745,937 
Unfunded pension liability*** $54,046,800  $54,046,800  $54,046,800  $54,046,800  
Outstanding debt and interest $119,658,211  $119,658,211  $119,658,211  $119,658,211 
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT $345,450,949  $345,450,949  $345,450,949  $345,450,949 
*  In 2008, the county distributed legacy costs evenly to all departments based on number of active employees 
and salary levels. 
**  This method distributes legacy costs according to a department's retiree history. 
*** Estimated liability allocated to department is based on the department's retiree history. 
 
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE SERVICE PROVIDER 
 
The most commonly discussed alternative provider/administrator of parks and recreation in 
Milwaukee County is a separate parks district.  The following provides a brief analysis of that 
option. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our research on administration of public parks and recreational facilities in other jurisdictions 
throughout the country finds that with few exceptions, local public parks are owned and 
administered using one of two approaches.   The first and most widely used involves some type 
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of general purpose government – typically city, village, town or county.  Under such an 
approach, the operation and maintenance of the parks generally is controlled by a designated 
parks department or director. The department or director is accountable to a municipal manager, 
elected board, or both.  In Wisconsin, this is the only type of governance structure allowed by 
state law.   
 
The second approach involves creation of a special district.  Special districts, as noted elsewhere 
in this report, typically are granted authority to dictate their own budget, issue bonds, and tax 
citizens within district boundaries.  Management is provided by a board of commissioners that 
can be appointed or elected.   
 
Park districts have been used in numerous jurisdictions since early in the 20th century.  In 
particular, the State of Illinois has more than 280 park districts, nine forest preserve districts and 
seven conservation districts.  Other states with park districts include Ohio, California, Colorado, 
Minnesota, South Dakota and North Dakota. 
 
A 2008 academic study by Dr. David N. Emanuelson explicitly focuses on effectiveness and 
efficiency differences between municipal parks departments and park districts in the Midwest.21  
While there are differences between municipal and county parks departments, the findings may 
have relevance to consideration of a potential park district in Milwaukee County. 
 
Using a quantitative analysis of survey responses submitted by Midwestern park district and 
department directors, Emanuelson developed several primary conclusions concerning the 
operations of municipal parks departments and districts.   
 
 Park districts provide higher levels of total services than municipal parks and recreation 
departments.  That finding is not necessarily linked to governance, however, but is more 
closely related to the “higher levels of operating and capital expenditures that park 
districts are allowed to make.” 
 
 The higher service levels found in park districts also may be linked to the finding that 
their staffs have higher professional training levels than parks and recreation departments.    
 
 In terms of efficiency, the data found only “weak evidence” that consolidation of park 
districts with municipalities produces greater budgetary efficiency and provides 
“economy of scale” benefits often predicted by policy analysts. 
 
Emanuelson’s bottom line policy considerations are as follows: 
 
“Park districts represent a satisfactory alternative to municipal government providing parks and 
recreation services at the local level. It does not appear to cost more for park district services 
                                                 
21 Emanuelson, David N. 2008. “A Comparative Analysis of Illinois, Ohio, Colorado and South Dakota Park 
Districts and Parks and Recreation Departments to Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Indiana, Michigan Parks and 
Recreation Departments.”  Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. 
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than if parks and recreation services were provided by the general-purpose municipality and the 
levels of services are somewhat higher when park districts provide them.  As a service delivery 
alternative, the park district system appears to provide some of its promised advantages while 
appearing to provide none of the predicted disadvantages.” 
  
Emanuelson wrote a follow-up article in which he analyzed the much smaller number of 
responses received in the 2008 survey from Midwestern county park departments and park 
districts.22  Again, Emanuelson observed that county park districts provided a much higher level 
of service as measured by park sites and park acres per thousand citizens, and that park spending 
per capita was higher.  He speculated that the greater degree of administrative autonomy enjoyed 
by park district administrators in setting operating budgets and making capital expenditures 
could be one explanation for the service difference.   
 
The article also discusses the experience of Ohio, which allows county park districts to be 
created by referenda.  The referenda allow county park districts to levy property taxes for a 
maximum of 10 years, after which another referendum is put before voters to extend the district’s 
taxing authority.  The article notes that, according to the Ohio Parks and Recreation Association, 
two-thirds of Ohio counties have park districts and “there has yet to be a case where voters in 
any Ohio county have decided against an extension of the districts’ existence.”   
 
Clearly, a key factor in comparing park districts with municipal or county parks departments is 
the source of funding.  Parks departments must compete with other city or county departments 
for resources, which can make their funding levels inconsistent and contingent on the fiscal 
health of the municipality or county.  In contrast, because districts have their own source of tax 
revenue, they often are able to provide more services—equipment, programs, maintenance, or 
staff—than parks departments.   
 
Wisconsin’s neighboring states of Minnesota and Illinois have significant experience with park 
districts that also may be relevant to the discussion in Milwaukee County.  In Minneapolis, the 
park district was criticized a few years ago by the League of Women Voters (LWV), which 
acknowledged the quality of Minneapolis parks, but suggested that use of a separate park district 
created significant service duplication within the city.23  The LWV asserted that park staff was 
forced to continually collaborate with city officials and that many of its functions (e.g. 
infrastructure repair and security) could be handled by other city departments such as police and 
public works.  In addition, the LWV suggested that at-large elections for the board precluded it 
from being representative of the city’s diverse population.  As a solution, the LWV suggested the 
park district and board be changed to a city department or be re-created as a regional park 
district. 
 
Meanwhile, despite the popularity of park districts in Illinois, use within the state has not been 
unquestioned.  In particular, the Chicago Park District was highly criticized in the mid-1990s for 
being ineffectual and a product of machine style patronage and corruption.  Critics argued that 
                                                 
22 Emanuelson, David N. 2009. “Parks in the Midwest.”   
23 League of Women Voters of Minneapolis. 2006. “Minneapolis Government: A Balancing Act II - The 
Independent Boards”. (April 2006). 
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reforming the district as a city department would at least partially solve such problems.24  More 
recently, a debate over park governance developed in Naperville, Illinois.  Following several 
publicly unpopular decisions by the Naperville Park Commission, it was suggested that city 
leaders consider establishing a municipal parks and recreation department.25  A change of 
governance structure did not occur in either instance.   
 
The following brief profiles of the Minneapolis and Chicago park districts provide further insight 
on different approaches to creating and organizing park districts.  This information demonstrates 
that if a municipality or region is considering the creation of a park district, variations can be 
adopted based on the nature and circumstances of the particular area seeking the change. 
 
Table 22: A Profile of the Chicago Park District 
Chicago, Illinois 
Establishment In 1934 the Illinois Legislature passed the Park Consolidation Act which combined 22 
separate parks districts in the City of Chicago into one unified district. 
Property The district currently owns and maintains 7,590 acres of green space which includes 570 
parks, 263 field houses, and 26 miles of lakefront property with 31 beaches.  In addition, 10 
museums, two conservatories, 16 lagoons and 10 bird and wildlife gardens are located on 
district property. 
Population served City of Chicago 
  Population: 2,896,016 
Governance The management and control of business and property of the Chicago Park District is vested 
in a Board of Commissioners as was established by the Park District Act.  The Board 
consists of seven members, each appointed by the Mayor.  There are three standing 
committees for regular business: Administration, Programs, and Recreation.  The General 
Superintendent and CEO is the primary officer below the District Board. 
Budget process The district prepares a budget document following strategic and operational goals.  Input is 
also received from park management and community members.  Public hearings are held in 
each park region in the summer to gain community input before the budget is presented to 
the District Board.  Once the District Board receives the budget, a final public hearing is 
held prior to final consideration and passage by the board members. 
Financial planning Each year the district prepares a five-year capital plan which is presented to the District 
Board.  A three year operating budget is also prepared each year and is used for long-term 
financial planning. 
Revenue In 2007, approximately 58.3% of the Park District’s revenue came from property taxes 
while 11.8% and 17.2% came from a personal property replacement tax and charges and 
services respectively.  The district is also allowed to incur debt for the purpose of 
developing park related projects. 
 
  
                                                 
24 Editorial. 1994. “Merge Park District into City Government.” Chicago Sun-Times, 11 February 1994. 
25 Boerema, Amy. 2007. “Should City have a Park District? Some Raise Idea of City Department for Recreation.” 
Chicago Daily Herald, 17 February 2007. 
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Table 23: A Profile of the Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board (MPRB) 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Establishment The Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board (MPRB) was created in 1883 by an act of the 
Minnesota State Legislature and a vote of Minneapolis residents to preserve, protect, and maintain 
parks, open space land, and lakes in Minneapolis. 
Property The MPRB owns and maintains approximately 6,400 acres of parkland and water within 182 
separate park properties.  Features include 49 recreation centers, 396 multipurpose sports fields, 12 
authorized beaches, 12 gardens, seven golf courses, four outdoor performance stages, 27 public 
computer labs, and 43 miles of walking/biking paths. 
Population served City of Minneapolis 
  Total population: 382,618 
Governance MPRB serves as an independently elected, semi-autonomous body responsible for governing, 
maintaining, and developing the park system.  Every four years nine commissioners are elected to 
the board—one from each of the city’s park districts and three that serve at large.  The 
Superintendent reports directly to the Board of Commissioners. 
Budget process The MPRB budget is created through a process of community input that also utilizes established 
goals and comprehensive plans.  The Superintendent presents a proposed budget to the MPRB.  The 
budget must then be reviewed and passed by the Commissioners. 
Financial planning Each year the MPRB creates, in addition to its one-year budget document, a five-year 
implementation plan. 
Revenue The MPRB has the ability to levy taxes but the levy must be within the limits set by the Minneapolis 
Board of Estimation and Taxation.  The majority of the MPRB budget, approximately 69%, is 
generated from property taxes paid by Minneapolis residents.  Additional revenue is generated 
through local government aid (22%), state grants (3%) and other sources and transfers (5%). 
 
In Milwaukee County, creation of a separate park district to govern and manage the county’s 
parks and recreational facilities previously has been supported by the county executive 
(conditional on an elected board) and a key friends group (the Park People of Milwaukee 
County).  Several bills to authorize creation of park districts in Wisconsin have been introduced 
in the Wisconsin Legislature during the past decade, but none have been adopted.   
 
The most recent – sponsored by Senator Alberta Darling and others in 2007 – would have 
allowed a park district to be created by resolution of a municipal or county government or by 
referendum.  Such districts would be administered by a seven-member elected and unpaid board 
and would be funded by the property tax previously utilized by the municipality or county to 
fund the parks, with the stipulation that the levy cap be reduced by an equivalent amount in that 
municipality or county.  Under the legislation, employees of the former parks department would 
transfer to the new district and would become members of the state retirement system.  The 
legislation contained no provision to transfer legacy costs to either the district or state, thereby 
leaving them with the municipality or county. 
 
As noted above, a potential park district in Milwaukee County could be organized in many 
different ways.  The following discussion of pros, cons and logistical issues focuses on the 
general concept. 
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Key pros 
 
• Creation of a park district with its own dedicated funding source would remove parks and 
recreational facilities from competition with other county functions for fiscal and other 
resources, and would eliminate prioritization of mandated county functions over the parks.  It 
also would provide greater certainty about funding, which is essential for long-term planning. 
 
• Some might argue that an independent park district could function more efficiently because it 
would be freed from having to utilize county internal services (e.g. fleet management, fiscal, 
human resources and legal).  In the Forum’s 2008 report on the parks, the parks director 
argued that “while additional resources likely are necessary, additional independence would 
be even better.  In fact, she says she would welcome a multi-year guarantee of level tax levy 
support for operations (similar to the 10-year commitment to the Milwaukee Public 
Museum), if it were accompanied by the authority to lease and manage her own fleet; hire 
and pay for her own legal, human resources and information technology staff; and privatize 
concessions and other functions where it would be profitable to do so.”   
 
• Housing the parks in a separate authority could heighten prospects for non-public funding 
from foundations and other sources.  
 
Key cons 
 
• Housing the parks in a separate district could lead to an increase in spending on parks and 
recreation services because of lack of competition with other locally funded services, which 
forces policymakers to prioritize among a wide variety of programs and services and make 
difficult spending choices.   
 
• Some might argue that “if it’s not broken, don’t fix it.”  Despite its funding and other 
challenges, the Milwaukee County Parks recently was awarded the National Recreation and 
Park Association's Gold Medal Award in the Park and Recreation Management Program.  
Placing the parks outside of county government and forcing parks department employees to 
terminate their county employment might lead to the loss of key staff and harm overall parks 
administration. 
 
• It could be argued that Milwaukee County already has enough separate governmental or 
quasi-governmental agencies, and creation of a new park district simply would create another 
layer of unneeded government bureaucracy. 
 
Key logistical questions/obstacles 
 
• The parks department has one of the highest legacy liabilities of any county function, 
amounting to more than $9.5 million annually for health care and pensions for parks 
department retirees, and nearly $120 million in outstanding debt on parks facilities and 
infrastructure.  In developing legislation to create a park district in Milwaukee County, the 
state would need to determine whether the new authority would assume responsibility for the 
department’s legacy liabilities and the outstanding debt on parks facilities.   
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• The authorizing legislation would need to determine whether county workers moving over to 
the new park district would be able to remain in the county pension system and receive 
county health insurance and other benefits, whether they would become members of the state 
retirement system and receive health care and other benefits from the state, or whether a new 
benefits structure would need to be created in the district. 
 
• In a memorandum prepared by county board and administrative services staff for the 
county’s Intergovernmental Relations Committee in 2007, concern was expressed over the 
transfer of equipment and infrastructure to a proposed park district without a similar transfer 
of debt service, as the county would remain responsible for paying debt service for 
equipment it no longer owned.  Authorizing legislation would need to address that concern.     
 
• The composition of the park district board would need to receive careful deliberation by state 
officials, who would need to determine whether it should be appointed or elected, whether it 
would be paid or volunteer, the necessary qualifications of board members, and whether a 
citizen board could be constructed to have the necessary expertise and experience to oversee 
a parks and recreational system as immense as that administered by Milwaukee County.  
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SHERIFF 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Milwaukee County’s Office of the Sheriff is responsible for a wide range of law enforcement 
activities, many of which are mandated by state statute, and others of which are not mandated but 
are authorized under state law.  The basis for the position itself is Article IV, section four of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which establishes the sheriff as an elected county official and specifies 
that the sheriff’s term of office is four years.  Along with most other elected offices, the governor 
has the power to remove the sheriff (for cause), and the power to appoint a successor in case the 
office is vacated prior to an election.  Otherwise, the state statutes, and not the constitution, 
establish a county sheriff’s duties and obligations. 
Chapter 59 of the Wisconsin statutes directs the sheriff to “keep and preserve the peace.”  The 
sheriff’s principal duties are to operate the county jail, “attend upon the circuit court,” and serve 
and execute processes, writs, warrants and other judicial orders.   
As a constitutional officer of the state but an elected official of the county, case law has 
established the nature and limits of the sheriff’s roles and responsibilities.  Generally speaking, 
the sheriff has a degree of autonomy not granted county department heads.  The county board 
has budget authority over the sheriff’s office but must fund the office sufficiently to meet state 
mandates and provide law enforcement.  The sheriff also has certain autonomy vis-à-vis state 
government regulation.   
The Office of the Sheriff is divided into four distinct budgetary programs: 
 Administration—provides management and operational support such as budget, 
accounting, personnel, public information, communications and internal audit services. 
Also provides bailiff services to the county criminal and family courts and provides 
training of recruits and in-service programs. 
 
 Emergency Management—administers a county-wide emergency plan and conducts 
related public information activities. 
 
 Police Services—patrols the county grounds, parks, airport, zoo and expressway, and 
operates drug enforcement units, conducts criminal investigations, and serves civil writs.  
The unit also operates a SWAT team, dive team and bomb disposal unit. 
 
 Detention Services—includes the county jail, House of Correction (HOC), inmate 
transportation services and medical and psychiatric services for inmates.  Until 2009, the 
HOC was a separate organizational unit headed by a superintendent who reported directly 
to the county executive.  In 2009, the HOC was renamed the County Correctional 
Facility-South and placed under the direction of the sheriff.   The facility has a design 
capacity for 1,658 inmates but typically houses approximately 1,900.  
 
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 92 
 
While control of the HOC was shifted to the sheriff in 2009, the county’s 2009 budget continued 
to present the two entities as separate budgets.  Total budgeted expenditures for the sheriff’s 
office in 2009 were $93.2 million, including $77.5 million in property tax levy and $15.6 million 
from non-levy revenues.  Total budgeted expenditures for the HOC were $50.4 million, 
including $45.6 million in property tax levy and $4.8 million from non-levy revenues.   
The $123.1 million in property tax levy for the combined sheriff/HOC function makes it by far 
the largest departmental recipient of property tax levy in the county budget.  The Behavioral 
Health Division is second with $57 million of property tax levy.  The sheriff/corrections function 
also is largest in terms of number of employees, with 1,439 FTE’s budgeted in 2009. 
The following table shows how expenditures and tax levy were distributed across the major 
programs of the sheriff’s office and HOC in the 2009 budget.  The totals of the individual 
programs do not tie to the overall sheriff and corrections budget totals because program 
expenditures include indirect costs that are budgeted elsewhere in the county budget. 
Table 24: 2009 Budgeted Program Expenditures for Sheriff and HOC 
Program   Expenditure Tax levy 
Sheriff     
Administration $7,268,451  $5,840,701  
Emergency Management $1,058,301  $545,762  
Police Services $25,631,698  $11,015,181  
Detention $62,138,183  $55,092,059  
Special Operations $16,380,038  $5,024,029  
House of Correction     
Administration $8,013,098  $7,445,906  
Food Service $3,642,050  $3,642,050  
Inmate Industries $2,430,001  $1,440,222  
Adult Correctional Center $35,903,984  $32,064,800  
 
In recent years, a greater share of Milwaukee County’s property tax levy has gone to support the 
sheriff and corrections.  The Public Policy Forum’s March 2009 report on the county’s fiscal 
condition found that from 2003 to 2007, corrections received an additional $9.2 million from the 
tax levy and the sheriff’s office received an additional $6.1 million.  Only the Behavioral Health 
Division received a greater increase in levy funding during this time.   
It is important to note, however, that the sheriff’s office and corrections had substantial increases 
in health care and pension benefit costs because of the large number of workers they employ.  
From 2003 to 2007, the sheriff’s budget grew by $6.6 million, but fringe benefits grew by $11 
million, nearly double the total budget increase.  Corrections saw its budget jump by an 
additional $9.3 million, or 22%, from 2003 to 2007, but $7.7 million of the increase was 
consumed by additional fringe benefit costs.   
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BUDGET BREAKDOWN 
 
Table 25 breaks down the Office of the Sheriff’s actual expenditures and revenue in 2008 (the 
sheriff and HOC budgets are combined to reflect the post-2008 merger), showing both total costs 
and costs when legacy obligations are subtracted.  This analysis shows that the sheriff’s office 
spent $17.9 million on central service charges from other county departments, $126.1 million on 
its own personnel, and $1.2 million on non-personnel expenditures, which include commodities 
such as food and prescription drugs for inmates. 
 
The analysis also shows that $1.7 million of the sheriff’s central service charges and $21.6 
million of its personnel expenditures were not directly connected to the cost of providing or 
administering law enforcement and corrections services, but instead were county legacy costs 
distributed to the department by the central budget office.  This tells us that if a different entity 
had provided the same services, secured administrative overhead at the same price, and 
paid the same wages and benefits to its active employees in 2008, it potentially could have 
provided law enforcement and corrections services for $23.3 million less if it was not 
responsible for the sheriff’s share of the county’s legacy costs.   
 
In addition, the analysis shows that if legacy costs had been distributed to the sheriff’s office on 
the basis of its actual number of retirees, as opposed to its share of the existing county 
workforce, those costs would have totaled $12.1 million.  This $12.1 million figure represents a 
more accurate depiction of the approximate annual county legacy obligation held by the sheriff’s 
office.  As with every other function analyzed in this report, under a change in governance these 
legacy costs either could be assumed by the function’s new governing body, or they could 
remain the responsibility of county government or county taxpayers (if county government no 
longer existed). 
 
Finally, in terms of the sheriff’s overall share of the county’s outstanding liabilities, its share of 
the county’s OPEB liability is $199 million, its share of the pension fund liability (consisting of 
both POB debt and the unfunded liability) is $62.6 million, and total General Obligation debt on 
sheriff/HOC facilities is $31 million. 
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Table 25: Breakdown of Office of the Sheriff 2008 Actual Expenditures and Revenues and 
Legacy Costs 
Sheriff (with HOC) 
Cost to operate as 
county department 
(current practice) 
Cost to operate 
minus legacy 
costs Legacy costs 
      
Using 2008 
fringe allocation 
method* 
Based on 
retiree 
history** 
Administrative $3,788,310  $3,418,532  $369,778  $358,707  
Information technology $5,526,128  $4,986,721  $539,407  $523,257  
Legal counsel $0  $0  $0  $0  
Facility management $6,583,187  $5,940,601  $642,586  $623,348  
Fleet management $2,021,257  $1,823,962  $197,295  $191,388  
Central charges/overhead $17,918,882  $16,169,816  $1,749,066  $1,696,700  
Salary and wages $71,842,054  $71,842,054  $0  $0  
Social security $5,432,031  $5,432,031  $0  $0  
Employee healthcare $17,829,213  $17,829,213  $0  $0  
Employee pension $7,521,024  $7,521,024  $0  $0  
Retiree healthcare $17,829,213  $0  $17,829,213  $8,624,913  
Retiree pension $3,760,512  $0  $3,760,512  $1,760,267  
Other $1,867,157  $1,867,157  $0  $0  
Personnel costs $126,081,204  $104,491,479  $21,589,725  $10,385,180 
Non-personnel expenditures $1,193,440  $1,193,440  $0  $0  
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $145,193,526  $121,854,735  $23,338,791  $12,081,881  
State revenue $8,274,543  $8,274,543  $0  $0  
Federal revenue $3,706,523  $3,706,523  $0  $0  
Other revenue $10,640,456  $10,640,456  $0  $0  
TOTAL REVENUES $22,621,522  $22,621,522  $0  $0  
          
TOTAL LEVY $122,572,004  $99,233,213  $23,338,791  $12,081,881  
Unfunded OPEB liability *** $199,046,592  $199,046,592  $199,046,592  $199,046,592 
Unfunded pension liability*** $62,638,055  $62,638,055  $62,638,055  $62,638,055  
Outstanding debt/ interest**** $31,025,227  $31,025,227  $31,025,227  $31,025,227  
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT $292,709,874  $292,709,874  $292,709,874  $292,709,874 
* In 2008, the county distributed legacy costs evenly to all departments based on number of active employees and 
salary levels. 
** This method distributes legacy costs according to a department's retiree history. 
*** Estimated liability allocated to department is based on the department's retiree history. 
 ****Includes only HOC debt, as data limitations prevented an accurate calculation of courthouse debt attributed to 
the sheriff’s office. 
 
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE SERVICE PROVIDER 
 
If Milwaukee County government was dissolved, the most natural and logical place to assign 
sheriff and correctional operations would be the State of Wisconsin.  The following provides a 
brief analysis of that option, and also provides brief discussion of the potential for removing 
some non-mandated responsibilities from the sheriff’s office. 
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Discussion 
 
The sheriff’s office already could be considered an adjunct to state government since it is 
established under the state constitution.  Also, the county’s detention programs are part of an 
overall statewide corrections system, with state prisons dedicated to holding inmates convicted 
of major crimes, and counties typically incarcerating individuals whose sentence is less than one 
year in length, or those awaiting trial.  The overcrowding of state prisons, however, has blurred 
this separation of responsibilities, and the state of Wisconsin now contracts with the county to 
house some of its inmates.  In 2009, state inmate counts in Milwaukee County under a contract 
with the state were estimated at 180 a day, and the county was budgeted to realize $3.4 million 
from this arrangement. 
On its face, transferring the sheriff and corrections to state government encounters one major 
legal and procedural obstacle: changing the state constitution.  Amending the Wisconsin 
constitution involves a time-consuming and unique three-step process.  First, the majority of both 
houses of the state legislature must approve the amendment; second, the legislature must affirm 
this action in the next legislative session (in other words, the second vote follows the next 
general election); and, third, the amendment must be approved in a popular vote of Wisconsin 
citizens.  The constitution also can be amended through a constitutional convention whose 
convening requires the approval of a majority of state legislators and, then, the approval of 
Wisconsin voters in a general election.   
An approach for Milwaukee County that may not require a constitutional change would be to 
transfer the office of the sheriff to state government while retaining the sheriff as a countywide 
elected office.  As we discuss in Section IV, during the 1990s, Massachusetts dissolved the 
government of seven of the state’s 14 counties and transferred their operations to state 
government.  While sheriffs continued to be elected on a countywide basis, the sheriff and his or 
her employees were transferred to the state payroll.  The sheriff was allowed to retain full 
administrative control of his or her operations, with appropriations established by legislators as 
part of the state budget.  Whether or not this type of approach would be permissible under the 
Wisconsin constitution would require further study and deliberation.  
Another, more modest restructuring option that could be contemplated under a strategy to 
downsize (as opposed to eliminate) county government would be to transfer or eliminate sheriff 
programs that some might consider inconsistent with the office’s original state-mandated 
mission.  Perhaps the best candidate for such action would be the expressway patrol unit.  In 
each of Wisconsin’s 71 other counties, the State Patrol polices state expressways.  In Milwaukee, 
however, state statutes assign this responsibility to the county, which receives state revenues for 
its effort.   
Originally, the expressway patrol was thought to be a break-even or profitable program for 
Milwaukee County.  However, two internal audits conducted in 2002 and 2006 found that 
property tax levy funds supported this operation when both direct and indirect costs are 
considered.  The 2006 audit showed that levy costs associated with the $6.5 million program had 
grown from $286,000 in 2001 to $886,000 in 2004, even though the county had reduced the 
number of deputies patrolling state highways.  A drop-off in citation revenue and 
intergovernmental grants was responsible for the increasing deficit.   
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In 2008, actual property tax levy costs associated with expressway patrol had grown to $2.4 
million, though about half of that cost was attributed to county legacy costs and would not 
disappear if expressway patrol was shifted back to the state (unless the legacy costs also were 
shifted).  A state audit in 2002 suggested that the county and state reconsider funding 
responsibilities for the expressway patrol.   The county has not undertaken another study of this 
program’s costs since 2006. 
County reorganization also could consider the transfer or elimination of other sheriff services 
and special operations.  The current size and complexity of the sheriff’s office is the result of 
incremental growth in responsibilities, some of which occurred with the encouragement of 
federal and state grant support in the last few decades when the county’s revenue picture was 
quite different.  In the late 1990s, for instance, the county expanded or created new units for 
water safety, county park law enforcement, expressway patrol and also added an air wing and 
upgraded narcotics investigation.  Table 26 shows the growth of two discretionary areas of the 
Sheriff’s budget that received significant property tax levy allocations during the past five years 
as well as the growth in tax levy spending on expressway patrol. 
Table 26: Budgeted tax levy allocations to select sheriff units 2006-2010 
Unit 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
5-year change 
Difference % change
Expressway Patrol $1,414,255  $919,161 $1,464,497 $2,054,008 $2,660,037  $1,245,782 88% 
Tactical Enforcement Unit $0  $0  $3,044,846 $3,043,536 $3,311,856  $3,311,856 n/a 
Park Patrol $109,623  $529,814 $261,675  $289,060  $259,306  $149,683  137% 
 * 2009 levy amounts are from the 2009 adopted budget. 
** 2010 levy amounts are from recommended budget and are adjusted to net out recommended salary and fringe 
reduction. 
 
It is conceivable that under a scenario in which county government either was eliminated or 
reduced to its mandated functions, many of the office’s detective and policing functions could be 
transferred to municipal police departments, or perhaps eliminated altogether.   In Indianapolis, 
for example, the Indianapolis Police Department and Marion County Sheriff's Department had 
maintained separate police agencies.  In 2007, however, a new Indianapolis Metropolitan Police 
Department (IMPD) was formed by adding the law enforcement branch of the Marion County 
Sheriff Department to the Indianapolis Police Department.  IMPD is a distinct agency, while the 
Sheriff's Department has continued its jail and court functions.  IMPD has jurisdiction over those 
portions of Marion County not explicitly covered by the police of another jurisdiction.  IMPD is 
headed up by the sheriff, who appoints a chief of police to direct department operations. 
 
Key pros 
 
• Placing the Milwaukee County Office of the Sheriff under state government could enhance 
the synergy and coordination of detention services and policies between the county jail, HOC 
and the state prison system administered by the Wisconsin Department of Correction.  It also 
could produce better information sharing between the county detention system and state 
corrections and law enforcement systems. 
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• While the state certainly has budget challenges of its own, moving sheriff services from 
county government to the state might enhance those services by shielding them from the 
county’s overall budget difficulties, legacy costs and competition with other county 
priorities. 
 
• Population pressures and costs incurred at the county jail and HOC can be impacted 
significantly by modifications to sentencing guidelines and other legislative policy changes 
adopted by the Wisconsin Legislature.  Placing the Milwaukee County sheriff under state 
government would require state legislators to pay more attention to those pressures and costs 
in contemplating new criminal justice policies. 
 
• Downsizing the Office of the Sheriff by transferring policing functions to the Milwaukee 
Police Department or other municipal police departments could reduce redundancy and 
produce property tax levy savings for county taxpayers.  
 
Key cons 
 
• While it could be argued that the state might have more capacity than Milwaukee County to 
shield the sheriff’s function from budget reductions, it also might be argued that state 
legislators would be less concerned than county policymakers with appropriately funding 
local law enforcement activities in one county, and that the Office of the Sheriff might 
therefore suffer financially if placed under state control. 
 
• As noted above, the Office of the Sheriff in Milwaukee County has taken on a much larger 
role in local policing functions than is mandated by the state, and a larger role than the sheriff 
plays in other Wisconsin counties.  It is possible that state officials would not be supportive 
of funding those functions so as to ensure uniformity across all counties and in light of the 
state’s fiscal constraints. 
 
• The sheriff’s office has achieved notable progress per the National Institute of Corrections in 
addressing problems at the county jail and HOC, and the current sheriff has successfully 
balanced his budget each year in contrast to some previous officeholders.  While transferring 
the office to state government likely would not directly impact the sheriff’s autonomy, it 
could be asked whether any change is warranted in light of the office’s recent performance.    
 
• Downsizing the Office of the Sheriff by transferring policing functions to the Milwaukee 
Police Department or other municipal police departments could weaken law enforcement 
activities in county parks and other county properties and eliminate important specialized law 
enforcement activities that municipal police departments would not have the capacity to 
deliver themselves.  
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Key logistical questions/obstacles 
 
• As noted above, given the sheriff’s status as a constitutional officer, attorneys would need to 
determine the appropriate statutory or constitutional mechanism for transferring the 
Milwaukee County sheriff’s office to state government.  This mechanism also would depend 
on whether legislators wished to retain Milwaukee County’s ability to directly elect its 
sheriff. 
 
• In 2008, Milwaukee County spent more than $99 million of local property tax levy to support 
non-legacy sheriff services.  If the Office of the Sheriff was shifted to state control under an 
initiative to streamline county government, the state would need to determine whether to seek 
annual reimbursement from what would be left of county government or assume that 
significant cost itself.  If county government was eliminated, state officials would need to 
decide either to fill the gap or assess county taxpayers for an equivalent amount. 
 
• The Office of the Sheriff also has considerable legacy liabilities, amounting to more than $12 
million annually for the cost of health care and pensions for its retirees, and more than $31 
million in outstanding debt on capital infrastructure.  The state would need to determine 
whether those costs would be left with the county (or its taxpayers in the case of elimination), 
or whether it would assume them. 
 
• State statutes would need to be modified and the state might need to pick up $1-$3 million in 
costs if the expressway patrol function in Milwaukee County was transferred to state 
government.  Statutory modifications also may be required if certain sheriff’s policing 
functions were transferred to municipalities. 
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TRANSIT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Milwaukee County Transit System (MCTS) provides public transit services to the citizens of 
Milwaukee County.  Those services consist of a fixed route system of traditional buses and a 
paratransit system of demand responsive van-based services that are available to persons with 
disabilities who qualify under the Americans with Disabilities Act.   
Direct management and operation of the transit system is provided by Milwaukee Transport 
Services, Inc. (MTS), a private non-profit corporation that contracts with the county and is also 
considered a “legal instrumentality” of the county.  This arrangement has existed since 1975, 
when the county, at its own discretion, acquired ownership of the transit system from a private 
operator.  MTS administers both the traditional fixed route transit service in Milwaukee County 
and paratransit services.  The system’s equipment and facilities are owned by Milwaukee 
County, but its approximately 1,100 employees work for MTS and are paid by MTS.  MTS 
employees and retirees are not part of the county’s pension system nor do they receive health 
care benefits from the county.    
MCTS operates under the purview of the county’s Department of Transportation and Public 
Works (DTPW).  The DTPW Director’s Office provides oversight over the MTS contract and 
prepares and administers federal and state transit grants, while other DTPW personnel assist with 
the acquisition of capital equipment and design and construction for certain transit capital 
projects.   
 
In 2007, MCTS provided more than 42 million revenue rides on its fixed route services and more 
than one million additional rides on its paratransit services. MCTS’ 479 buses operate on 52 
routes in Milwaukee County.  MCTS also runs the Ozaukee County Express under contract to 
Ozaukee County.   
 
MCTS’ fixed route service is funded by a combination of four primary revenue sources: federal 
aids (both formula and earmarked funds), state operating assistance, county property tax levy and 
revenue collected from riders (also known as “farebox revenue”).  MCTS also typically receives 
smaller amounts of other state and federal funding, such as Congestion and Mitigation Air 
Quality (CMAQ) grants and other special allocations, and it derives small amounts of revenue 
from advertising and related activities.   
 
The county’s property tax levy allocation to MCTS consists of both a contribution to the direct 
cost of running the transit system and a contribution that pays for indirect costs such as 
depreciation, interest on county-issued debt and county service charges.  These indirect costs are 
not controlled by MCTS and essentially are dictated to the system by the county.   
 
Paratransit services also are funded via a combination of the four primary revenue sources used 
for the fixed route system, though passenger revenue accounts for a much smaller percentage 
(approximately 15% as compared with approximately 32% for fixed route).  The paratransit 
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budget, however, contains significant revenue from the State Medicaid program and from the 
county’s Department on Aging and Disabilities Services Division.  
 
The annual county budget combines the fixed route and paratransit budgets into one unified 
MCTS budget.   However, Tables 27 and 28 break down actual spending for the 2005-08 period 
and the adopted 2009 budgets for each program on an individual basis. 
 
Table 27: MCTS Fixed Route Operating Revenue and Expenditures, 2005-2009 
   2005   2006   2007   2008  2009 
   Actual   Actual   Actual   Actual   Budget  
Revenue   
Passenger revenue $38,453,154 $41,038,542 $42,573,787 $45,257,369 $45,579,580 
Other transit revenue $3,717,475 $5,761,414 $3,460,242 $3,049,540 $2,970,000 
Total operating revenue $42,170,629 $46,799,956 $46,034,029 $48,306,908 $48,549,580 
Expenses           
Employee expenses $104,758,993 $107,315,792 $109,070,643 $107,175,287 $113,228,826 
Bus repair parts $3,214,669 $2,683,266 $3,377,221 $4,058,878 $3,633,001 
Fuel $7,103,595 $8,547,925 $9,060,440 $14,535,517 $14,911,623 
Other transit expenses $4,239,613 $5,716,088 $7,467,343 $7,377,551 $7,510,820 
Total operating expenses $119,316,870 $124,263,071 $128,975,647 $133,147,232 $139,284,270 
Public funding           
Federal (capitalized maint.) $17,682,260 $17,413,955 $17,750,000 $18,250,000 $18,600,000 
State operating assistance $47,684,220 $49,763,550 $50,806,000 $55,392,000 $56,253,000 
Local (Milw. Co. tax levy) $11,139,459 $9,621,474 $13,548,287 $10,281,371 $15,229,690 
Other state and federal $640,302 $664,136 $837,330 $916,953 $652,000 
Total public funding $77,146,241 $77,463,115 $82,941,618 $84,840,324 $90,734,690 
 
Table 28: MCTS Paratransit Operating Revenue and Expenditures, 2005-2009 
   2005   2006   2007   2008  2009 
   Actual   Actual   Actual   Actual   Budget  
Revenue           
Passenger revenue $3,273,428 $3,343,709 $3,577,102 $3,473,581 $3,637,625 
Title XIX $1,095,720 $1,264,753 $1,344,350 $1,700,659 $1,318,000 
Miscellaneous revenue $31,541 $58,080 $915,813 $2,684,075 $5,499,500 
Total operating revenue $4,400,689 $4,666,541 $5,837,265 $7,858,315 $10,455,125 
Operating expenses           
Employee expenses $959,105 $906,636 $929,831 $923,957 $997,371 
Purchased transportation expense $18,108,949 $19,078,355 $20,895,592 $22,737,919 $24,063,524 
Other paratransit expenses  $134,128 -$2,983 $168,036 $150,257 $151,900 
Total operating expenses $19,202,183 $19,982,008 $21,993,459 $23,812,133 $25,212,795 
Public funding           
Federal (capitalized maintenance) $0 $0 $1,650,000 $1,750,000 $1,850,000 
State $9,127,561 $8,184,450 $8,301,000 $8,393,000 $9,047,000 
State Section 8521 $928,789 $1,265,263 $1,441,028 $1,457,868 $1,494,000 
Other federal and state $0 $0 $0 $0   
Local (Milwaukee County tax levy) $4,745,144 $5,865,754 $4,764,166 $4,352,950 $2,366,670 
Total public funding $14,801,494 $15,315,467 $16,156,194 $15,953,818 $14,757,670 
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As the Public Policy Forum noted in our May 2008 report on MCTS (Milwaukee County’s 
Transit Crisis: How Did We Get Here and What Do We Do Now?), each year there is 
considerable attention focused on the county’s property tax levy contribution to MCTS despite 
its relatively small percentage of MCTS’ revenue budget.  That attention stems from the method 
in which MCTS constructs it annual budget and the role of the county as “backstop.”  MCTS 
develops its budget first by estimating operating expenditures for the coming year, followed by 
its anticipated state operating assistance, federal funding and farebox and other miscellaneous 
revenue.  The difference between estimated expenditures and other forms of revenue is the 
amount to be funded by county property tax levy.   
As explained in the May 2008 report, each year the county’s property tax requirement tends to be 
considerably larger than the previous year’s because operating needs grow at a significantly 
higher rate than anticipated state, federal and farebox revenue.  Consequently, county 
policymakers are faced with the dilemma of allocating additional property tax dollars, cutting 
service and/or raising fares.  In light of their reluctance to take any of those steps, during the past 
several years, county officials instead have depleted reserves and made increasing use of federal 
“capitalized maintenance” funds to plug holes in MCTS’ operating budget (though moderate fare 
increases and service cuts also have been a staple of MCTS budgets this decade).   
According to the Forum’s report (and confirmed by MCTS officials), the depletion of reserves 
and the imminent need to purchase new buses with federal capital dollars now used for 
maintenance has created a structural hole in MCTS’ budget of about $20 million annually.  
According to MCTS officials, filling such a hole with expenditure cuts would require more than 
a 30% reduction in transit service, which would involve elimination of all freeway flyer service 
and one in three local bus routes.  While this major structural problem has been averted 
temporarily because of the availability of federal stimulus funds to purchase new buses, it will 
re-emerge once those funds disappear unless other revenue sources are implemented.  
The total budget for MCTS in 2009 was about $172 million.  MCTS’ 2009 budgeted property tax  
levy was $23 million, ranking it fifth among all county departments (behind the Office of the 
Sheriff, Behavioral Health Division, Courts and Parks).   As noted above, MCTS employees are 
not county employees, but instead work for MTS.  If MCTS was a county department, its 
approximately 1,200 employees would make it second largest after the Office of the Sheriff.   
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BUDGET BREAKDOWN 
 
Table 29 breaks down MCTS’ actual expenditures and revenue in 2008.  MCTS’ budget looks 
different from most other county departments and divisions when shown in this format because it 
does not contain personnel costs.  Those costs are folded into the “non-personnel expenditures” 
category, as the personnel in question are non-county personnel and are funded through the 
county’s direct allocation to MCTS.   This analysis does show that MCTS spent $439,000 on 
central service charges from other county departments and $3.7 million on debt and depreciation 
on county-owned assets – expenditures that could be impacted if MCTS was transferred outside 
of county government.    
 
Table 29: Breakdown of MCTS 2008 Actual Expenditures and Revenues and Legacy Costs 
Mass Transit 
Cost to operate as 
county department 
(current practice) 
Cost to operate 
minus legacy 
costs Legacy costs 
      
Using 2008 
fringe allocation 
method* 
Based on 
retiree 
history** 
Administrative $159,671  $144,085  $15,586  $15,119  
Information technology $50,029  $45,146  $4,883  $4,737  
Legal counsel $0  $0  $0  $0  
Facility management $229,281  $206,901  $22,380  $21,710  
Fleet management $0  $0  $0  $0  
Central charges/overhead $438,981  $396,132  $42,849  $41,566  
Salary and wages $0  $0  $0  $0  
Social security $0  $0  $0  $0  
Employee healthcare $0  $0  $0  $0  
Employee pension $0  $0  $0  $0  
Retiree healthcare $0  $0  $0  $0  
Retiree pension $0  $0  $0  $0  
OPEB liability (proprietary fund) $0  $0  $0  $0  
Other $0  $0  $0  $0  
Personnel costs $0  $0  $0  $0  
Debt service $944,382  $944,382  $0  $0  
Depreciation $2,720,833  $2,720,833  $0  $0  
Other expenditures*** $159,882,214 $159,882,214 $0  $0  
Other expenditures $163,547,429  $163,547,429  $0  $0  
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $163,986,410  $163,943,561  $42,849  $41,566  
State revenue $67,374,662  $67,374,662  $0  $0  
Federal revenue $21,110,292  $21,110,292  $0  $0  
Transit revenue $51,780,490 $51,780,490  $0  $0  
Other revenue $4,672,974 $4,672,974  $0  $0  
TOTAL REVENUES $144,938,418  $144,938,418  $0  $0  
          
TOTAL LEVY $19,047,992  $19,005,143  $42,849  $41,566  
Unfunded pension liability**** $0  $0  $0  $0  
Outstanding debt and interest $24,220,175  $24,220,175  $24,220,175  $24,220,175 
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT $24,220,175  $24,220,175  $24,220,175  $24,220,175 
*  In 2008, the county distributed legacy costs evenly to all departments based on number of active employees and 
salary levels. 
**  This method distributes legacy costs according to a department's retiree history. 
***  These figures include the costs of bus drivers, managers, and other staff that are not county employees but that 
of MTS, Inc. 
****  Estimated liability allocated to department is based on the department's retiree history. 
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The treatment of legacy costs should administration of the transit system be transferred outside 
of Milwaukee County is not an issue with MCTS from the county’s perspective, as legacy 
liabilities for bus drivers and other transit employees are held by MTS and not the county.26  The 
one outstanding liability that would have to be addressed is county-held General Obligation debt 
on transit buses, equipment and facilities, which totals $24.2 million.   
 
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
The potential alternative governance structure for mass transit services that has received the most 
public discussion is creation of a Regional Transit Authority (RTA) to govern transit operations 
in Milwaukee County and other southeast Wisconsin counties.  The section below provides a 
brief analysis of that option. 
 
Discussion 
 
The concept of an RTA to administer mass transit in southeast Wisconsin has been debated off 
and on for at least the past two decades.  In 1990, the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors 
adopted a resolution requesting the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission 
(SEWRPC) to explore the feasibility of establishing an RTA to administer both transit and other 
transportation services.  According to a SEWRPC memorandum, “the Board’s resolution cited, 
in particular, the difficulty in developing a truly regional mass transit system that would provide 
effective and efficient area-wide transit service.”27  A similar request was made by the City of 
Milwaukee’s public works director. 
SEWRPC conducted the study and found, among other things, that of the nation’s 35 largest 
urban areas, Milwaukee was one of only four with no RTA.  Subsequent to the study, the 
Wisconsin Legislature, as part of the 1991-93 state budget, created a temporary seven-county 
RTA in Southeast Wisconsin to study the creation of a permanent RTA and to make 
recommendations regarding how transportation services in the region should be funded. 
The temporary RTA issued a report in 1993 that recommended creation of a permanent seven-
county RTA with the following characteristics: 
• The RTA would collect and distribute revenue for both roads and transit in the region, and 
potentially administer transit. 
• The RTA would be governed by an 11-member board consisting of one representative from 
each county (Milwaukee, Kenosha, Racine, Waukesha, Ozaukee, Washington, Walworth), 
three at-large members and the Wisconsin Secretary of Transportation.  All members would 
be appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate. 
                                                 
26 The exception is the $42,000 in legacy costs associated with administrative services for transit that are charged to 
the MCTS budget, which would have to remain with the county or be assumed by another governing body.  
27 SEWRPC, “A Regional Transportation Authority Feasibility Study for Southeast Wisconsin”, 1990. 
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• The RTA would have a $95 million annual funding target: $57 million to replace property 
taxes and $38 million for new investment.  Funding would be generated from a .4% sales tax 
and five-cent gas tax in the region.   
This recommendation was forwarded to each of the seven counties but rejected by county boards 
in six of the seven.  Only the Milwaukee County board supported the recommendation, though 
its support was based on the condition that the gasoline tax be increased statewide.  
Consequently, the temporary RTA was disbanded and a permanent RTA was not created. 
The RTA concept resurfaced earlier this decade, when proponents of a new commuter rail line to 
connect Kenosha, Racine and Milwaukee counties suggested creation of an RTA for those three 
counties.  The proposed RTA would administer and pay for both buses and the new rail line, but 
not local roads.  The Wisconsin Legislature supported the concept by creating a temporary three-
county RTA as part of the 2005-07 State budget to explore the creation and funding of a 
permanent three-county RTA and report back to the Legislature by November 2008.     
On November 15, 2008, the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Transit Authority (SEWRTA) 
issued recommendations to the governor and Legislature.   Three months later, in his 2009-11 
State budget request, the governor introduced his own proposal, which encompassed many of the 
RTA recommendations but also contained some unique provisions.  Highlights of the governor’s 
proposal included the following: 
• Establishment of a permanent RTA, initially assumed to include the counties of Kenosha and 
Milwaukee and the urbanized area of Racine, provided that the appropriate governing bodies 
adopt a resolution to join the RTA.      
 
• The RTA would consist of one representative appointed by the mayor and one by the county 
executive from Milwaukee and Kenosha; one representative from the city of Racine; and two 
representatives appointed by the governor, at least one of whom would have to be from 
Milwaukee County.   
 
• Authorization for the new RTA to levy up to a 0.5 percent sales tax as a dedicated source of 
funding to support transit, commuter rail and other transit projects in the region.   The 
existing authorization for imposition of a vehicle rental fee of up to a $2 per rental 
transaction also would be retained.  
 
•  The RTA would be required to provide or contract for the provision of transit service within 
the authority's jurisdictional area.  It could acquire an existing local transit system and either 
run the system itself or contract for its operation, or it could contract with an existing transit 
operator to run an existing transit system.  
 
The RTA proposal was the subject of fierce debate, and ultimately a modified version emerged 
as part of the 2009-11 state budget passed by the legislature.  However, that version was vetoed 
by the governor in July 2009.  One of the key sticking points is whether the assets of existing 
transit systems in the region should be transferred to the RTA – thereby establishing it as the 
transit administrator and/or operator in the region – or whether it should function primarily as the 
repository of dedicated sales tax revenue that sets broad policy and contracts with existing transit 
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administrators to run the existing systems.  If the legislation moves forward, then how that 
question is resolved obviously would impact the questions addressed in this report, as under the 
latter scenario the Milwaukee County Transit System would not be transferred out of Milwaukee 
County government.   
 
To provide additional context, we explored transit authorities in other parts of the country, which 
have become increasingly popular since the 1970s.  Particularly in urban or larger suburban 
areas, special districts have been allowed to own and operate bus and rail services in place of 
either general purpose governments or private for-profit companies.   
 
Several transit authorities were examined to shed light on their structure, level of service 
provision and financing strategies.  These include the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority, the Alamance County (NC) Transportation Authority, the Orange County (CA) 
Transportation Authority, and the Mason County (WA) Transportation Authority.  The following 
provides brief individual case studies for the Capital Metro Transportation Authority, the Central 
Ohio Transit Authority, the Chicago Transit Authority, and the Nashville Metropolitan Transit 
Authority. 
 
Table 30: A Profile of the Capital Metro Transportation Authority 
Metropolitan Austin, Texas 
Establishment Capital Metro was created on January 19, 1985 by a referendum of metropolitan Austin voters.  
Voters in the 1985 election also approved a service plan that expanded the existing Austin city bus 
service and called for the development of a light rail transportation system to serve the area (this 
was not completed until 2008).  Operations began on July 1, 1985. 
Property The Authority provides bus and high-speed rail service in and around metropolitan Austin. It owns 
and operates six operations facilities, 401 buses, 65 paratransit vans, 53 paratransit sedans, nine rail 
stations, and ten transit centers.  The authority also provides 16 park-and-ride facilities around the 
greater Austin area.  Day-to-day services are provided by a contracted organization. 
Population served The municipalities of Austin, San Leanna, Leander, Lago Vista, Anderson Mill, Jonestown, Manor, 
Volente and Point Venture. 
  Population: 680,887 (approx.) 
Governance Capital Metro is governed by an eight-member board of directors which has governance 
responsibilities over all activities related to Capital Metro.  The Board consists of eight members, 
three of whom are appointed by the Capital Area Metropolitan Planning Organization, two by the 
City of Austin mayor, one by Travis County, one by Williamson County, and one by the small city 
members. 
Budget process State legislation mandates that Capital Metro’s board adopt an annual operating budget.  This 
budget is prepared by the Capital Metro President/CEO.  The budget must be adopted before the 
beginning of each fiscal year on October 1st.  The board also holds a public hearing on the proposed 
operating budget and makes the proposed budget available to the public. 
Financial planning In preparing the budget, Capital Metro utilizes a 25 year strategic vision and plan—All Systems 
Go!— that was adopted in 2004.  The plan established a set of capital priorities and financing 
strategies. 
Revenue The Authority obtains revenue from a 1% sales and use tax, passenger fees, freight fees and contract 
fees.  Approximately 70% of the Authority’s revenue is obtained from the sales and use tax. 
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Table 31: A Profile of the Central Ohio Transit Authority 
Metropolitan Columbus, Ohio 
Establishment In 1971, when 11 municipalities and one county in metropolitan Columbus area were threatened 
by the loss of bus service from the privately owned Columbus Transit Company (CTC), the 
governments came together to form the Central Ohio Transit Authority (COTA). COTA began 
providing service in Franklin County on January 1, 1974. 
Property The Authority owns and operates all services and fixed capital related to bus transit within its 556 
square mile boundaries.  The Authority utilizes 234 buses to serve 55 bus routes and provides 
4,216 bus stops, 387 passenger shelters and 26 park-and-ride facilities. 
Population served Municipalities of Bexley, Columbus, Gahanna, Grandview Heights, Grove City, Hilliard, 
Reynoldsburg, Upper Arlington, Westerville, Whitehall, Worthington and Franklin County 
  Population: 949,708 (approx.) 
Governance A 13-member board of trustees oversees the transit system and appoints a president/CEO to 
manage the day-to-day operations of the authority.  Trustees represent 11 municipalities and 
Franklin County.  The City of Columbus has seven trustees that are appointed by the mayor.  The 
10 other member municipalities are divided into four groups with each group appointing 
representatives to the board on an alternating basis (also mayoral appointments).  Finally, the 
Franklin County Commissioners appoint two trustees to the board. 
Budget process The president/CEO works with staff members to create a yearly budget.  These budgets, including 
any fare increases, are then examined and approved by the board prior to their implementation. 
Financial planning In 2006 the Authority created and passed a Long-Range Transit Plan that analyzed, predicted and 
provided preliminary budget allocations through 2030. 
Revenue Franklin County voters approved a 0.25 percent permanent sales tax for COTA in November 
1999, and another 0.25 sales and use tax in 2006.  This has allowed the Authority to supplement 
its user fees with revenue from the 0.5 percent total sales and use tax. 
 
Table 32: A Profile of the Chicago Transit Authority 
Metropolitan Chicago, Illinois 
Establishment The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) began operating in 1947 after it acquired the properties of 
the Chicago Rapid Transit Company and the Chicago Surface Lines.  In 1952, CTA became the 
primary operator of Chicago transit when it purchased the Chicago Motor Coach system. 
Property The Authority has 1,971 buses that operate more than 150 routes and 2,517 route miles.  
Additionally, the Authority operates a rapid transit system which includes 1,190 rail cars that 
operate over eight routes and 224.1 miles of track.  The rapid transit system also serves both 
Chicago area airports- O’Hare International Airport and Midway Airport. 
Population served The City of Chicago and 40 suburban municipalities in the metropolitan area. 
  Population: 3,900,000 (approx.) 
Governance The CTA is governed by the Chicago Transit Board.  The board consists of seven members: four 
appointed by the Mayor of Chicago and three by the Governor of Illinois.  The Mayor's 
appointees are subject to the approval of the Governor and the Chicago City Council; the 
Governor's appointees are subject to the approval of the Mayor and the Illinois State Senate. 
CTA's day-to-day operations are directed by a president. 
Budget process The president works with staff members to create annual budget recommendation reports.  These 
budget recommendations, including any fare increases, are then examined and approved by the 
board. 
Financial planning In addition to an annual budget, the president and CTA staff also develop annual capital budgets.  
These capital budgets are informed by several long-term planning and expansion plans for various 
segments of the Authority’s operations (e.g. rails lines, bus routes, facilities). 
Revenue The Authority obtains revenue from both user fees and supplemental funding for operating 
expenses from the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA).  The supplemental funding 
amounted to nearly 50 percent of total revenues in 2007. 
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Table 33: A Profile of the Nashville Metropolitan Transit Authority 
Metropolitan Nashville, Tennessee 
Establishment In early 1973, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County applied for a 
federal grant for the purchase of the privately owned Nashville Transit Company. By 
September of 1973, the transfer from private to public ownership was completed and the 
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) was officially chartered. 
Property The Nashville MTA provides bus-related services to the greater Nashville-Davidson County 
metropolitan area.  The Authority currently has 137 fixed route buses, 63 AccessRide buses, 
several primary terminals and 475 employees.  The Authority also provides 17 park-and-ride 
lots located throughout the Nashville-Davidson County metropolitan area.  Day-to-day services 
are provided by a contracted nonprofit firm. 
Population served Nashville/Davidson County 
  Population: 569,891 
Governance A five-member board of directors, appointed by the Mayor and approved by the City Council, 
governs the Nashville MTA.  A management team, headed by a Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), oversees the day-to day operations. 
Budget process The CEO, with the assistance of financial staff and an executive finance committee, prepares 
an annual budget.  The budget, once presented to the board, must then be passed by a majority 
vote.  An annual capital budget is also prepared by the CEO and passed by the board. 
Financial planning In 2009, the Nashville MTA adopted a strategic master plan.  The plan outlined priorities for 
short (2009-2015), mid (2015-2025) and long (2025-2035) term.  The plan outlined specific 
capital and organizational priorities as well as corresponding financing strategies.  
Revenue The Authority generates revenue by utilizing state and federal government grants, financial 
assistance from the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and self-
generated income. The self-generated income comes from fares, advertising revenue, and 
revenues from contracts and special events. 
 
These four districts and others analyzed share several structural similarities.  First, the services 
provided by each district are limited to transit, i.e. bus, rail, and shuttle systems as opposed to 
roads or airports.  Second, similar to other special districts, each authority is governed by an 
executive board.  The board members generally are appointed by elected officials from the 
municipalities within the districts.  Third, all of the above districts operate on a regional scale.  
Whether primarily on a county-wide basis (e.g. Orange, Alamance, and Mason Counties) or a 
much larger metropolitan scale (e.g. Chicago, Massachusetts, or central Ohio), the services 
provided by the districts are not confined to a single municipality.  Thus, the existence of a 
transportation district appears to also require a certain degree of regional cooperation. 
In terms of structural differences, the scope of each district varies extensively.  As one would 
assume, the total amount of services provided by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority of metropolitan Boston is much larger than the total amount provided by the more 
rural Mason County Transportation Authority.  The size of the served communities guarantees 
that service levels vary across each district.  Also, the types of transit services vary.  In 
particular, rail service is provided by some authorities, while bus systems are the sole 
concentration of others.  Additionally, some districts (e.g. Mason County Transportation 
Authority) tend to have a greater focus on shuttle or van services for the elderly and disabled.   
The financial strategies and revenue streams of the examined districts are relatively similar.  
Each authority is required to develop operations and capital budgets on an annual basis.  
Additionally, the majority of the districts currently utilize some type of long-range 
comprehensive plan to structure future service and financial priorities.  Revenue sources also are 
similar across the authorities.  With the exception of the Nashville Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, each district relies on a sales and use tax to fund general operations and small capital 
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projects.  These transit-specific sales taxes range from .25% to 1%.  Additional revenues are 
obtained from passenger fees, freight fees, rents, and various types of state and federal grants. 
Key pros 
 
• Creation of a regional transit authority or district in southeast Wisconsin – particularly one 
with its own dedicated funding source – would remove transit services from competition with 
other county functions for fiscal and other resources, and would eliminate prioritization of 
mandated county functions over transit.  It also would provide greater certainty about 
funding, which is essential for long-term planning. 
 
• If the special transit district was created as a multi-county regional transit authority, it would 
be able to coordinate services across county boundaries and potentially reduce duplication of 
administrative and overhead functions.   
 
• Metro Milwaukee not only is one of the only major metropolitan areas in the country that 
does not administer mass transit services with a regional transit authority, but it also is one of 
the only metro areas that utilizes the property tax as its sole source of local funding.  
Implementing a dedicated non-property tax revenue source is considered by many to be 
critical to the survival of MCTS, and it could be argued that it makes the most sense to do so 
on a regional basis in order to avoid “tax island” impacts on Milwaukee County and in order 
to fund streamlined, regional service with such a revenue source.   
 
• Unlike the county board, a transit authority board would be more likely to focus on 
enhancing transit operations and not as heavily influenced by the parochial concerns of 
individual elected officials regarding transit routes. 
 
Key cons 
 
• Federal audits repeatedly have shown MCTS to be one of the most cost effective and 
efficient transit systems in the country.  It has been argued that changing the governance 
structure makes little sense in light of that success. 
 
• Some might argue that direct oversight of Milwaukee County’s transit system by elected 
officials leads to greater accountability to taxpayers and the general public than would occur 
under an appointed board. 
 
• Most transit authorities are almost entirely dependent upon sales and use taxes, which have 
declined precipitously during the economic downturn.  Nearly every district we examined 
was engaging in some type of service or personnel cuts to compensate for the revenue 
shortfalls.  Thus, creation of an RTA that would be funded by a regional sales tax may not 
provide the type of fiscal stability envisioned.  
 
• Housing transit in a separate district could lead to a significant increase in taxing and 
spending on transit services because of lack of competition with other locally funded 
services, which forces policymakers to prioritize among a wide variety of programs and 
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services and make difficult spending choices.  Also, less competition for funding could 
produce less incentive for transit officials to identify and implement administrative and 
operational efficiencies and generate revenue from outside funding sources. 
 
• It could be argued that Milwaukee County already has enough separate governmental or 
quasi-governmental agencies, and creation of a new transit authority simply would create 
another layer of unneeded government bureaucracy. 
 
Key logistical questions/obstacles 
 
• As noted above, perhaps the key logistical question would be whether a new transit authority 
would receive the assets and/or liabilities of MCTS and essentially take over both ownership 
and operation of the transit system, or simply contract with the county to continue its 
ownership and governance role.   
 
• Depending on the answer to the above question, authorizing legislation may need to 
determine whether a new authority would assume responsibility for the outstanding General 
Obligation debt on county buses, equipment and facilities, or leave that debt with the county.  
In addition, it would need to determine whether the county would receive any compensation 
from the new authority for transit system assets. 
 
• There is a legal question as to whether the pension and retiree health care liabilities held by 
MTS would fall to Milwaukee County if MTS ceased to exist.  That question would need to 
be answered in the context of deciding whether the new transit authority would be a direct 
provider of transit services, directly contract with MTS, or simply contract with the county to 
maintain the existing arrangement. 
 
• There also is a legal question regarding collective bargaining agreements in place for MTS 
employees and whether those would necessarily transfer to the new authority, as well as the 
MTS employees themselves. 
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OTHER COUNTY FUNCTIONS 
 
This section reviews most of the remaining functions of Milwaukee County government, but in a 
less comprehensive manner than the functions discussed above.  That does not mean these 
functions are not significant, but simply that they do not involve as much staff or funding, or that 
the issues surrounding their transfer are not as complex.  Departments or divisions that exist 
primarily to serve other units of county government are not discussed in this section, as it is 
assumed that those departments and divisions would cease to exist if Milwaukee County 
government was eliminated, or would be downsized in a roughly equivalent ratio to the reduction 
in county staff and services that would result from various streamlining strategies.   
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
 
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is one of the largest in county 
government, with a 2009 adopted budget totaling $198 million and 682 FTEs.  While this would 
suggest that attempting to transfer its functions out of county government would be an extremely 
complicated endeavor, that might not necessarily be the case given the state’s recent actions to 
assume administration of other human services functions in Milwaukee County. 
 
DHHS is comprised of four programmatic divisions: Economic Support, Delinquency and Court 
Services, Disabilities Services and Housing.  The following describes the functions of each 
division and the potential assignment of those functions should county government be 
eliminated. 
 
• Economic Support Division (ESD).  Per Chapters 46 and 49 of the Wisconsin Statutes, ESD 
traditionally has administered eligibility determination and related functions on behalf of the 
state for public assistance programs in Milwaukee County, including Food Share, Medicaid, 
Child Day Care and Home Energy Assistance.  The division had a budget of $55 million in 
2009, most of which was comprised of state and federal revenue allocated to the county to 
carry out these functions, as well as $1.7 million of property tax levy.  In terms of staff level, 
ESD was the second largest DHHS division in 2009 (after BHD) with 333 budgeted FTEs.   
 
In the spring of 2009, the State of Wisconsin announced its intention to assume the 
administration of all public assistance programs in Milwaukee County, with the exception of 
the energy program and general assistance burials.  This intent was codified with adoption of 
Wisconsin Act 15 this past summer, which placed the administration of these programs under 
the control of state government, but which also stipulated that the programs would continue 
to be staffed by county union-represented positions under the supervision of state managers.  
Act 15 also defined the financial terms and conditions of the arrangement.   
 
In light of this development, if county government was eliminated, it would be logical simply 
to complete the state’s takeover of public assistance programs by transferring the remaining 
county positions in ESD (including positions associated with the energy and general 
assistance burial programs) to state government.  Among the key logistical/fiscal issues that 
would need to be worked out would be whether the state would assume the significant legacy 
costs associated with retired ESD workers; whether the state would replace county property 
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tax levy (which increases to $3.7 million in the 2010 budget); and whether the state would 
assume debt service costs associated with the Marcia P. Coggs Human Services Building.  If 
the state was unwilling to assume such costs, then it potentially could seek to assess county 
taxpayers for them, or intercept shared revenue or other state aids if parts of county 
government remained intact.     
 
• Delinquency and Court Services Division (DCSD).  Per Chapters 46, 48 and 938 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, DCSD provides juvenile court intake and disposition services for youth 
referred for delinquency and youth in need of protection and services; administers a broad 
range of services designed to divert delinquent youth from the state juvenile corrections 
system; administers a 120-bed Juvenile Detention Center; and provides probation and related 
services to youth adjudicated delinquent.  The division had a budget of $41 million in 2009, 
with about $23 million comprised of state revenue and $18 million of property tax levy 
(making it one of the largest departmental recipients of property tax levy in the county).  
DCSD had 188 budgeted FTEs in 2009. 
 
In addition to providing and contracting for delinquency services, DCSD pays the state for 
Milwaukee County youth sentenced to state juvenile corrections institutions per a daily rate 
established in the state budget.  DCSD’s budget does not include those charges, however, 
which are intercepted from the county’s Youth Aids allocation from the state.  In 2009, the 
county was budgeted to pay approximately $28 million of state Department of Corrections 
charges, while its Youth Aids allocation was projected at $38 million.  The remaining $10 
million is reflected as revenue in DCSD’s budget and is used to fund part of the cost of 
community-based delinquency programming.  
 
If Milwaukee County government was eliminated, DCSD’s functions logically could be 
taken over by state government.  Because many of the division’s functions could be 
considered judicial/correctional in nature, those functions potentially could be spread across 
the Wisconsin departments of health services and corrections, as well as the circuit courts.  
Pros, cons and logistical issues associated with such a transfer would be similar to those cited 
earlier for behavioral health services, the courts and other social services, and would need to 
include consideration of how to replace the significant county property tax levy contribution 
to delinquency programming. 
 
• Disabilities Services Division (DSD).  Per Chapters 46 and 51 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 
DSD provides services to adults and children with physical and developmental disabilities, 
with an emphasis on community-based services that allow such individuals to live 
independent lives in the community.   
 
DSD was the second largest component of the DHHS budget in 2009 (after BHD), with 
expenditures of $84 million.  All of the division’s expenditures were offset with state and 
federal revenue, primarily consisting of federal Medicaid waiver revenue that is provided to 
reimburse local governments for costs associated with providing services for persons with 
disabilities in the community, as opposed to nursing homes or other institutions.  However, 
the full offset also reflects the county’s discretionary decision to allocate a significant portion 
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 112 
 
of its state Community Aids allocation to disabilities services, as opposed to delinquency or 
other social services.  DSD had 90 budgeted FTEs in 2009. 
 
As discussed in the earlier section on the Family Care CMO, Milwaukee County currently is 
transitioning most of the adult population served by DSD to the Family Care program.  Once 
that transition is complete, DSD will be reduced to a relatively small set of fully reimbursed 
programs and services for children with disabilities; a small set of contracted services for 
individuals with disabilities who do not qualify for Family Care; a small contingent of staff 
to conduct investigations regarding potential abuse or neglect of individuals with disabilities; 
and operation of the $4 million Disabilities Resource Center, which serves as the intake and 
referral mechanism for individuals with disabilities who may be eligible for Family Care.   
 
If county government ceased to exist, it would be logical to transfer administration of those 
functions to the state with other remaining county social service functions.  The state would 
not have to be a direct provider of services, but could instead contract with community-based 
providers to operate these services, including the Resource Center.   Pros, cons and logistical 
issues associated with such a transfer would be similar to those cited earlier for behavioral 
health services and other social services, and would need to include consideration of how to 
address legacy costs associated with hundreds of retired DSD employees. 
     
• Housing Division.  The Housing Division administers programs funded with Milwaukee 
County’s allocation of federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) grant 
dollars, including the Section 8 Rent Assistance program, HOME/Home Repair, Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) and special needs housing programs.  The division also 
administers a set of small contracts that provide general operational support to local homeless 
shelters, and it administers supportive housing programs for individuals served by BHD.  The 
division had a budget of $21 million in 2009, with most consisting of HUD dollars and $2.3 
million of property tax levy.  The Housing Division had 31 budgeted FTEs in 2009. 
 
The City of Milwaukee receives even greater allocations of Section 8, HOME/Home Repair 
and CDBG dollars from HUD and has a larger infrastructure to administer those programs.  
Other Milwaukee County municipalities – including West Allis, Wauwatosa and South 
Milwaukee – also receive allocations from HUD.   
 
If county government was eliminated, it would be logical to shift the county’s HUD 
allocations to city government and have it expand its reach to Milwaukee County suburbs, 
and/or distribute portions of the HUD allocations to those municipalities that already 
administer HUD grants.  A similar concept also could be undertaken under an initiative to 
streamline county government, as was suggested by the Forum in its May 2009 report on 
Milwaukee County’s affordable housing landscape (Give Me Shelter: Responding to 
Milwaukee County’s Affordable Housing Challenges).  The funding and services provided by 
the division to BHD clients, meanwhile, could be shifted to the state or a mental health 
authority with other mental health functions.  A key logistical consideration would be 
addressing the legacy costs associated with Housing Division retirees (which municipal 
governments would be highly unlikely to assume), as well as replacing the $2.3 million of 
county property tax levy dedicated to housing programs.  
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DEPARTMENT ON AGING 
 
The Department on Aging was created in 1991 to be the designated Area Agency on Aging for 
Milwaukee County under the Older Americans Act, and to carry out other programs for the 
county’s older adult population.  It houses the Aging Resource Center, which serves as the point 
of entry for Family Care for older adults, and it also provides a network of support services 
funded through a combination of Older Americans Act funds, state revenue and property tax 
levy, including the Senior Meal Program and five county-owned senior centers.  The department 
had a budget of $19.1 million in 2009 (including $2.9 million in property tax levy) and 83 FTEs. 
 
If county government ceased to exist, it would be logical simply to transfer administration of 
aging programs to the state along with other remaining county social service functions.  Pros, 
cons and logistical issues associated with such a transfer would be similar to those cited earlier 
for behavioral health services and other social services, and would need to include consideration 
of whether state government would be willing to fill the $2.9 million property tax levy gap and 
assume the legacy costs associated with dozens of retired Department on Aging employees. 
     
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES 
 
The Milwaukee County Emergency Medical Services (EMS) system was established in the 
1970s under Chapter 97 of the Milwaukee County Code of General Ordinances in order to 
establish a coordinated, countywide approach to providing paramedic and other emergency 
medical services in the county.  Under this coordinated approach, Milwaukee County provides 
medical direction for the system (through a contract with the Medical College of Wisconsin) and 
certain centralized support functions, while municipal fire departments deliver actual paramedic 
services.   
 
The system includes 14 paramedic units and multiple paramedic first response units operated by 
municipalities; a communications base that provides the communication link between paramedic 
units, receiving hospitals and medical staff; an education center that provides paramedic training 
and continuing education; and other support functions, including quality assurance, supply 
purchasing and recordkeeping.  Milwaukee County property tax levy supports the centralized, 
system-wide functions, and the county also provides a $3 million tax levy appropriation to help 
offset the cost of paramedic services incurred by municipalities.  Municipalities split the $3 
million via a formula agreed to by the Intergovernmental Coordinating Council (ICC) and also 
retain reimbursement revenue from health insurance companies and individuals to offset costs.  
The EMS function had a budget of $7.6 million in 2009 (including $6.9 million in property tax 
levy) and 25 FTEs. 
 
For much of its existence, EMS has been housed in the county’s County Health Programs 
Division, which also housed the General Assistance Medical Program (GAMP).  GAMP was 
eliminated in 2009 because of the state’s implementation of a new Badger Care benefit for 
childless adults.  Consequently, EMS was shifted in the 2010 budget to the Behavioral Health 
Division. 
 
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 114 
 
If county government ceased to exist, municipal paramedic providers could provide for their own 
medical direction and other supports, though such an approach could require each municipality 
to establish its own infrastructure, thereby reducing economies of scale and producing greater 
inefficiency.  An alternative approach might be to turn to the City of Milwaukee or another 
municipal provider to purchase medical direction services and fulfill the coordination and 
centralization functions currently provided by Milwaukee County, or perhaps attempt to house 
that function in the ICC.  Under any of those alternatives, the county’s significant property tax 
levy contribution would need to be replaced, and legacy costs associated with dozens of retired 
EMS employees would need to be addressed. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC WORKS (DTPW) 
 
The largest divisions of DTPW – Airport and the Milwaukee County Transit System – have been 
covered earlier in this report.  Remaining divisions consist primarily of services that support 
other county operations and those that support state and county highways.  The former set of 
services likely would not be needed if county government was eliminated, though legacy costs 
associated with those services would need to be addressed, and the entities inheriting county 
buildings and equipment (to the extent those would not be sold or mothballed) would need to 
determine how to provide the services needed to maintain them.  The highway functions, 
meanwhile, could be shifted to the state or to municipalities. 
 
DTPW divisions that support other county operations are Architectural, Engineering and 
Environmental Services, Fleet Management and Facilities Management.  Brief summaries of 
those divisions are provided below. 
 
• Architectural, Engineering and Environmental Services (A, E & E).   The A, E & E 
division provides architectural and engineering services related to the county’s infrastructure 
and new capital projects, as well as environmental services largely related to county land and 
facilities.  The division had a $6.3 million budget in 2009 (including $665,000 of property 
tax levy) and 38 FTEs.  The functions of this division could be eliminated if county 
government was dissolved, though the entity that assumed ownership of the county’s 
physical assets ostensibly would have to assume and pay for architectural, engineering and 
environmental services related to those assets.   This division also houses the Milwaukee 
County Automated Mapping and Land Information System, which functions as the county’s 
Land Information Office.  That function likely would have to be picked up by the state or 
perhaps SEWRPC.   
 
• Fleet Management.  This division purchases and maintains vehicles and major equipment 
used by most county departments, including vehicles related to the sheriff’s office, zoo and 
parks.  The airport assumed responsibility for its own fleet maintenance in 2009, and MCTS 
also maintains its own fleet.  The division had a $9.4 million budget in 2009 and 43 FTEs.  
Virtually all costs are recovered through charges to county departments that utilize the 
division’s services.  The functions of this division could be eliminated if county government 
was dissolved, though the entities that assumed administration of functions that possess 
vehicles and equipment would need to pay for their own fleet management services. 
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• Facilities Management.    This division provides maintenance operations and property 
management functions for most county departments and buildings (including the Courthouse, 
Criminal Justice Facility, Vel R. Phillips Juvenile Justice Center and Mental Health 
Complex), as well as for buildings on the Milwaukee County Grounds owned by the 
Milwaukee County Research Park.  Those functions include security and skilled trades 
services.  The division had a $23 million budget in 2009 and 150 FTEs.  Virtually all costs 
are recovered through charges to county departments that utilize the division’s services.  The 
functions of this division could be eliminated if county government was dissolved, though 
the entities that assumed ownership of the county’s buildings and properties would have to 
assume and pay for maintenance operations and property management.  A particular 
challenge would be the numerous buildings and vast property on the County Grounds.  
 
The other two DTPW divisions are Transportation Services and Highway Maintenance, which 
are devoted largely to construction, engineering and maintenance activities related to county-
owned highways and bridges, as well as maintenance and plowing of state highways in 
Milwaukee County.   Per Chapter 86 of the Wisconsin Statutes, each county in Wisconsin 
maintains its own county highway system, which is known by routes that are designated by 
letters instead of numbers.  Milwaukee County’s county trunk highways consist of 343 lane 
miles. 
 
Transportation Services provides planning, design and management for construction projects on 
county trunk highways and bridges.   The division had a $2.3 million budget in 2009 (including 
$228,000 in property tax levy) and 12 FTEs.  Highway Maintenance, meanwhile, provides 
general and winter maintenance on state expressways and state trunk highways in Milwaukee 
County (for which it is fully reimbursed from state revenue), and similar functions plus major 
improvements for county trunk highways (for which considerable reimbursement is available 
through state General Transportation Aids and the state’s Local Road Improvement Program).   
The division had a $17.6 million budget in 2009 (including $855,000 in property tax levy) and 
136 FTEs. 
 
The elimination of county government obviously would raise the question of which entity should 
be charged with maintaining state expressways and highways in Milwaukee County, as well as 
who should own and maintain the county trunk highways.  The state highway maintenance 
question is a difficult one because, according to the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 
“Wisconsin is the only state to rely exclusively on counties to perform maintenance on state 
highways.”28  The state might logically seek to transfer state highway maintenance to the City of 
Milwaukee, which has its own significant public works department.  Another option would be to 
contract with private firms, which is an alternative that has been employed in varying degrees in 
other states. 
 
With regard to county trunk highways, a logical alternative would be to determine which of those 
serve a localized function and should simply be broken up and transferred to the municipal 
governments through which they traverse, and which fall more appropriately under the category 
of state trunk highway and should revert back to the state.  The general question of whether 
certain elements of Milwaukee County’s county trunk highway system should be re-designated 
                                                 
28 Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau Report No. 97-4. 
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or maintained by other entities has been discussed at various times in the past several years 
outside of the context of eliminating county government.  For example, in July 2009, the current 
county executive “floated the idea of county government giving up its responsibilities for county 
highways and giving its share of state transportation money to municipalities to do the job.”29  
SEWRPC also currently is examining this issue.   
 
Municipal officials have expressed concern, however, about the sufficiency of state 
reimbursement to fully offset their costs should they assume elements of the county trunk 
highway system, and about the ability of small municipal public works departments to assume 
this responsibility.  Another key set of questions would revolve around who would assume 
outstanding debt on county trunk highway construction projects, whether pending capital 
projects should be completed and paid for by the county prior to transfer, and how to address 
legacy costs associated with retired county highway workers.   
 
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 
 
Per Sections 49 and 59 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the Department of Child Support Enforcement 
(CSE) implements and administers federal child support enforcement regulations in Milwaukee 
County.  Those regulations require the department to provide services to locate parents, establish 
paternity and enforce and establish child support and medical support orders on cases referred by 
county, state and private social service agencies.  The department’s legal division represents the 
state before Family Court judges and commissioners.  The department had a budget of $17.6 
million in 2009 (including $1.2 million in property tax levy) and 131 FTEs.     
 
If county government ceased to exist, it would be logical simply to transfer administration of 
child support enforcement functions to the state.  Delegation of child support enforcement 
responsibilities varies from state to state, but many states do administer this function themselves.  
According to a recent consultant’s report developed for the Minnesota Department of Human 
Services, “24 states have some form of service delivery in which local services are delivered by 
an independent local governmental agency,” while the remainder are administered at the state 
level.30  
 
The Minnesota consultant’s report recommends that Minnesota move from its current county-
operated child support enforcement system to a state-administered system.  Among the reasons 
cited are enhanced consistency in service delivery, reduced costs and greater accountability.    
 
Pros, cons and logistical issues associated with such a transfer in Milwaukee County would be 
similar to those cited earlier for behavioral health services and other social services, and would 
need to include consideration of whether state government would be willing to fill the $1.2 
million property tax levy gap and assume the legacy costs associated with hundreds of retired 
CSE employees.   
  
                                                 
29 “Public works projects defy partnerships,” The Daily Reporter, July 21, 2009.  
30 Executive Summary, Minnesota Department of Human Services Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) 
Analysis of Service Delivery Model (ASDM) Project, October 2009, p. 15. 
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MEDICAL EXAMINER 
 
Per Chapters 59, 69, 157 and 979 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the Milwaukee County Medical 
Examiner’s Office (ME) is charged with responsibilities involving the investigation of sudden, 
unexpected or unusual deaths, detection of communicable diseases, issuance of death certificates 
and maintenance of a forensic toxicology laboratory.  The position of County Coroner was once 
a constitutionally required position, but the Legislature adopted a change in 1978 abolishing the 
elected office of coroner in counties with more than 500,000 citizens (i.e. Milwaukee County) 
and allowing other counties to do likewise.  In place of an elected coroner, counties can establish 
a system with an appointed medical examiner.  Milwaukee County’s ME office had a budget of 
$4.6 million in 2009 (including $3.5 million in property tax levy) and 29 FTEs.     
 
If county government ceased to exist, it would be logical simply to transfer the ME’s office to 
state government similar to the sheriff, district attorney and other public safety functions.  A 
similar approach was proposed by Milwaukee County’s ME in 2002 in a detailed position paper 
calling for creation of a state-administered medical examiner system implemented through seven 
regional offices.  He argued that such an approach would standardize policies and procedures at a 
more appropriate level across all counties, create higher standards and better quality control, and 
produce administrative efficiencies.   
 
Pros, cons and logistical issues associated with such a transfer only in Milwaukee County would 
be similar to those cited for other public safety services, and would need to include consideration 
of whether state government would be willing to fill the $3.5 million property tax levy gap and 
assume the legacy costs associated with retired ME employees. 
 
ELECTION COMMISSION 
  
Chapter 7.20 of the Wisconsin Statutes stipulates that each county and municipality with 500,000 
or more citizens shall have a three-member election commission board and shall be empowered 
to hire staff to carry out the commission’s duties.  In Milwaukee County, the Election 
Commission prepares, prints, distributes and maintains custody of ballots, canvasses and certifies 
returns, advertises federal, state and countywide elections, and administers ethics and campaign-
related oversight functions pertaining to county elected officials.  The commission had a budget 
of $603,000 in 2009, though the budget is dependent upon the number and scope of elections in a 
given year, and is typically slightly over $1 million in even-numbered years.  Most of that 
allocation is property tax levy.  FTE levels typically fluctuate between six and eight.   
 
If county government ceased to exist, one option would be to transfer the Milwaukee County 
Election Commission to state government under the Wisconsin Government Accountability 
Board – Elections Division.  The office still could be housed in Milwaukee County and carry out 
the same functions, and commissioners could be selected in the same manner as they are today, 
but employees would be state employees.  The state would need to determine whether it would 
be willing to fill the property tax levy gap and assume any potential legacy costs associated with 
commission employees.  Another option would be to have municipalities handle this function 
within their own jurisdictions, with the City of Milwaukee assuming responsibility for 
countywide elections pertaining to constitutional officers.  
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CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICERS 
 
The Wisconsin Constitution establishes the positions of County Clerk, Register of Deeds and 
County Treasurer in Milwaukee County (as well as the previously discussed positions of Sheriff, 
Clerk of Court and District Attorney).   The following is a brief summary of each office. 
 
• County Clerk.  The County Clerk supports the legislative activities of the Milwaukee 
County Board of Supervisors by maintaining records of county board actions and updating 
and publishing county ordinances.  The clerk’s office also issues marriage licenses and 
regulates lobbyists and lobbying activities pertaining to county government.  The office had a 
budget of $802,000 in 2009 (including $321,000 in property tax levy) and 7 FTEs. 
 
• County Treasurer.  The County Treasurer performs cash, investment management and 
banking functions for the county and collects delinquent property taxes for 18 of its 19 
municipalities (the City of Milwaukee collects its own).  The treasurer’s office had an 
expenditure budget of $1.5 million in 2009 and 9 FTEs.  Because interest collected on 
delinquent property taxes is housed in this budget, there is no expenditure of property tax 
levy. 
       
• Register of Deeds.  The Register of Deeds records, indexes and maintains a variety of 
official documents, including real estate documents, corporation papers, and birth, marriage 
and death certificates.  The office also collects the real estate transfer tax.  The office had an 
expenditure budget of $4.3 million in 2009 and 43 FTEs.  Because real estate transfer and 
general recording fee revenues are housed in this budget, there is no expenditure of property 
tax levy. 
 
If county government ceased to exist, the fact that these positions are constitutionally established 
would create a challenge.  If there was a desire to maintain the positions, they potentially could 
continue to be elected on a countywide basis, but the positions and the office’s employees and 
budgets could be placed in state government.  Alternatively, they could simply remain as 
independent offices.  As discussed in a later section of this report, Massachusetts elected to move 
constitutional officers to state government when it eliminated several of its county governments.  
Whether such an approach would be legally permissible under the Wisconsin Constitution would 
have to be determined by state attorneys.  The question of legacy costs also would have to be 
addressed.  Another option might be to abolish the County Clerk and County Treasurer positions 
in light of the elimination of many of their functions should county government no longer exist. 
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THREE GOVERNANCE REFORM MODELS 
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The preceding functional analysis of Milwaukee County government yields insight into the 
complexity involved with transferring its functions elsewhere, as well as the arguments that 
could be made for and against alternative governance options for individual functions.  It also 
shows that for virtually every set of services delivered by Milwaukee County, there is an 
example of a state or metropolitan area that delivers those services under a different structure.   
 
While not wishing to minimize the complexities associated with transferring major functions out 
of county government, this section takes into account the insights gained in Section II to develop 
and provide a broad fiscal analysis of three alternative restructuring scenarios:   
 
• Scenario 1 is the complete elimination of Milwaukee County government, an option this 
report specifically was commissioned to explore. 
 
• Scenario 2 returns county government to its “roots”, consisting only of its constitutional and 
statutory mandates.  The one exception is health and human services.  While this largely is a 
mandated service, Scenario 2 returns it to the state in light of the state’s previous takeover of 
several human service functions in Milwaukee County, and the rationale that it may be 
beneficial to have all county human services administered and coordinated by one entity.   
 
• Scenario 3 removes only the transit system, airport, parks and cultural facilities from county 
government.  This scenario differs from the second scenario in that all existing health and 
human services functions remain with the county.  The functions that are removed are not 
mandated and already have been subject to considerable discussion regarding new 
governance options.  In addition, these are functions for which new regional approaches to 
governance may be viable.  
 
Table 34 summarizes the three scenarios, including fiscal summaries that will be explained in 
this section. 
 
Table 34: Summary of Three County Government Restructuring Scenarios 
  
Key functions 
removed 
Estimated 
remaining 
expenditure 
budget 
Estimated 
remaining 
property tax 
levy* 
Legacy 
costs as % 
of remaining 
tax levy 
Estimated 
remaining 
FTEs 
2008 County 
government** None $1,340,250,497 $236,268,763 34.2% 5,707  
Scenario 1 – 
Eliminate county 
government 
All $85,685,857 $80,685,858 100.0% 0 
Scenario 2 – 
Significantly 
streamline 
Parks, Culture, Airport, 
Transit, Health & 
Human Services, 
CMO, Aging, CSE 
$370,377,101 $104,423,293 77.3% 2,424 
Scenario 3 – 
Remove major 
discretionary 
Parks, Culture, Airport, 
Transit $1,014,430,758 $181,790,833 44.4% 4,567 
* Under each of the three scenarios, policymakers would need to determine whether and to what extent the 
existing .5% Milwaukee County sales tax would remain in place and continue to be utilized to offset debt 
service.  That decision could significantly impact the property tax levy amounts shown for each scenario. 
** 2008 expenditure totals do not include expenditures on the General Assistance Medical Program, as that 
program has since been eliminated and would no longer factor into this analysis. 
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Fiscal data utilized in analyzing the three scenarios is based on 2008 actual spending, which is 
the last full year for which actual, audited financial data is available.  This provides an accurate 
starting point to consider potential fiscal impacts, but it must be understood that those impacts 
will change from year to year because of changes to the county’s annual budget.  For example, 
the annual legacy costs associated with each function likely are understated in this report, as they 
are based in part on the county’s actual 2008 pension expenditure of $41 million, as opposed to 
the 2010 budgeted expenditure of $68 million.    
 
Diagram 1 on the next page provides a flow chart depicting the movement of county functions 
under the three restructuring scenarios. 
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∗   This report cites multiple potential alternative 
      receiving entities for this function. 
Note: As discussed in Section II of this report, an alternative to creating separate special districts for parks and zoo/cultural would be to create 
one special district for parks and cultural services.  The same holds for the airport and transit system—those two functions could fall under one 
umbrella  transportation district. 
Milwaukee 
County 
Diagram 1: Summary of Flow of Functions in Restructuring Scenarios 
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SCENARIO 1 – ELIMINATE MILWAUKEE COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
 
Under a scenario in which Milwaukee County government is eliminated entirely, we assume that 
all of its existing functions would be moved either to state government, municipal governments 
or new special purpose districts or authorities.  In determining whether any fiscal savings would 
result, it is necessary to make additional assumptions regarding administrative services, elected 
offices, county assets and liabilities (including legacy), and labor costs.   
 
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES  
 
In 2008, Milwaukee County spent about $78 million on central charges/overhead, which we 
define as administrative (e.g. budget/accounting, audit, financial services, risk management, 
procurement, employee benefits, human resources), information technology, legal counsel, 
facilities management (including architectural, engineering and environmental services) and fleet 
management.  Table 35 shows the breakdown of those expenditures. 
 
Table 35: Central Cross-charging Department Expenditure Breakdown, 2008 
Expenditures 
Admin $13,073,533 
Information technology $17,884,938 
Legal counsel $1,577,128 
Facilities management $34,544,230 
Fleet management $10,436,699 
Total central service crosscharge $77,516,528 
 
As described elsewhere in this report, the county currently “charges out” most of the cost of 
those services to user departments (including the share of legacy costs held by central service 
divisions).  Thus, the current budget of each department contains administrative 
services/overhead costs.  In attempting to calculate cost savings associated with eliminating 
county government, the question becomes whether the administrative services/overhead costs 
currently budgeted in each function would be greater than the costs of administration incurred by 
an alternative governing body.   
 
In the Forum’s 2008 report on Milwaukee County parks and cultural institutions, the county’s 
parks and zoo directors both argued that if they were independent, they could secure 
administrative overhead at a much lower rate than the existing county cross-charge for such 
services.  That argument was based on their belief that they were being charged too much for the 
level of service they were receiving.   
 
While that argument may have merit, it is important to consider the economies of scale 
associated with providing administrative services centrally, which holds down the cost of those 
services for county departments.  In addition, while county departments may believe they pay 
more for central service charges than they receive in return, it is quite possible that purchasing 
legal, accounting, information technology and other services outside of county government 
would cost more on a per unit basis in light of the higher salaries paid to those professions in the 
private sector.  
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Any attempt to accurately quantify potential administrative overhead savings would require 
analyzing the specific administrative support services required by each individual function and 
attempting to calculate how much it would cost the receiving entity to secure those services 
outside of the county.  Because such an analysis would be extremely speculative and would have 
to be conducted on a service-by-service basis, we do not assign an overall cost savings to the 
elimination of county administrative services/overhead departments.  If policymakers continue to 
discuss the elimination of county government or the transfer of certain functions, then individual 
analyses should be undertaken for the various functions in order to attempt to quantify any such 
savings or added costs.       
 
ELECTED OFFICES 
 
As discussed elsewhere in this report, a key question surrounding the possible elimination or 
streamlining of county government is the legality of abolishing or transferring certain elected 
officials (and their offices) that are established in the Wisconsin Constitution.  A constitutional 
conflict would not preclude abolishment of the office, but would necessitate undertaking the 
time-consuming process of amending the Constitution.    
 
Notwithstanding that question, we assume that if county government was eliminated, then the 
offices of county executive, county board of supervisors, county clerk and county treasurer 
would become obsolete and logically would disappear.  We are able, therefore, to calculate a 
savings associated with the elimination of those offices, which is reflected in Table 36 below.  It 
should be noted that the marriage license function performed by the county clerk and the 
delinquent property tax collection function performed by the county treasurer would have to be 
assigned elsewhere, but we assume for the purposes of discussion that the savings reflected in 
Table 36 would not be offset with additional costs. 
 
COUNTY ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
 
As noted repeatedly throughout this report, perhaps the key question in attempting to determine 
the fiscal impacts of eliminating county government is determining how to address the county’s 
pension fund and retiree health liabilities (including nearly $400 million in outstanding pension 
obligation bond debt).  Another critical question is how to handle the approximately $504 
million in outstanding bonds and notes held by the county for capital projects, which will require 
a net debt service payment of $65 million in 2010.   
 
Those questions likely would need to be decided on an individual basis for each county function, 
based in large measure on the willingness and capacity of the receiving government to 
accommodate legacy costs and the extent to which capital assets are transferred.  For the sake of 
analysis and discussion, however, we assume the following: 
 
• Legacy costs associated with benefits for those who already have retired from or otherwise 
left Milwaukee County government would not be transferred.  That means that under a 
scenario in which county government is eliminated, those retirement liabilities would need to 
be assumed and managed by an alternative entity (likely the State of Wisconsin, though 
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Section IV suggests a potential alternative approach).  The alternative entity then could be 
empowered to assess county taxpayers for the annual costs associated with those liabilities. 
 
• Retirement liabilities associated with active county employees who become employed by the 
alternative governing body would be assumed by that new entity.31  We assume that most of 
those employees would become members of the Wisconsin Retirement System, either 
because they would become employees of the state or of special districts.  State policymakers 
would need to decide under such a scenario whether to seek reimbursement from county 
taxpayers by assessing them for the annual cost associated with such liabilities (or 
withholding an equivalent amount from the county’s shared revenue payment under a 
scenario in which county government remains). 
 
• Outstanding debt on capital assets would be transferred to the receiving governments along 
with capital assets (e.g. parks facilities and any debt on those facilities would be transferred 
to a new parks district).  There is a relatively small portion of county debt, however, that 
could not readily be transferred because the projects on which the debt is held are not related 
to an existing function of county government.  Examples include $27 million in debt related 
to Doyne Hospital and the former County Stadium.  It also would be impossible to transfer 
debt related to central service departments (e.g. information technology, human resources 
and financial services hardware and software).  In both instances, such debt logically would 
need to be assumed by the state, which again could be empowered to assess county taxpayers 
on an annual basis for debt service costs.  
 
We make this collective set of assumptions not because they necessarily represent the most 
appropriate public policy, but because we consider this to be the most realistic starting point for 
debate based on recent legislative proposals regarding parks and airport districts, and our 
examination of other scenarios in which functions have been transferred outside of Milwaukee 
County government (including the Milwaukee Public Museum and district attorneys, which are 
detailed elsewhere in this report).   
 
Finally, an important source of potential savings should Milwaukee County government be 
eliminated would be reduced obligations toward the management of county buildings and 
property and/or revenues realized from the sale of such assets.  The extent of such savings cannot 
be calculated at this time, however, because they would largely depend on whether receiving 
governments would need to utilize and manage existing county infrastructure for their own use.  
While we do not, therefore, assign a dollar amount to this potential savings, we assume the 
elimination or streamlining of county government would create an opportunity to strategically 
divest some of the county’s physical infrastructure in a manner that would yield significant 
revenues and offset leftover liabilities.   
 
  
                                                 
31 Our modeling uses the county’s budgetary methodology for distinguishing between pension costs linked to active 
employees and those linked to retirees.  This topic likely would be the subject of considerable debate if county 
employees were transferred to alternative government bodies.   
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POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN LABOR COSTS 
 
Some have argued that one of the primary benefits associated with moving certain functions 
outside of county government would be the ability to hire new employees with lower wages and 
benefits.  An attempt to quantify such potential savings again would be purely speculative, 
however, and also must weigh the following: 
 
• There is no certainty that significant wage and benefit savings would be experienced by 
alternative government entities once county retiree legacy costs are removed from the 
equation. 
 
• Receiving governments may wish to retain county workers to perform their existing jobs in a 
new district or in state government, and previous transfers of county functions (e.g. 
Milwaukee Public Museum and child welfare), as well as proposed and adopted legislation 
regarding authorities and special districts, have guaranteed similar wage and benefit levels 
for transferred employees. 
 
Consequently, we do not cite any savings in labor costs from moving functions outside of 
Milwaukee County government.  If policymakers are serious about pursuing the transfer of 
certain functions, then individual analyses could be undertaken for the various functions in order 
to attempt to quantify any such savings.       
 
FISCAL IMPACTS 
 
In light of the above assumptions and determinations, we present in Table 36 those annual 
savings resulting from the elimination of Milwaukee County government (based on 2008 actual 
spending) that we can approximate with some degree of certainty.   
 
Table 36: 2008 Levy Savings from Eliminating County Government  
  
Levy savings 
(legacy already 
netted out) 
County Executive ($831,826) 
County Board ($5,459,700) 
County Treasurer* ($1,185,901) 
County Clerk ($310,195) 
Election Commission ($1,155,025) 
Community Business Development Partners ($417,841) 
Personnel Review Board ($171,347) 
Civil Service Commission ($27,596) 
Total ($9,559,432) 
*Treasurer only includes expenditure savings.  Figures assume no revenue impact  
as revenue would likely be collected by an alternate entity. 
 
As the table indicates, we estimate that annual property tax levy savings of about $9.6 million 
could be recognized from eliminating the elected offices of the county executive, county board, 
county clerk and county treasurer, and also from eliminating certain central services that would 
not need to be replicated in receiving governments.      
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As noted above, these potential savings should not be viewed as the definitive statement of 
savings associated with the elimination of county government.  Instead, they should be seen as a 
starting point for further analysis if there is an interest in pursuing this scenario. 
 
Table 37, meanwhile, illustrates the total legacy obligations that would remain if county 
government is eliminated, but those costs are not distributed to the governments that receive 
county functions.  This table estimates that almost $81 million of the county’s $236 million in 
property tax levy expenditures in 2008 was attributed to such legacy costs.   
 
Consequently, if county government had been eliminated in that year, $155.6 million in property 
taxes levied by county government ostensibly would have disappeared, though we assume that 
all but the $9.6 million in savings outlined in Table 37 would have to be raised in some other 
fashion by receiving entities in order to provide similar levels of service.  A legacy cost of $80.7 
million would have remained, likely as an obligation for county taxpayers. 
 
It should be noted that this $80.7 million projection likely understates the amount that would be 
required if county government was eliminated in 2010, as not only have the county’s annual 
pension costs grown considerably in the past two years, but the county’s ability to charge a 
portion of that $80.7 million to state or federal contracts or other sources (such as GMIA’s 
signatory airlines) also would be eliminated under this scenario.  It is also important to recognize 
– as we discussed in Section I – that this annual obligation would grow for several years before 
gradually declining and ultimately disappearing.  
 
Table 37: Legacy Obligations Remaining after Elimination of County Government 
2008 County 
budget* 
Total expenditures $1,340,250,497 
Total levy $236,268,763 
Legacy $80,685,858 
Expenditures (w/out legacy) $1,259,564,639 
Levy (w/out legacy) $155,582,905 
* GAMP deducted from 2008 budget. 
 
In addition to the legacy liability, a sizable obligation would remain for outstanding debt that 
could not logically be transferred to receiving governments.  We estimate that approximately $5 
million of the county’s $43 million net debt service payment in 2008 would have been attributed 
to such debt.  Combined, then, approximately $86 million in legacy costs and debt service would 
have remained as an obligation for county taxpayers in 2008 had county government been 
eliminated. 
   
As a point of reference, we calculated what the impact would have been on the owner of a 
Milwaukee County home assessed at $150,000, assuming that state government elected to assess 
the county’s property taxpayers for that cost in the absence of county government. We found 
that under such a scenario, the owner of a $150,000 home would have seen a line item of 
$197 on his or her property tax bill.  That compares to the $543 county property tax bill 
actually paid by that homeowner in 2008. 
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A potential alternative might be to use revenues generated from the county’s existing .5% sales 
tax to partially offset that cost.  Based on our assumption that debt service costs would be spread 
out to receiving entities (when possible), if we were also to assume that those entities would pay 
for debt service out of new or existing revenue streams, then most of the $65 million per year 
generated by the county sales tax could be utilized to offset the annual legacy payment, as 
opposed to its current use of paying for debt service.32  That possibility, of course, would be 
dependent upon a decision by policymakers to leave the county sales tax in place even if county 
government no longer was in existence. 
 
Finally, as noted above, the remaining obligations of county government potentially could be 
reduced by using the proceeds from the sale or lease of county assets to pay down pension or 
health care liabilities or general obligation debt.  If county government was eliminated, it would 
be logical to assume that state government would assume the assets not transferred to new 
authorities or municipal governments and would develop a plan for managing those assets in a 
manner that would seek to maximize the reduction of county liabilities. 
 
  
                                                 
32 County ordinances require all county sales tax revenue in a given year to be used first to pay for general obligation 
debt service.  In recent years, the county has used any remaining sales tax revenue to pay for fringe benefit 
liabilities. 
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SCENARIO 2 – SIGNIFICANTLY STREAMLINE  
MILWAUKEE COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
 
Under this scenario, we envision a county government that consists only of its constitutional and 
statutorily mandated functions in the areas of courts, public safety and public works, as well as 
other constitutional offices.  We also envision a smaller administrative services function that is 
commensurate with the size of the new government.  On the revenue side, we assume that all 
revenue from the existing .5% sales tax is retained by the smaller county government (despite the 
fact that debt service on capital projects associated with transferred functions is transferred out), 
and we assume that the county’s shared revenue payment from the state is decreased by a 
percentage equivalent to the reduction in the county’s overall expenditures.  
 
This scenario essentially creates a county government that focuses solely on those functions that 
are typically thought of as “county functions.”  The National Association of Counties (NACo), 
for example, lists property assessment, record-keeping, road maintenance, elections, courts, 
social services and public safety as “historic services” performed by counties throughout the 
United States.33       
 
We do not include mandated health and human service functions in this scenario (which we 
define to include child support enforcement and Family Care).  Our rationale is that state 
government already has assumed administrative responsibility for several health and human 
services in Milwaukee County, and it is perhaps more plausible than for other mandated 
functions that the state could be convinced to take over the remainder.  Also, NACo notes that 
social services are provided with “wide variations” throughout the country, and therefore could 
be considered less of a traditional county function than the others noted above.34  Scenario 3 is 
identical to this scenario but retains Milwaukee County’s existing role in administering health 
and human services.  
 
Table 38 lists the functions that would be included in Milwaukee County government under this 
scenario and the amount of actual expenditures and property tax levy associated with each 
function.  The total county budget under this scenario would have been $370 million in 2008, or 
about 28% of the actual $1.3 billion total.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 National Association of Counties, “County Government in America”, www.naco.org 
34 National Association of Counties, “An Overview of County Government”, www.naco.org 
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Table 38: County Functional Expenses – Scenario 2 
Breakdown of county functions…  All Exp   Levy   Legacy  
Legislative & 
executive 
• County executive $383,702 $377,223 $181,287 
• County board $1,634,646 $1,625,936 $530,913 
Central 
services 
• Community business development partners $712,289 $494,914 $64,746 
• Personnel review board $225,600 $225,578 $51,796 
• Civil service commission $53,639 $53,639 $25,898 
General 
government 
• County treasurer $1,342,309 ($950,813) $142,440 
• County clerk $850,920 $427,458 $103,593 
• Election commission $1,148,848 $1,055,758 $90,644 
• Register of deeds $4,385,345 $208,446 $414,371 
Judiciary & 
public safety 
• Courts $51,399,202 $40,560,428 $3,522,156 
• Sheriff $145,193,526 $122,572,004 $10,385,180 
• District attorney $19,109,930 $10,647,210 $1,139,521 
• Medical examiner $4,322,407 $3,658,303 $310,778 
Highway • Highway maintenance & transportation services $20,091,976 $583,704 $1,761,078 
Debt service • Debt service (Total 2008 = exp $54,261,536/ levy = $43,072,369) $27,628,697 $21,931,436  
Revenues • State shared revenue (2008 - $37,133,490) ($9,825,557) • Sales tax revenue (2008 - $66,695,072) ($66,695,072) 
Retained 
legacy 
• Legacy related to departing depts $33,810,958 $33,810,958 
• Legacy related to Doyne retirees $13,790,794 $13,790,794 
Miscellaneous • Miscellaneous $44,292,312 ($22,527,302) $14,359,703 
Option 2 exp & levy $370,377,101 $104,423,293 $80,685,858 
 
In considering the fiscal impacts of this scenario, we utilize similar assumptions to those outlined 
for Scenario 1.  We need to diverge from those assumptions, however, in considering the offices 
of county executive, county board and county clerk, which presumably would need to exist in a 
streamlined county government.  For purposes of estimating a savings, we assume that the 
budget for the office of county executive would be reduced to approximately $175,000 to reflect 
the cost of that position and one assistant that would be needed in light of the vastly reduced size 
of county government.  It is also possible that policymakers would wish to consider an appointed 
county administrator model for this scenario. 
 
With regard to the county board, we assume that a 19-member full-time board would be 
inappropriate for a much smaller county government that is limited only to state-mandated 
administrative functions.  We assume, therefore, that the county board budget would be reduced 
by the percentage that overall county expenditures are reduced.  The reduced budget would 
support a county board consisting of six members if supervisors were to retain full-time status, or 
a larger number if policymakers elected to go with a part-time board. 
 
Finally, we assume that a reduction in the size of the county board would not significantly 
impact the duties of the county clerk – as a need for legislative and other recordkeeping would 
remain in a streamlined county government – so we assume no cost savings in that office, nor in 
the offices of county treasurer, civil service commission, personnel review board and community 
development business partners, which would need to exist in a county government of any size.  
Table 39 shows the $5.1 million projected savings that would have occurred had this 
government structure been in place in 2008, as compared to the $9.6 million projected savings 
under Scenario 1. 
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Table 39: Comparison of 2008 Levy Savings, Scenarios 1 and 2 
  
Scenario 1: 
Levy savings 
Scenario 2: 
Levy savings 
County Executive ($831,826) ($656,711) 
County Board ($5,459,700) ($4,438,180) 
County Treasurer* ($1,185,901) -- 
County Clerk ($310,195) -- 
Election Commission ($1,155,025) -- 
Community Business Development Partners ($417,841) -- 
Personnel Review Board ($171,347) -- 
Civil Service Commission ($27,596) -- 
Total ($9,559,432) ($5,094,891) 
*Treasurer only includes expenditure savings.  Figures assume no revenue impact as revenue  
would likely be collected by an alternate entity. 
 
To determine the impact of liabilities, we again assume that retirement liabilities associated with 
retired and inactive county employees for functions removed from county government are left 
with the county, while debt service linked to those functions is transferred to receiving 
governments.  This produces a situation in which legacy costs would represent 22% of overall 
annual expenditures in Milwaukee County government and 77% of the county’s total property 
tax levy.  Graphs 3 and 4 illustrate the significant proportional growth of the legacy obligation 
under Scenario 2 by first showing actual legacy costs as a percentage of county expenditures in 
2008, and then showing what that percentage would look like in the government structure 
outlined under Scenario 2.  
 
Graph 3: Legacy Obligation - 2008 Budget         Graph 4: Legacy Obligation - Scenario 2 
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A potential rationale for Scenario 2 would be the opportunity to reinstate the focus of Milwaukee 
County government to the functions it was created to deliver on behalf of state government in the 
first place.  Such a transformation to the traditional role of “administrative arm” of state 
government – if accompanied by a similar transformation of the governance structure to a much 
smaller or part-time county board and smaller county executive’s office (or perhaps an appointed 
county administrator), plus a commitment to hire and place faith in professional administrators as 
the county recently did for its employee benefits division  – might significantly reduce the 
politics and dissention that characterize Milwaukee County government today.  The outcome 
could be more stable and functional governance of core county services.   
 
Meanwhile, as discussed in Section II, a rationale exists for the provision of transit, aviation, 
parks and cultural services in special districts and/or on a regional level given the discretionary 
nature and regional breadth of such services.  Also, as discussed previously, the administration of 
all health and human services at the state level might be justified as a means of ensuring better 
accountability for social service outcomes in Milwaukee County.  
 
Of course, creating regional authorities or special districts, and transferring health and human 
services to the state, also would require consideration of the “cons” and logistical considerations 
cited in Section II, including difficult questions regarding establishment of new funding sources 
and potential assumption of significant costs by state government.  And, our analysis 
demonstrates the additional challenge that would be created by the notion of creating a 
streamlined county government that would have a proportional legacy burden that is nearly triple 
the size of the current liability.   
 
As with Scenario 1, policymakers would have the option to continue using the property tax to 
fund that burden, though that would produce a situation in which, according to our analysis, 
legacy costs would be equivalent to 77% of the county property tax levy.  A critical question is 
whether policymakers and county taxpayers would be willing to accept such a framework 
knowing that, eventually, legacy obligations would dissipate and ultimately disappear as county 
retirees and their beneficiaries pass away. 
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SCENARIO 3 – REMOVE MAJOR DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS  
FROM MILWAUKEE COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
  
Scenario 3 differs from Scenario 2 only in its assumption that the health and human services 
function would remain with county government.  Because health and human services is by far 
the largest function in county government, however, that assumption changes the complexion of 
this scenario dramatically. 
 
Table 40 lists the functions that would be included in Milwaukee County government under 
Scenario 3 and the amount of actual expenditures and property tax levy associated with each 
function.  The total county budget under this scenario would have been just over $1 billion, a 
reduction of 24% from actual 2008 expenditures.  
 
Table 40: County Functional Expenses – Scenario 3 
Breakdown of county functions… All Exp Levy Legacy 
Legislative & 
executive 
• County executive $766,820 $749,306 $181,287 
• County board $4,418,287 $4,394,746 $530,913 
Central 
services 
• Community business development partners $712,289 $494,914 $64,746 
• Personnel review board $225,600 $225,578 $51,796 
• Civil service commission $53,639 $53,639 $25,898 
General 
government 
• County treasurer $1,342,309 ($950,813) $142,440 
• County clerk $850,920 $427,458 $103,593 
• Election commission $1,148,848 $1,055,758 $90,644 
• Register of deeds $4,385,345 $208,446 $414,371 
Judiciary & 
public safety 
• Courts $51,399,202 $40,560,428 $3,522,156 
• Sheriff $145,193,526 $122,572,004 $10,385,180 
• District attorney $19,109,930 $10,647,210 $1,139,521 
• Medical examiner $4,322,407 $3,658,303 $310,778 
Highway • Highway maintenance & transportation services $20,091,976 $583,704 $1,761,078 
Social services 
• Behavioral health division (only BHD) $175,064,628 $48,648,689 $11,628,949 
• GAMP payment & EMS $6,775,347 $5,654,201 $450,063 
• Dept of health and human services $211,481,786 $20,749,011 $841,692 
• Child support enforcement $18,696,449 $889,294 $1,307,859 
• Aging $19,044,230 $2,698,084 $130,321 
• CMO $198,570,114 $440,984 $1,358,826 
Debt service • Debt service (Total 2008 = exp 
$54,261,536/ levy = $43,072,369) 
$32,010,421 $25,409,614  
Revenues • State shared revenue (2008 - $37,133,490) ($26,911,349) 
• Sales tax revenue (2008 - $66,695,072) ($66,695,072) 
Retained 
legacy 
• Legacy related to departing depts $18,093,248 $18,093,248 
• Legacy related to Doyne retirees $13,790,794 $13,790,794 
Miscellaneous • Miscellaneous $66,882,642 ($13,773,304) $14,359,703 
Option 3 exp & levy $1,014,430,758 $181,790,833 $80,685,858 
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In considering the fiscal impacts of this scenario, we utilize similar assumptions as those outlined 
for Scenario 2.  For example, we assume that the offices of the county executive and county 
board would be reduced by the percentage that overall county expenditures are reduced.  The 
reduced budget would support a county board consisting of 14 members if supervisors retain 
full-time status.  Table 41 indicates the projected savings that would have occurred had this 
government structure been in place in 2008, as compared to the levy savings in Scenarios 1 and 
2.  Graph 5, meanwhile, shows legacy costs as a percentage of county expenditures in the new 
government structure. 
 
Table 41: Comparison of 2008 Levy Savings, Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 
  
Scenario 1: 
Levy savings 
Scenario 2: 
Levy savings 
Scenario 3: 
Levy savings 
County Executive ($831,826) ($656,711) ($284,628) 
County Board ($5,459,700) ($4,438,180) ($1,669,370) 
County Treasurer* ($1,185,901) -- -- 
County Clerk ($310,195) -- -- 
Election Commission ($1,155,025) -- -- 
Community Business Development Partners ($417,841) -- -- 
Personnel Review Board ($171,347) -- -- 
Civil Service Commission ($27,596) -- -- 
Total ($9,559,432) ($5,094,891) ($1,953,999) 
*Treasurer only includes expenditure savings.  Figures assume no revenue impact as revenue would likely be 
collected by an alternate entity. 
 
Graph 5: Legacy Obligation – Scenario 3 
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This analysis indicates that the legacy issues created by Scenarios 1 and 2 are not as severe for 
this scenario.  While legacy costs as a percentage of the county’s overall expenditure budget 
would be higher than they are today, they would not be substantially higher.  That is because 
transit system workers are not county employees, and because the overall size of the county 
budget would not shrink nearly as dramatically as under the other two scenarios.   
 
A rationale for this scenario would include the following: 
 
• It could be argued that the county’s severe financial challenges have had the greatest negative 
impact during the past two decades on parks, culture and transit in light of their discretionary 
status.  Consequently, there is appeal in separating those functions from county government 
in order to eliminate their uphill struggle to compete for scarce resources and restore the 
county’s focus to its mandated services. 
 
• If the four discretionary functions were transferred with similar functions from other counties 
into new regional authorities, then new administrative efficiencies might be created by 
consolidating functions administered at lower levels of government into higher levels.  Also, 
as discussed in Section II, an argument can be made that transit and aviation services are 
best provided on a regional level because of their significance to the regional economy and 
residents from throughout southeast Wisconsin; and that a regional parks and culture district 
is appropriate in light of the regional importance and usage of cultural amenities and several 
Milwaukee County parks.    
 
• In light of the considerable debt service obligations associated with parks and cultural 
facilities, a scenario in which debt service is transferred to a new authority would free up 
significant sales tax dollars that could enable the county to offset a considerable amount of its 
legacy obligations associated with those functions.  
 
• As with Scenario 2, this scenario would offer the opportunity to streamline the legislative and 
executive structure and transform the mission of county government into operating as a 
professionally administered service arm of the state.   
 
A negative is that while the legacy problem is not as severe under this scenario, it still exists.  As 
discussed in Section I, legacy costs would continue to grow during the next several years, and 
Scenario 3 would require them to be absorbed by a smaller government with far fewer 
employees and with less ability to charge out the cost to revenue-generating entities, such as the 
airport.  In addition, the policy-oriented and political arguments against the establishment of new 
authorities for parks, cultural and transportation functions that are outlined in Section II still 
would need to be addressed and/or overcome in order to pursue this scenario.          
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SECTION IV 
 
THE MASSACHUSETTS EXAMPLE 
 
 
  
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 137 
 
Previous discussion of a possible new 
government structure in Milwaukee 
County often has focused on the notion 
of combining the governments of the 
City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee 
County.  Two of the most commonly 
referenced examples of city-county 
consolidations are Indianapolis and 
Marion County, Indiana, which merged 
in 1969; and Louisville and Jefferson 
County, Kentucky, which merged in 
2003.   
It is important, however, not to confuse 
consolidation with the concept that is 
now being discussed by business leaders 
and the county executive in Milwaukee 
County.  In Indianapolis and Louisville, 
city and county governments merged to 
form a larger government that provides 
both traditional municipal and traditional 
county services to a county-wide 
population of citizens.  Efficiencies and 
dollar savings were pursued by merging 
administrative functions, eliminating one 
of two chief executive officers and 
consolidating legislative boards.  
Nevertheless, the same functions 
previously provided by each level of 
government still are provided at the local 
level, only by a single, unified entity. 
As the adjacent text box indicates, 
another alternative governance approach 
– employed most notably in the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul region – is metro 
governance.  That approach involves 
creating an additional level of 
government across an entire region that 
governs certain services as an alternative 
to counties or municipalities, but does 
not replace them.  
Here in Milwaukee, the concept under 
discussion would have the county 
transfer some of its existing services to 
the state, some to its various 
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR  
GOVERNANCE REFORM 
Shedding or diminishing a  layer of  local government can 
take  one  of  several  forms.    The  two  most  common 
methods  are  consolidation  and  metro  governance.  
Consolidation  focuses  on  eliminating  duplication  by 
sharing services.   Metro government  focuses on sharing 
governance across a region in order to balance disparities 
in  service.    The method  being  debated  and  researched 
here  in  Milwaukee  is  neither  consolidation  nor  metro 
governance.   
Consolidation reduces the number of governmental units 
active in a geographic area and is best exemplified by the 
case of Indianapolis.  The 1970 merger of governments in 
Marion County,  Indiana combined 57  local governments 
(22 cities and towns, 9 townships, 11 school districts, and 
15 special‐purpose districts) and one county government 
into  one  unit,  Unigov,  headed  by  the  mayor  of 
Indianapolis and a city‐county council.   Voters  in Marion 
County  never  voted whether  to merge with  the  city  of 
Indianapolis; the merger was a result of state legislation, 
which provides  for automatic consolidation of  first‐class 
cities  and  their  counties.    As  a  result,  all  residents  of 
Marion  County  vote  for  the mayor  and  the  city‐county 
council,  who  provide  all  services  and  governmental 
responsibilities  normally  mandated  to  county 
governments  in  Indiana.    These  services  are  funded  by 
county‐wide property tax revenues.   
The  prime  example  of  metro  governance  is  in  the 
Minneapolis‐St.  Paul  metro  area,  with  its  Twin  Cities 
Metropolitan Council providing regional governance.  The 
Council was created in 1967.  Its members are appointed 
by  the  governor  and  confirmed by  the  state  senate.    It 
has the ability to levy property taxes and issue bonds and 
performs governance functions and services of a regional 
nature,  such  as  land  use  and  transportation  planning, 
transit  services,  economic  development,  storm  water 
management  and  affordable  housing,  as  well  as 
facilitating shared services on  the  local  level.   While  the 
creation of the Council did not eliminate any other  level 
of government in the region, the statutory powers of the 
Council  do  supersede  the  powers  of  the municipal  and 
county  governments within  its  boundaries,  allowing  for 
enhanced regional decision‐making and cooperation.   
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municipalities, and others to newly formed authorities or districts.  In addition, according to a 
proposal put forward by the current county executive in the summer of 2009, the duties of 
constitutional officers such as the sheriff and register of deeds would remain with those offices, 
which would function independently from any other government.  Rather than creating one large 
government – such as Indianapolis’ UniGov – to provide both municipal and county services to 
residents of the county, the concept being discussed in Milwaukee County would create 
additional “mini” governments while turning back human services and courts to the state. 
In searching for examples of similar approaches elsewhere in the country, the closest and most 
recent we could find was Massachusetts, which in the late 1990s eliminated several of its county 
governments.  The Massachusetts example does not provide an exact parallel with the concept 
suggested for Milwaukee County because its counties had far fewer responsibilities to begin 
with, making elimination a far less complicated endeavor.  Nevertheless, this example does offer 
several important insights into how a significant level of government can be made to disappear. 
RATIONALE FOR ACTION 
 
County governments have never played a prominent role in Massachusetts, nor in other New 
England states.  As the Massachusetts Secretary of State’s web site puts it: 
“Generally speaking, New England states do not have as active a county government system as 
compared to the rest of the nation. In Massachusetts for example, state roads (usually numbered 
routes) are cared for by the state highway department (MassHighway), while individual 
communities care for non-state roads within their borders.  This can cause some confusion for 
folks who move here from other parts of the nation as the opposite appears true in their former 
home state.” 
Massachusetts has 14 counties, which according to the Massachusetts League of Women Voters 
(LWV) web site were “regional administrative districts before the Revolutionary War.”  The 
primary role of counties from that time until the 1970s primarily was to administer jails, health 
facilities, agricultural schools, registries of deeds and probate, county courts and courthouses, 
county roads and extension services.  
In 1978, the role of counties in Massachusetts was further diminished with enactment of 
legislation creating the Massachusetts Trial Court to administer trial courts statewide.  Before 
that time, all trial courts in the state either were county courts or local courts funded through the 
counties.  With adoption of this legislation, all trial court judges became state judges and 
received their salary and benefits from the state.  Also, a newly created state Administrative 
Office of the Trial Court took responsibility for a wide range of centralized functions, including 
budget development, central accounting and procurement systems and personnel policies.  The 
only remaining role for counties was ownership of the court buildings. 
Consideration of completely eliminating county governments in Massachusetts began in earnest 
shortly thereafter.  The LWV notes that “for many years, there was criticism of county 
governments as wasteful and inefficient.” In addition to being seen as duplicative, some county 
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governments also developed reputations for “cronyism and corruption, with a parade of veteran 
county officials caught on the take,” according to the Boston Globe.35  
This criticism accelerated as several counties experienced fiscal problems and turned to the state 
for emergency assistance in the early 1990s.  One county in particular – Middlesex County, the 
state’s largest with 1.4 million citizens – became the subject of public ridicule after defaulting on 
$4.6 million of hospital loans and teetering on the brink of bankruptcy.   
The push to eliminate county governments also was fueled by the state’s governor, William 
Weld, who was elected in 1990 and re-elected in 1994 in part on promises to rein in “big 
government” and eliminate unneeded layers of bureaucracy.  Weld began pushing to abolish 
some counties in his first term, and he first introduced legislation to abolish all counties in 
January 1996.  While the legislation initially did not fare well, by late 1996 momentum had built 
in support of it, driven largely by the chaos surrounding Middlesex County.  As the Globe 
editorialized in December 1996: 
“The coming bankruptcy of (Middlesex) county…will force the Legislature to consider 
something it should have done decades ago: abolish all the existing county governments so cities 
and towns can decide the shape of any future regional governments…Even though the counties 
are controlled by elected officials, few voters pay attention to county races, with the occasional 
exception of contests for sheriff and district attorney.  The few people who do care about county 
elections are the candidates’ friends and relatives and job supplicants.  The result is government 
that caters to the needs of the few at the expense of the common good….Governor Weld is ready 
to abolish the counties; it’s time for the Legislature to send him a bill to do so.”36   
LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
 
On January 7, 1997, Governor Weld and his Lieutenant Governor, Paul Cellucci, re-introduced 
legislation to abolish county governments.   
“Rather than learning to control spending within their means, the counties have developed kind 
of a chronic addiction to state bailouts,” Weld told the Globe.  “I think we’ve reached a 
consensus at the state level that this is a fifth wheel…that has outlived its usefulness, if it ever 
had one.”37 
The Globe noted that county government had become “costly for the state, which pays between 
85 percent and 90 percent of the costs of the 14 county governments,” and which had been 
forced to pay “an additional $25 million to bail out county governments 22 times over the past 
six years.”  It reported further that county governments had accumulated $45 million in debt and 
$125 million in unfunded pension liabilities despite the bailouts. 
 
 
                                                 
35 “State’s Counties are Failing Throughout Massachusetts”, Boston Globe, December 24, 1996. 
36 “The Woeful Counties”, Boston Globe, December 27, 1996. 
37 “Weld Bill Would Phase Out County Government”, Boston Globe, January 8, 1997. 
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Weld’s bill called for the following: 
• Abolition of county taxes as of July 1, 1998, unless the state auditor determined that a 
county’s liabilities exceeded its assets, in which case a county tax could be continued for up 
to 20 years to pay off the debt. 
• Transfer of the registries of deeds to the secretary of state’s office. 
• Retain elected sheriffs but move them under the State Executive Office of Public Safety, and 
convert Sheriff’s employees to state employees. 
Weld’s initial proposal in 1996 had been the subject of acrimonious debate in the Massachusetts 
Legislature, with several legislators contesting the notion that it would produce long-term cost 
savings.  Some county officials also opposed the transfer of county employees to the state health 
care plan, arguing that the state plan was “less flexible and more expensive than the one now in 
use.”38  While the new version enjoyed greater support, the House Ways and Means Committee 
“ultimately decided that the financial crisis in Middlesex County demands immediate attention, 
while there are too many unanswered questions about the other 13 counties.”39   
On July 11, 1997, Governor Weld signed legislation that immediately abolished Middlesex 
County, eliminated two more counties within one year, and put into place a series of mechanisms 
designed to lead to the abolishment of all county governments within two years.  While not as 
far-reaching as he would have liked, Weld declared that “the legislation that we are signing today 
is a good first step in eliminating a vestige of Massachusetts colonial government.”40 
Under the legislation, the state agreed to pay off $24.6 million in Middlesex County debt and 
assumed responsibility for its estimated $38 million in unfunded pension liabilities.  The 
legislation also empowered state officials to levy an annual assessment upon the property 
taxpayers of Middlesex County to pay off costs incurred by the state over a 30-year period (see 
the subsection below for more information about the mechanics of the legislation).     
Over the next two years, Massachusetts eliminated half of its 14 county governments.  Those 
eliminated were north and west of Boston, while those spared were south of Boston, including 
four small counties on Cape Cod.  The Globe pointed out in a 1999 article that “there was 
relatively little resistance” to the elimination of the seven to the north and west, as “some were 
facing financial crises, while others were discredited by scandal.  Many local officials in the 
central and western counties were eyeing forming new regional governments anyway to provide 
services in rural communities.”41  
Weld’s successor as governor, Cellucci, introduced a plan to eliminate two additional counties in 
1999, but the plan was successfully resisted by the Legislature.  The Globe pointed out that in 
contrast to the counties that had been eliminated previously, those counties “have been largely 
free of scandal and have not had any severe financial problems in recent years.  They offer a 
                                                 
38 “Massachusetts Governor Proposes Eliminating Counties,” County News, National Association of Counties, 
February 19, 1996. 
39 “Panel OK’s Bill to Abolish Middlesex County”, Boston Globe, June 12, 1997. 
40 “Weld Signs Law Ending all County Government”, Boston Herald, July 12, 1997.  
41 “Proposal to Scrap Counties Resisted”, Boston Globe, February 7, 1999. 
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number of locally popular programs, from agricultural extension services to mosquito spraying 
to forest firefighting units.”42   
While talk has surfaced occasionally since then of reviving the movement to eliminate county 
governments, no formal action has been taken.  When a candidate for the Legislature proposed 
abolishing Norfolk County – one of the largest remaining in the state – in 2006, the co-chairman 
of the Legislature’s Committee on Municipalities and Regional Government cited its “highway 
engineering and public safety dispatch systems as valuable services” and called it a “well-run 
regional government that provides benefits that towns otherwise couldn’t provide.”43  
MECHANICS OF MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
 
The process for abolishing counties is laid out in Chapter 34B of the General Laws of 
Massachusetts.  Of specific relevance to the discussion of abolishing Milwaukee County 
government are the following provisions: 
• All abolished counties’ functions, duties and responsibilities are transferred to the state, 
including operation and management of jails and houses of correction, registries of deeds and 
courthouses.  The law also stipulates that all employees whose work involves the operation 
and maintenance of county courthouses are transferred to the state “with no impairment of 
employment rights…without interruption of service, without loss of earned vacation and sick 
time, without reduction in compensation or salary grade, and without impairment of 
seniority, retirement or other rights of employees.” 
 
• For the most part, all “valid” liabilities and debts of an abolished county as of the date of 
abolishment are transferred to the state, while all assets (including revenue received 
immediately before the transfer date) also are transferred to the state.  Some specific 
exceptions are cited in the statute (e.g. the state agreed to allow one county to retain an 
historic courthouse for use by its regional council of government). 
 
• Included in the transfer of assets is “all rights, title and interest in real and personal property 
owned or held by an abolished county immediately before the transfer date.”  This includes 
county roads, but the law stipulates that those are then transferred back to the successor 
council of governments (if one exists) or to the town in which the road (or road segment) is 
located.  
 
• All “valid leases and contracts” held by the abolished county are transferred to the state, 
which also has authority to exercise all rights “and enjoy all interests” associated with such 
leases and contracts. 
 
• The Massachusetts Secretary of Administration and Finance is empowered to “establish a 
plan” for the state to recover “amounts expended…for the liabilities and other debts assumed 
and paid for” by the state on behalf of an abolished county.  The plan involves the following 
stipulations: 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 “Push to Scrap County System Revives Debate”, Boston Globe, June 1, 2006 
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o The secretary shall determine “said amounts by comparing the gross liabilities of an 
abolished county assumed by the commonwealth with the gross assets received by the 
commonwealth from said county and recovering the difference from the member 
municipalities of said counties.”   
 
o Liabilities shall specifically include, but not be limited to, the salary of the county 
treasurer, bonded debt and unfunded pension liabilities.   
 
o Specific assets include cash on hand at the time of transfer and the value of real estate 
transferred to the state (net any state dollars previously provided for the asset and 
state payments for debt service).   
 
o Real estate value is determined as 75% of the assessed value as of the transfer date, 
subject to adjustment if the state appraises the real estate at a higher value within four 
years.  Also, if the state sells any of the transferred property and realizes a greater 
sum than the value at which the property was assessed, then the difference is credited 
against the net liabilities of the county. 
 
o The secretary is charged with establishing an amortization schedule to recover any 
amounts expended by the state that reflect the difference between the gross liabilities 
and assets of the county.  The state treasurer is then empowered to assess upon each 
city and town of the abolished county a tax up to or equal to the county tax paid by 
each city or town in the year immediately preceding the county’s abolishment.    
 
• County treasurers are allowed to remain in office for the duration of their existing term, and 
then their positions are eliminated. 
 
• Registers of deeds are immediately transferred to the payroll of state government under the 
supervision of the secretary of state, but the position remains an elected position on a 
countywide basis.  Budgets for the registries are to be determined by the secretary of state 
(subject to appropriations).  Employees of register of deeds offices are immediately 
transferred to state employment with no change in union representation.  
 
• Sheriffs also are immediately transferred to the state payroll and continue to be elected by the 
citizens of the county in which they preside.  Unlike the registers of deeds, sheriffs retain 
administrative and operational control of their office and jail/house of correction.  All 
deputies, jailers, superintendents and other employees are transferred to the state payroll with 
“no impairment of employment rights” held immediately preceding the transfer. 
 
• An abolished county’s retirees and inactive members as of the date of abolishment become 
members of the regional retirement system, which is responsible for any unfunded liabilities 
attributable to the service of such individuals.  In Massachusetts, a primary responsibility of 
counties previously had been to administer a regional retirement system for their employees 
and municipal employees from within their counties.  The legislation stipulates that those 
regional retirement systems remain in existence, though they are no longer part of county 
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government and instead are managed by a new retirement board, whose membership is 
specified in the legislation.   
 
• Employees of an abolished county who become state employees join the state retirement 
system.  The state system picks up all liabilities associated with those employees, but those 
liabilities are then subject to recovery from county taxpayers per the mechanisms described 
above.  Also, the accumulated deductions and employer contribution (including interest) 
credited to the accounts of members who switch from a county system to the state system are 
credited to members’ accounts in the state system.  Finally, there are provisions to assure that 
the amount of assets transferred between the two systems maintains a funded ratio for active 
employees in the regional retirement system that is no less than the funded ratio prior to the 
transfer.  The law further stipulates that any calculations performed to carry out these 
provisions be performed by the actuary that performed the most recent valuation of the 
regional retirement system using the same assumptions previously utilized.  
 
• Cities and towns within or contiguous to abolished counties are authorized to vote to join a 
regional charter commission.  Each such city and town can then send a representative to the 
commission, which is empowered to design a charter proposal recommending establishment 
of a regional council of government.  That charter must then be placed before the voters of 
each individual city or town whose leaders wish it to join the regional council of government.  
 
• The regional council of government is envisioned as an entity that would provide certain 
government services on a regional basis, somewhat similar to the role counties previously 
played.  However, the voters of each city and town would have to vote to take part in the 
council, and each represented municipality that did so would then elect one individual to 
serve as its representative on the council.  The council would decide on an annual budget, 
including assessment of fees or assessments, acceptance of grants, and other revenue sources.  
The council is authorized to provide any government services it so chooses – whether 
previously provided by the county government or not – with the exception of services 
specifically transferred from counties to the state.  Also, the council is forbidden from 
levying a county-wide tax.     
INSIGHTS FOR MILWAUKEE COUNTY 
 
As noted at the beginning of this section, any comparison between Massachusetts’ efforts to 
eliminate its county governments and a potential effort to eliminate Milwaukee County 
government must be tempered by the realization that Milwaukee County provides far more 
services, has many more employees and retirees, owns much more real estate and property, and 
possesses much larger liabilities than any Massachusetts county.  Consequently, in terms of both 
logistics and legal/political issues, the challenges faced by those desiring to undertake such an 
endeavor in Milwaukee would be far more daunting and take considerably more time to address. 
Nevertheless, the Massachusetts approach includes some interesting elements that could be 
relevant not only to the discussion of abolishing Milwaukee County government, but also to 
discussion about removing only some of its functions or leaving it largely as is.  The remainder 
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of this section discusses those elements of the Massachusetts example that are deemed most 
relevant to the discussion of downsizing or eliminating Milwaukee County government.   
TREATMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICERS   
 
Massachusetts utilized three different approaches for three positions that are constitutional 
officers in Wisconsin: it transferred the register of deeds and that office’s employees to the state 
payroll, and specified that while the position still would be elected on a countywide basis, it 
would be part of the secretary of state’s office and under the domain of the secretary; it 
transferred the sheriff and that office’s employees to the state payroll, also specified that the 
position would be elected on a countywide basis, but allowed the sheriff to retain full 
administrative control of his operations (with appropriations established by legislators as part of 
the state budget); and it allowed the treasurer to remain in office for the remainder of his term to 
tend to fiscal matters still impacting the county, but then abolished the position. 
Each of those approaches could have applicability to Milwaukee County’s constitutional officers, 
which also include the clerk of circuit court, district attorney (who is already a state employee) 
and county clerk.  If policymakers decided to remove the positions from county government 
(either because county government was being eliminated or for other reasons), it would be 
fiscally prudent to avoid requiring each office to establish its own internal services apparatus to 
provide human resources, accounting, information technology, etc.  Housing each office in a 
state government department could accomplish that goal.   
In terms of budgetary control, if the constitutional officers were to remain as freestanding 
independent offices, it likely would be necessary to grant each with some form of taxation 
authority or a dedicated revenue source (e.g. the register of deeds office could be funded with 
some of the proceeds from the real estate transfer fee).  However, if each instead was assigned to 
a state government department, budgets and revenue sources would be established as part of the 
state budget process, which could ensure greater fiscal oversight and accountability. 
Some may argue that while placing the constitutional officers in state departments would be 
appropriate from a fiscal perspective, it would be inappropriate to have some or all of these 
officers relinquish programmatic autonomy to state officials.  If that were the case, then for those 
positions in which administrative autonomy was deemed programmatically and/or legally 
necessary and appropriate, administrative control over operations could be granted to the 
constitutional officer similar to the manner in which sheriffs are granted such authority in 
Massachusetts.   
Finally, similar to Massachusetts’ approach with the treasurer position, Wisconsin policymakers 
could consider eliminating certain constitutional officers after a transition period should 
Milwaukee County government be eliminated.  In particular, as discussed elsewhere in this 
report, the treasurer and county clerk positions would appear to be unnecessary under such a 
scenario.  If the state took over all court functions in the county, then it also might be logical to 
abolish the clerk of circuit court position, or simply to make it an unelected state position.  Under 
each of those scenarios, of course, the Wisconsin Constitution likely would need to be amended. 
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TREATMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
 
As discussed throughout this report, the determination of how to value assets and liabilities that 
would be shifted to other governments – and the corresponding determination of who would pay 
for differences between the two – poses one of the most challenging aspects of any move to 
downsize or eliminate Milwaukee County government.  In Massachusetts, the solution was to lay 
out a relatively prescriptive process in state statutes and then entrust the state director of 
administration to carry out the process in an impartial manner. 
The prescriptive process – as described above – essentially called for creation of a balance sheet 
in which liabilities of the former county government would be listed and valued on one side, and 
assets on the other.  A methodology for valuing real estate assets was established in the 
legislation, as was an approach for determining pension-related liabilities.  Upon determining the 
net cost to the state (i.e. the value of liabilities incurred in excess of assets obtained), the 
secretary of administration was empowered to develop a schedule under which the state would 
be fully reimbursed over a period of several years via an assessment on taxpayers of the former 
county.  The length of the reimbursement period was to be determined by the secretary with the 
stipulation that county taxpayers would never pay an annual assessment that was greater than the 
amount they had been taxed by the county government in its last year of existence. 
The adoption of such an approach in Milwaukee County could be considerably more contentious 
than it was in Massachusetts, as county elected officials and citizens would need to place 
considerable faith in state government to treat it equitably.  In light of the acrimony that has 
characterized the state-county relationship in Milwaukee over the years, this leap of faith could 
be bitterly contested at the local level.   
There is precedence for such an approach on a smaller scale, however, with the state takeover of 
child welfare services early in the decade and its more recent takeover of income maintenance 
services.  In both cases, financial agreements on matters such as the county’s continuing property 
tax levy contributions to the programs were not subject to negotiation, but instead were largely 
dictated by the state.  If attempted on a larger scale, it would be similarly difficult to imagine a 
true negotiation between the state and county given the multitude of complicated issues that 
would be involved and the unlikely prospect that those could be successfully negotiated on a 
timely basis without one party being in charge.  A key question is whether such an approach 
would be accepted by citizens and local policymakers in Milwaukee County and, if not, whether 
they and their elected representatives at the state level could successfully oppose it. 
Notwithstanding the policy and political issues involved, an approach in which the state would 
tally assets and liabilities of the county and attempt to reimburse itself for any net costs incurred 
could produce benefits to county taxpayers.  For example, while Milwaukee County obviously is 
saddled with huge retirement liabilities, it also possesses significant real estate assets that might 
be leveraged by the state to pay down those costs if county government ceased to exist.   
In particular, the elimination of central administrative staff and transfer of parks, public works 
and social services personnel to other entities could free up considerable county office space.  
While most of the former county functions still would be provided by other entities that would 
have space needs of their own, there still could be considerable opportunity for significant 
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consolidation at the courthouse (which presumably still would be the appropriate location for 
circuit court functions) and at county-owned buildings that have the least re-sale value (e.g. the 
Marcia P. Coggs Human Services Building).  That, in turn, could free up more valuable real 
estate on the County Grounds (e.g. Children’s Court, Parks Administration or excess Mental 
Health Complex space) for possible sale or lease.   
Other potential sale or lease opportunities include parking structures (e.g. O’Donnell Park and 6th 
and State), cultural facilities (e.g. the Milwaukee Public Museum and Marcus Center for the 
Performing Arts to the non-profit organizations that currently run them) and, of course, General 
Mitchell International Airport.   
The appropriate ownership of these facilities should county government cease to exist obviously 
is a complex question.  What is clear, however, is that while the county board has shown little 
disposition to consider sale or lease strategies on its own despite its fiscal challenges, state 
government officials would have less reason to retain control of such assets if they ended up in 
the state’s hands as part of an elimination plan, and they would have significant incentive to sell 
or lease parcels that hold the most value in order to reduce the assessment burden on county 
taxpayers.  
TREATMENT OF PENSION BENEFITS AND FUNDING 
 
Massachusetts implemented dual strategies for addressing the pension-related issues created by 
elimination of counties: it moved those employees transferred to the state payroll to the state 
retirement system, and left the regional retirement system in place to continue to serve retirees 
and inactive members.  Both strategies hold relevance for the Milwaukee County discussion. 
With regard to active Milwaukee County employees who are transferred to the state, new 
regional authorities, or municipal governments other than the City of Milwaukee, it may be most 
logical for those employees simply to become part of the state retirement system (which 
currently houses all county and municipal workers in the state except those working for 
Milwaukee County and the City, both of which administer their own systems).  County workers 
who are transferred to the City of Milwaukee logically would become part of that system. 
Like the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the State of Wisconsin and City of Milwaukee 
undoubtedly would want to be held harmless for any unfunded pension liabilities associated with 
former county workers.  Consequently, a calculation similar to that prescribed in the 
Massachusetts legislation could be established, under which the cost of the liability for 
transferred workers could be calculated by the county’s pension fund actuary and county 
taxpayers would be assessed for that cost over a period of years.  In the case of those transferred 
to the state, the liability would be added to the overall calculation of county liabilities performed 
by the secretary of administration.  In the case of those transferred to the city, a separate 
arrangement would need to be worked out. 
The treatment of Milwaukee County retirees and inactive vested employees could be more 
difficult to reconcile given the even more significant dollar amounts involved and the lack of a 
logical home for their pension earnings and liabilities. In Massachusetts, the solution to retain the 
former county pension system and transform it into a regional system was simplified by the fact 
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that the system included municipal workers – as well as county workers – and therefore needed 
to exist in some form after elimination of the county government.   
While that is not the case in Milwaukee County, it still might be logical and desirable simply to 
maintain the existing county retirement system and have it professionally managed by an 
appointed board until such time as it is no longer needed because all members and their 
dependents are deceased.  Under such an approach, the board could be appointed by the state 
and/or former constitutional officers and municipal officials.  It could be empowered to oversee 
fund investments and levy an assessment on county taxpayers for any annual actuarially 
determined unfunded liability payment and/or debt service payment on existing pension 
obligation bonds (POBs).  The liability could be reduced from the sale or lease of county assets, 
which could be credited both to the system and to the net liability calculated by the secretary of 
administration based on a ratio of the size of the pension fund liability to the total net liability. 
This overall approach is one that county and/or state officials may wish to contemplate 
regardless of whether Milwaukee County government is abolished.  After the county pension 
scandal emerged in 2002, some policymakers discussed ending the county retirement system and 
moving all county employees and retirees into the state system.  While this idea was not 
embraced at the time by either the state or county, its reconsideration may be in order in light of 
the size of the unfunded liability and the extent to which it is negatively impacting every county 
service. 
Indeed, there may be logic to the notion of immediately closing the county retirement system to 
new members and additional employee earnings, turning it over to a group of appointed 
managers to administer, and empowering them to assess county taxpayers for any liability/POB 
payments as a separate line item on the annual property tax bill. In this manner, the cost of this 
liability would be removed from county government per se, thereby allowing county services to 
be managed free from the crushing weight of pension liabilities.  While county taxpayers still 
would be required to fund the liability, they would do so with the knowledge that it would 
gradually be eliminated over time.   
In the meantime, under such an approach, all existing county employees would become members 
of the state retirement system and any future benefits earned would be at the reduced (but still 
generous) level enjoyed by state employees.  Previously accrued pension earnings and liabilities 
for these active workers could be transferred to the state (though this may be subject to legal 
challenge), which could be empowered to deduct any annual cost associated with the net liability 
from shared revenue payments or other state aids.              
REGIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENT 
 
Another intriguing component of the Massachusetts approach was its mechanism to allow the 
cities and towns of counties whose governments had been eliminated to form regional councils 
of government to provide shared services.  According to a Massachusetts state senator 
interviewed for this report, this mechanism reflected a belief by many who supported eliminating 
county governments that regional service delivery still made sense in many instances.  Their 
objection was to having a county government with its own elected officials, political bureaucracy 
and taxing authority to administer those services. 
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The key differences between a regional council of governments and a county government, as laid 
out by the Massachusetts Legislature and later implemented in some regions, are as follows: 
1. Each municipality within the former county (or other municipalities contiguous to it) 
could “opt in” per a vote of their citizens, but was not required to have services 
performed by the regional council. 
 
2. The council consists of one member from each participating municipality voted in by 
the citizens of that municipality, as opposed to county commissioners voted in 
countywide.  These council members presumably would not have staff and would not 
constitute a legislative branch of government that required legislative support services, 
etc. 
 
3. The council would decide for itself what services it wished to provide (as opposed to 
having certain services mandated by the state) and would determine how to pay for 
those services, but only could assess citizens from municipalities that had opted in, as 
opposed to all of the county’s citizens. 
 
4. Mechanisms were established whereby a participating municipality could “opt out” if it 
was not satisfied with its participation. 
It is critical to note that in practice, the only regional councils formed in Massachusetts to 
succeed county governments have been in rural areas of the state, as more densely populated 
municipalities in urban counties opted to provide services on their own.  This might call into 
question whether such an approach would be attractive to Milwaukee County municipalities, 
which already provide a wide range of municipal services and may elect to  keep things that way 
even if required to adopt some former county services (such as county trunk highway 
maintenance) should the county cease to exist. 
However, it is clear that there are a broad range of municipal services for which such an 
approach might be warranted, such as public health, general road and street maintenance, 
housing, economic development, local parks maintenance and even special public safety 
services.  The combination of the county’s elimination and the need to identify efficiencies in the 
face of significant budget challenges of their own could spur some Milwaukee County 
municipalities to consider a regional council approach, particularly given the existence of an 
Intergovernmental Cooperation Council that already has spearheaded some shared service 
initiatives. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the much smaller scope of county governments in Massachusetts, the Massachusetts 
experience demonstrates that the daunting logistical challenges associated with eliminating a 
significant level of government can be met successfully if the political resolve exists to do so.  It 
is critical to recognize, however, that in Massachusetts, that resolve came from the governor and 
state legislative leaders, who not only led the push to abolish counties, but also established a 
framework that put the state firmly in charge of the mechanics of the dissolution.   While 
ensuring that the process of dismantling counties would not be bogged down by state-local 
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conflict, that approach left state policymakers accountable for any potential political backlash 
from county taxpayers and added another set of complicated and contentious issues to state 
government’s agenda.   
Elimination of counties in Massachusetts did remain a controversial issue well after adoption of 
the 1997 legislation.  For example, according to the Boston Globe, when the Legislature 
considered a bill to finalize the elimination of Essex County in 1998, the Senate reversed course 
from the earlier legislation and favored having the state assume the retirement costs of county 
retirees.44  After the House rejected that approach, the two bodies agreed on a compromise under 
which the state would foot the initial bill and assess the county communities for reimbursement 
over a 30-year period (similar to the original framework established the previous year).  
Governor Cellucci then vetoed the compromise, creating panic among the county’s 34 cities and 
towns that they would have to assume immediate responsibility for the liability.  After some 
significant additional legislative tussling, the original compromise was adopted. 
Not only did the details of eliminating county governments remain contentious for months, but 
the overall wisdom of the approach also continues to be debated.  A Globe op ed piece penned 
by a state university professor in 2006 argued that elimination of counties had placed 
Massachusetts outside of the mainstream of government reform. 
“It (is) hard to explain why Massachusetts has pretty much dismantled county government as 
another wasteful example of too much government.  What continues to dominate the governing 
scene in Massachusetts are cities and small towns – 351 of them, in fact – with a full range of 
services and people to run those services…not surprisingly, the cost of keeping small-size 
government with all these services continues to rise, in large part because regionalization and 
consolidation have little support. While the corporate world is awash in mergers and cost 
efficiency brought about by consolidation, Massachusetts holds true to local government 
operations.”45 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether elimination of counties in 
Massachusetts turned out to be a success or failure, a primary lesson learned is that under-
taking a government reform that is so complex and contentious requires resolute leader-
ship from state government and a willingness by the state to devote considerable human 
resources and an up-front financial investment to the endeavor.   In Milwaukee County, the 
current county executive has expressed support for abolishing county government, but the 
governor and legislative leaders thus far have been largely absent from any discussion about 
significant downsizing or outright elimination.  The Massachusetts example teaches us that state 
elected officials not only would have to be in on the discussion, but they would have to lead it. 
  
                                                 
44 “County Pension Issue is a Nagging Concern for 19 Towns in Essex”, Boston Globe, March 21, 1999. 
45 Kryzanek, Michael, “Could County System Work Here”, Boston Globe, May 11, 2006. 
   Should It Stay or Should It Go? 
Page 150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION V  
 
FINDINGS AND POLICY OPTIONS  
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FINDINGS 
 
As stated in the introduction, the overall intent of this report is to provide community leaders and 
elected officials with a level of analysis that will allow them to reasonably debate whether 
downsizing or eliminating Milwaukee County government is a viable and desired option.  The 
following is a brief summary of the report’s major findings:  
 
• Retiree fringe benefit liabilities are a legal obligation and must be financed regardless 
of any county governance change that may (or may not) be implemented.  The county’s 
pension and health care expenditures nearly tripled during the first eight years of this decade, 
from $67 million in 2000 to $179 million in 2008.  About 46% of those costs are “legacy 
costs” attributed to retirees.  Retiree fringe benefit increases will continue to accumulate in 
future years, driven by unfunded pension liabilities and the rising cost of health care, and will 
continue to have a huge impact on county taxpayers for the foreseeable future.  Prompt action 
is needed to isolate and control those costs. 
 
• The treatment of the county’s fringe benefit obligations would be a key factor in 
reorganization deliberations.  If consensus was achieved to remove certain functions from 
Milwaukee County government, the magnitude of the retiree legacy liabilities attached to 
such functions makes it unlikely that any other government would readily accept them.  
Moving those functions to another government while leaving their associated legacy 
liabilities with the county, however, could result in a much smaller county government even 
less capable of affording its legacy-related costs.   
 
• Milwaukee County operates a vast array of diverse programs that must compete for a 
shrinking set of resources.  Milwaukee County was created as an “administrative arm” to 
manage programs locally on behalf of the state, but it has taken on significant discretionary 
programs over the years.  This creates a level of competition for county taxpayer resources 
among diverse programs that is somewhat unique and that perhaps was not intended by those 
who founded Milwaukee County’s current governance structure.   
 
• Transferring functions like parks and transit to special districts with a dedicated 
funding source would enhance funding stability but also would produce new 
government bodies with their own funding demands.  In other states, the primary rationale 
for creating special districts has been to provide services more effectively at a regional level 
and/or to prevent certain services from being negatively affected by the budget difficulties 
facing a municipal or county government.  Before taking a similar approach, Milwaukee 
County citizens should weigh the potential for stable funding and better quality versus the 
creation of new, independent government bodies that claim a share of taxpayer resources.  
Citizens also should weigh the potential benefits of creating a streamlined county 
government that is able to focus solely on its mandated services. 
 
• Potential savings associated with government restructuring are difficult to measure 
precisely but merit further exploration. Restructuring could produce several sources of 
potential savings that could not be quantified in this report.  Those include reduced overhead 
costs, profits from liquidating unneeded buildings and equipment, and the opportunity to 
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negotiate lower wage and benefit costs.  The report models three restructuring scenarios and 
reports savings that can be reliably estimated ranging from $2 million to $9.6 million 
annually. Restructuring also could produce new possibilities for funding the county’s long-
term liabilities if state elected officials create new funding sources for transferred functions 
while allowing existing county revenue streams to remain intact.  In particular, the county’s 
.5% sales tax could be a funding contributor to its legacy obligations if it is no longer 
responsible for debt service on physical assets transferred to the state or special districts.     
 
• Massachusetts overcame similar (though much smaller-scale) complexities to eliminate 
several county governments and could be a model for how such an endeavor might be 
undertaken in Milwaukee.  The Massachusetts example also demonstrates the extraordinary 
amount of leadership, resources and attention that would be required by state government. 
 
POLICY OPTIONS 
 
While governance reform promises to be complicated and in need of strong state leadership, 
local leaders should not abandon efforts to pursue comprehensive structural change in 
Milwaukee County government.  On the contrary, the county’s fiscal condition demands 
consideration of structural change, though the specific shape of such change should weigh the 
findings contained in this report and needs to be addressed on a function-by-function basis.   
In the meantime, a set of critical issues has emerged from this and previous Public Policy Forum 
analyses that require immediate decision-making regardless of whether and what type of 
governance changes are pursued.   
 
DECISION 1: THE FUTURE OF DISCRETIONARY COUNTY PROGRAMS 
 
As far back as 1996, the Milwaukee County Commission for the 21st Century raised serious 
concern about Milwaukee County’s ability to provide sufficient resources for services other than 
those specifically mandated by state government.  Today, it could be argued that unsustainable 
budget strategies are the only means through which the county is able to provide its three major 
areas of property tax-funded discretionary services (parks, zoo/cultural facilities and transit).   
   
Those strategies include depletion of reserves and deferral of bus purchases – combined with use 
of one-time stimulus funds – to temporarily avert a gaping structural deficit in the transit system 
budget; and enactment of sizeable property tax levy cuts and deferral of major maintenance in 
parks and cultural facilities, which cannot continue without causing severe degradation to those 
facilities.  In addition, discretionary functions benefited from the downsizing and gradual 
elimination of GAMP – a fourth major discretionary program.   
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Now, having exhausted those strategies, and facing 
the likelihood of continued cuts or flat funding from 
the state for mandated programs, the county cannot 
continue to provide these discretionary services at a 
level even approximating the expectations of their 
users while also accommodating its growing legacy 
costs.  Simply put, county government and its 
citizens are at a crossroads.  They can choose to 
dramatically increase property tax levy support for 
parks, cultural and transit services; identify new 
sources of revenue to support those services; or 
accept a significant decline in their breadth and 
quality. 
The urgency of this situation obviously has not been 
lost on several county and state elected officials, 
who have been pushing for a dedicated sales tax for 
some or all of these functions.  Nor has that urgency 
been lost on a majority of the county’s voters, who 
supported an advisory referendum calling for a 1% 
sales tax for parks, culture, transit and Emergency 
Medical Services (with some offsetting property tax 
relief) in November 2008. 
To date, however, the sales tax debate has largely 
ignored how a dedicated funding source for 
discretionary programs could impact the severe 
budget issues facing other county services.  Indeed, 
how the nearly $130 million in annual revenue from 
the proposed sales tax specifically would be 
allocated to the discretionary services for which it is 
intended – and how those specific uses would 
impact the county’s larger fiscal issues – has not 
been discussed (see adjacent sidebar). 
The decision on how to fund parks, cultural 
facilities and transit must be made soon, and should 
be considered in the larger context of how to 
address county government’s overall fiscal 
challenges.  At the same time, it also could be the 
starting point for the necessary debate on the 
county’s long-term governance structure.       
This report shows there is not a clear-cut resolution 
to the issue of where to house the discretionary 
functions.  Transferring functions into special districts is not likely to significantly reduce their 
costs, which means a value judgment must be made as to whether certain sets of services are 
USING THE SALES TAX 
While proposals for dedicated sales taxes 
have been debated in Madison and put to 
voters, specific details on how the dollars 
would be allocated, how they would be 
restricted, and how they potentially would be 
offset with property tax decreases have been 
lacking.  Such details, however, may be critical 
to the county’s larger fiscal issues, as 
illustrated by a hypothetical approach that 
could be taken with regard to a proposed half‐
cent sales tax for parks and culture.   
As this report has discussed, the county 
assigns legacy costs to departments based on 
their number of active employees, as opposed 
to actual legacy costs associated with the 
retirees of that department.  Debt service, 
meanwhile, is not charged to most individual 
departments, but is budgeted in a separate 
organizational unit.  If, after adoption of a 
half‐cent sales tax for parks and culture, the 
county elected to change its legacy 
methodology to charge departments based on 
their own retirees, and to use revenue from 
the new tax to pay for both legacy costs and 
parks and culture‐related debt service, then 
more than a third of the estimated $65 million 
in new revenue would be used up without 
paying for a single additional parks worker or 
repairing a single playground.   
While such a scenario likely would not sit well 
with parks supporters, it might represent the 
optimal scenario for those who are most 
concerned with addressing the county’s 
structural deficit.  Indeed, the county’s 
financial picture would benefit greatly from 
the above scenario, which could free up about 
$5 million in property tax levy annually and 
nearly $20 million of revenue from the 
county’s existing half‐cent sales tax to pay for 
other needs. 
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sufficiently important or distinct from the primary mission of county government to justify not 
only their own segregated funding sources, but also separate governance.  Whether the services 
might be more effectively delivered on a multi-county regional basis also should factor into the 
equation, as should consideration of whether other counties have interest in such an approach. 
From the perspective of the county’s governance challenges, another question emerges: Could a 
reduction in the size and scope of Milwaukee County government, while not solving its fiscal 
problems, produce less political and more professional governance that would lead to better 
planning and decision-making?   
We have observed that other county and municipal governments in southeast Wisconsin 
generally function with greater focus and far less acrimony than Milwaukee County.  Whether 
this greater cohesion and problem-solving capacity is linked to size and structure needs to be 
contemplated.  
 
When we look at other county governments that do not administer transit systems, airports, 
comprehensive parks systems and regional cultural attractions – in other words, county 
governments whose primary focus is to effectively manage services as an administrative arm of 
state government – we see: 
 
• Greater emphasis on hiring professional administrators and greater deference to those 
administrators. 
 
• Greater focus on nuts-and-bolts administrative strategies – how to more effectively reduce 
jail populations, process individuals through the courts, achieve higher bond ratings, fill 
potholes – and less ideological debate. 
 
• Greater emphasis on broad program oversight and program outcomes, and far less on 
program mechanics, staffing and contracts.            
 
Consequently, the debate over how to pay for discretionary functions also must ask whether 
removing those functions and redesigning the administrative and legislative structure accordingly 
(as described in Section III) would produce the focused and professional approach to 
governance that is required to right the county’s financial ship.   
 
In the end, of course, creating a streamlined county government that focuses only on its state 
mandates might lead, as it did in Massachusetts, to more rigorous debate about the need for 
county government at all.  In the meantime, it would provide actual experience with which to 
evaluate the pros and cons of streamlining versus elimination, and to engage state government 
about the practical and political efficacy of its takeover of remaining human service, courts and 
public safety functions in Milwaukee County. 
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DECISION 2: ISOLATE AND CONTROL LEGACY COSTS 
 
Whether or not they pursue major organizational change, Milwaukee County leaders would be 
wise to consider a shift in philosophy and methodology with regard to legacy costs.  That shift 
would reflect the fact that legacy costs are a legal obligation to past employees that must be met 
(notwithstanding reasonable efforts to reduce it), but that must not impact the effectiveness of 
government functions without consideration of programmatic needs and priorities.  Different 
options and considerations for pursuing such a shift are discussed below.    
Pension Liability 
 
A September 2002 Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau (LAB) report examined ending the 
county pension system and shifting county employees and retirees to the Wisconsin Retirement 
System (WRS).  While that option was not pursued largely because of its legal, financial and 
administrative complexity, its reconsideration may be warranted.   
In light of previous legal opinions, and per the Massachusetts example, instead of attempting to 
shift the entire county pension system to the WRS, policymakers could consider closing the 
county pension system but only shifting future costs and liabilities to the state system.  All new 
employees, plus all future pension earnings of existing employees, would be covered by the 
WRS, thereby not impacting retirement benefits previously earned.  The assets and liabilities 
associated with existing workers also could be shifted into the WRS, which then could assess the 
county annually to cover the actuarially determined liability and normal costs.  Meanwhile, the 
existing county pension fund could be professionally managed until it eventually faded away.   
This approach not only could produce long-term savings for the county, but it also could enable 
the county to finally get past its 2000-2001 pension scandal.  Shutting down the county pension 
system might make it easier for taxpayers to understand and accept the notion of paying off its 
liabilities.  While the cost of the liabilities would not be diminished, taxpayers could take 
comfort in the knowledge that, barring future investment losses, they would not grow and the 
legally required payments eventually would disappear.    
Another approach could be to establish a defined contribution plan (i.e. 401(k)-type approach) 
for new county employees and for future pension benefits earned by existing employees.  Again, 
this might entail closing the existing pension fund and isolating and managing it under the 
existing or a new management structure.  A new defined contribution fund then could be 
established to manage employer and employee contributions under the new plan.       
Pursuit of either option likely would be contingent upon collective bargaining and require 
significant administrative deliberation.  In addition, removal of active members and their pension 
assets and liabilities from the existing pension fund could draw legal challenges, and could 
require the county to weigh larger near-term contributions to the remaining fund.  Nonetheless, 
the WRS has absorbed other public pension funds over the years, so the task is not impossible.  
While it explores those more complex options, the county might meanwhile consider the simple 
act of isolating the legacy share of its annual pension costs and determining how to address those 
costs centrally.  As discussed previously, this would help ensure that the county copes with 
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legacy costs based on its priorities and its legal mandates, as opposed to allocating those costs to 
departments at the beginning of the budget process as if they were directly related to 
departmental operations.   
Retiree Health Care 
 
Similar to pension costs and for the reasons discussed above, the county could benefit from 
isolating health care costs and liabilities associated with retired employees and addressing those 
costs centrally.  There are also other reasons to consider such a move.  First, separating those 
costs from other health care costs would allow for the singular, priority focus they deserve.  As 
noted earlier in this report, annual health care costs for retirees are nearly equivalent to those for 
active employees, and they are projected to grow dramatically for several years.  Because many 
retirees are not required to pay a share of health care premiums, strategies utilized to control 
costs for employees have had limited impact on the retiree population, yet that population has not 
received specialized focus by policymakers or as part of collective bargaining. 
In addition, isolating the retiree health care liability could encourage greater focus on potential 
long-term fiscal management options.  The $1.5 billion retiree health care liability discussed in 
Section I has not received much attention from county officials because of its pay-as-you-go 
status.  Hence, in contrast to the county’s pension bonding strategy, which resulted from lengthy 
deliberation regarding management of long-term pension liabilities, similar long-term financing 
strategies for addressing the retiree health liability have received little consideration. 
Finally, just as consideration could be given to combining elements of the county and state 
pension systems, county and state officials could explore requiring county employees and 
retirees to access health insurance through the state’s employee health care plans. Under such an 
arrangement, the county undoubtedly would be required to reimburse the state for the cost of 
such coverage, but it is possible that purchasing health insurance in this manner would be less 
expensive than its existing self-insured arrangement.           
Exploring Legacy Benefit Modifications   
 
Based on Milwaukee County’s previous judgment that little can be done legally to modify 
retirement benefits already earned by its employees, this report assumes that whether or not 
county government is restructured or eliminated, legacy liabilities are unlikely to be reduced 
significantly and will need to be paid. 
In light of the substantial and escalating impact of those liabilities, however, possibilities for 
reducing the cost of previously earned county retirement benefits should be re-evaluated.  Any 
such consideration must take into account not only the legal ramifications, but the moral 
implications associated with such action.  Indeed, a compelling argument can be made that 
retirement benefits earned by county workers during their employment reflect a promise that 
should not be modified or broken.  From a fiscal management standpoint, however, putting that 
question on the table is necessary and appropriate.     
In 2002, the Greater Milwaukee Committee convened a special committee to explore options for 
improving administrative oversight of the county’s pension system and reducing its costs.  Broad 
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recommendations were made regarding procedural matters, some of which have been adopted 
and have improved oversight, but none of which produced changes to benefit levels for groups 
other than new employees. 
Since 2002, the county has seen the prosecution of a key county pension official and settlement 
of its lawsuit against the pension board actuary, and it has adopted reductions in prospective 
pension earnings for non-union employees.  Those actions may have altered the legal landscape.  
Furthermore, the cost of retiree health benefits was not considered by the 2002 committee, and a 
recent court ruling involving City of Milwaukee retiree health care benefits may have altered the 
legal landscape in that area as well.   
Those factors suggest the time may be ripe for civic leaders to consider enlisting the best legal, 
actuarial and employee benefits professionals from Milwaukee’s private sector to form a new 
task force to assist the county in re-exploring possibilities for reducing its legacy costs.  
Alternatively, or perhaps in addition to such an effort, the county could retain outside legal 
counsel to review both its own previous legal opinions and recent legal developments.   
DECISION 3: A PLAN FOR THE COUNTY’S PHYSICAL ASSETS/INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
A private business faced with growing post-retirement liabilities that are wreaking havoc on its 
annual balance sheet first would seek to address the factors that are causing those liabilities to 
grow.  Next, it likely would take stock of its assets and contemplate how those might be 
strategically utilized to reduce annual operating costs or pay down its liabilities.  In light of the 
impact Milwaukee County’s legacy costs are having on its fiscal health, it would be logical for it 
to consider a similar approach.     
The discussion in Section IV explains that if county government was eliminated, such an 
approach would be guaranteed.  If, as occurred in Massachusetts, the county’s physical assets 
(with the exception of those transferred to new authorities) were turned over to state government, 
then the state logically would seek to determine in a strategic manner which of those assets it 
needed to carry out the county functions it was assuming, and which might be liquidated to 
eliminate maintenance costs and offset some of the liabilities it also was inheriting.   
A similar approach, of course, could be taken now.  That does not imply a “fire sale” of county 
property, but it does suggest the need for a strategic plan for the county’s physical assets that 
takes into account the vastly reduced size of its workforce and its severe operating challenges.  
Quite simply, county taxpayers and elected officials need to determine the appropriate size of 
Milwaukee County government not only from an operational perspective, but also from a 
physical one.   
Among the first issues the county might consider is the future of the land and buildings it owns 
and occupies on the already-developed portion of the Milwaukee County Grounds in 
Wauwatosa.  Several years ago, the county had a major presence on the County Grounds, 
including Doyne Hospital and a 900-bed mental health complex.  Today, Doyne Hospital is 
gone, and the mental health complex is down to 250 beds.  In addition, a Children and 
Adolescent Treatment Center that once housed mental health units and GAMP now houses 
largely vacant office space and day treatment programs for delinquent youth.   
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The county’s 2008 budget contained a provision calling for joint planning between the county 
and its Milwaukee Regional Medical Center partners to consider the future of the County 
Grounds, including whether and to what extent the county’s ongoing presence as a property 
owner and manager is appropriate.  That planning has not yet taken place, but it would appear 
appropriate to initiate it now in light of the county’s reduced space needs and the potential value 
of the real estate on which several of its Watertown Plank Road buildings are located.      
The strategic space plan also could look at potential long-term leases of valuable assets to secure 
resources to pay down county liabilities.  A potential long-term lease of General Mitchell 
International Airport has received the most attention to date in light of its tremendous value, but 
the county also owns parking lots, a marina and other land and structures that could be 
contemplated for lease arrangements, provided that the operation of those assets for their 
established public purposes could be maintained appropriately.  Also, as discussed in Section II, 
the county could contemplate transferring ownership of cultural institutions to the non-profit 
organizations that administer them in order to relieve itself of major maintenance and capital 
improvement needs and/or to generate new revenues. 
DECISION 4: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION 
 
While the Greater Milwaukee Committee commissioned this report to explore the possibility of 
downsizing or eliminating Milwaukee County government, other metropolitan areas have 
pursued different forms of governance change, including city-county consolidation and metro 
government.  Detailed consideration of such alternative forms of governance also may be 
warranted in Milwaukee County. 
 
Consideration also might be given to simply consolidating additional municipal functions at the 
county level without turning to a merger of governments.  Such services logically might include 
public health, economic development, housing, property assessment and “back office” 
administrative functions such as information technology, property tax collection, debt 
issuance/management and procurement. 
 
In light of the issues and problems currently facing the county, municipal leaders are not likely to 
view county government as an entity that could effectively serve as regional coordinator or 
provider of additional municipal services (as it currently does for EMS).  However, a streamlined 
county government with a governance structure that is established to be administrative and non-
political in nature could be the perfect home for such functions.  This scenario also could offer an 
opportunity to pursue a “regional council of governments” approach (as described in Section 
IV), in which municipal governments could “opt in” to certain service provision by the county 
and have a voice in the oversight and administration of those services.  
 
Ultimately, a top-to-bottom review of all municipal services should occur that is similar to that 
performed for county services in this report.  That review should consider which services might 
be more efficiently provided at a regional or state level, and whether there is political will to 
include jurisdictions outside of Milwaukee County in the definition of “regional.”    
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CONCLUSION 
 
Whether to embark on a lengthy process to streamline and potentially eliminate Milwaukee 
County government cannot be determined conclusively by research and fiscal analysis alone; that 
determination also requires value judgments regarding the importance of various county services 
as well as to the leadership abilities of current and future county leaders.   
 
The research and analysis contained in this report suggests a need for immediate decision-
making in four key areas regardless of whether comprehensive governance changes are pursued.  
To summarize, those areas are as follows: 
 
1. Immediately determine the future of parks, culture and transit services – both how to fund 
them and whether to continue to house them in county government.  Within the context of 
that decision, revisit the appropriate purpose of Milwaukee County government and consider 
creating an executive and legislative structure that befits that purpose. 
 
2. Isolate the county’s pension and retiree health care liabilities in order to more effectively 
manage them and to allow for better decision-making regarding the cost and priority of 
individual county services. 
 
3. Determine the appropriate physical size of Milwaukee County government and its assets. 
 
4. Explore consolidation of municipal services at the county or other levels of government. 
There are no silver bullets that will magically solve the financial problems facing Milwaukee 
County government and relieve taxpayers from obligations already incurred.  The depth of those 
problems and obligations, however, does create an imperative to consider how government 
structure influences fiscal health and impacts fiscal management and decision-making.      
  
 
 
  
 
